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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation aims to provide a better understanding of the technology licensing 
practices of academic research institutions. The study identifies time durations in 
licensing and incorporates these into a model to evaluate licensing performance. 
Performance is measured by the efficiency of an institution’s technology licensing 
process and efficiency changes over time, using Association of University Technology 
Managers annual survey data from 1991 to 2007. Organizational characteristics 
influencing the licensing performances of 46 U.S. research institutions also are explored. 
 
The study resulted in a new approach that integrates the identification of time lags in 
licensing, analysis of efficiency change, and exploration of the influence of 
organizational characteristics on efficiency change. A super-efficiency variable returns to 
scale data envelopment analysis (DEA) model was applied to the time-lag neutralized 
licensing data, to measure the efficiency of U.S. research institutions’ licensing 
performance over time. The study also includes an innovative approach to resolving 
issues with the super-efficiency DEA model, including mathematical infeasibility and 
zero-data issues. 
 
The licensing mechanisms included in the study are disclosure, patent applications, 
patents issued, licenses and options executed, start-ups, and licensing income. The time 
duration from expenditure to licensing income, including all intermediating licensing 
 ii 
 
processes, ranged from 2 to 27 years. The study identified the organizational 
characteristics related to licensing practice. Academic prestige and research quality are 
positively related to disclosure, patents granted, and start-up. The resources of a 
technology licensing office influences the number of licensing agreements, whereas 
licensing office experience has a positive relationship with start-ups. Increased licensing 
resources improve the efficiency of licensing practices, and a research institution with 
more dedicated licensing staff has improved licensing productivity. Private institutions 
improved their licensing practice more than public ones during the study period. On the 
other hand, institutions with a medical school demonstrated low efficiency. 
 
This dissertation fills a gap in the understanding of licensing practice and the 
organizational characteristics related to licensing performance. In addition, the study 
contributes to research methodology by providing a new approach to identifying time 
lags and improving the DEA method. 
 
The results, grounded in comprehensive observations over multiple time durations, 
provide an insight into the licensing practices of U.S. research institutions. The 
dissertation presents recommendations for research institutions based on the relationships 
identified among academic prestige, research intensity, organizational characteristics of 
the technology licensing office, and licensing performance.  
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1Chapter 1. Introduction 
The present study aims to provide a better understanding of technology licensing by 
academic research institutions. The study assesses the efficiency of academic research 
institution technology commercialization practices and examines how their efficiency has 
changed over time and institutional characteristics influencing the performance. This was 
accomplished using a new approach for identifying time lags in licensing. In addition to 
the time-lag process, a modified super-efficiency variable returns to scale (VRS) data 
envelopment analysis (DEA) model was applied to the time lag–neutralized licensing 
data. This model measured the efficiency of U.S. research institutions’ licensing 
performance over time. To accomplish this, it first was necessary to resolve issues with 
the super-efficiency DEA model, including mathematical infeasibility and zero-data 
considerations. 
 
Technology transfer is the movement of technological and technology-related 
organizational know-how and knowledge to partners in order to enhance the partner’s 
competence and strength [2]. Traditionally, technology transfer was regarded as a method 
of acquiring new technologies from other companies or as a way to internally transfer 
products or process technologies throughout a company to improve technological 
competence and fill technological capacity gaps. In recent years, however, interest has 
shifted to university research. University research has been an important source of new 
technologies and products and has contributed significantly to industrial innovation in 
 2 
 
various fields [16, 22, 48, 56, 75, 129]. A university’s contribution to the knowledge 
economy is expected to be increasingly critical in the future [136]. Therefore, universities 
are shifting from their traditional mission of teaching and are including an emerging 
mission of contributing to industry with their knowledge [46, 135]. 
 
Extensive studies have attempted to understand the research and development (R & D) of 
companies and thus to improve their productivity. These studies have provided 
theoretical and practical advances in the technology management of industry. While the 
companies were considered the main objective of the studies, in the context of the growth 
of national science, technology, and economic development, other studies on universities 
have focused on education and research [90]. Universities need to learn from the 
development of the business sector to respond to a quickly changing global economy [43]. 
 
Universities are service entities providing education, research, and services to the 
community and local businesses [117]. They transfer knowledge to outside organizations. 
Applied and basic research, in addition to education, have been universities’ primary 
tasks. However, as the commercialization of university-created knowledge becomes 
prominent (with federal government support and serving industrial needs), universities 
are trying to achieve effective technology transfer and to gain financial benefit. 
 
During the past two decades, various university activities have become interesting 
research areas, and very active and significant studies have focused on universities’ 
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technology development. Many studies have shown that universities are critical research 
and innovation centers, accelerating and increasing the national economic growth and 
technology competencies of a country and its industries [43, 100]. Therefore, academic 
studies have attempted to provide a better understanding of the nature of university 
technology transfer and to outline possible ways to improve technology 
commercialization. The most popular research topics have focused on finding best 
practices through benchmarking studies and locating important characteristics that lead to 
improved university performance. 
 
 Performance evaluations require multiple perspectives and must be based on the 
understanding of complex interests and roles. A framework or model integrating  various 
stakeholder activities and interests, different goals, and different intellectual property 
portfolios is required to facilitate best practices [80]. 
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 Research Scope and Objective 1.1.
 Related Topics and Research Scope 1.1.1.
There are four major paths of technology transfer among organizations: industry to 
industry, university to industry, government to government, and government to industry 
[18]. This study examines the commercialization of university technology research for 
industrial applications. There is a wide range of studies on university-to-industry 
technology transfer (Figure 1). The top level of topics focuses on the effect of university 
technology transfer on national economic growth and scientific and technological 
capacity. The second level focuses on technology transfer at the organizational level. 
Studies in this area evaluate the performance of university technology commercialization 
by benchmarking multiple universities, and examine the organizational characteristics 
that influence performance. The third level examines the commercialization process and 
the role of technology commercialization offices. Finally, the fourth level focuses on 
understanding and developing an individual technology commercialization mechanism. 
This dissertation covers the second and third levels. 
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Figure 1: Related topics and the scope of the dissertation 
 
 Research Objective and Goals 1.1.2.
The main objective of this dissertation is to contribute to the understanding of academic 
research institution technology commercialization (ARITC) activity by evaluating 
efficiencies and identifying patterns of change over time. Influencing characteristics, 
identified through the reviewed literature, are explored to understand their effect on 
performance and to define characteristic patterns. There are four research goals. 
 Goal 1: To identify the ARITC process and incorporate the time-lag effect 
 Goal 2: To assess U.S. ARITC performance from 1991 to 2007 
 Goal 3: To identify changes in ARITC efficiency during the period 1991 to 
2007 
 Goal 4: To identify the characteristics of ARITC performance 
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 Research Questions 1.2.
The following research questions are intended to achieve the research objective and goals. 
 
The research questions corresponding to Goal 1 are as follows: 
Research Question 1: What is the process of ARITC? 
Research Question 2: What are the input and output structures of ARITC? 
Research Question 3: What time lags exist among ARITC inputs and outputs? 
Research Question 4: What is the appropriate model to incorporate time-lag effects 
into the technology commercialization process? 
 
The research question corresponding to Goal 2 is as follows: 
Research Question 5: What are the efficiencies of U.S. ARITC from 1991 to 2007? 
 
The research question and sub-questions corresponding to Goal 3 are as follows: 
Research Question 6: What patterns of change are found in U.S. ARITC efficiencies 
from 1991 to 2007? 
 Research Question 6-1: What trends exist in technology 
commercialization process inputs and outputs over time? 
 Research Question 6-2: What trends exist in the technology 
commercialization efficiencies of U.S. academic research institutions from 
1991 to 2007? 
 
The research question corresponding to Goal 4 is as follows: 
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Research Question 7: What relationships exist among ARITC characteristics and 
licensing performance? 
 
 Research Process 1.3.
The present study assesses the relative licensing productivity of academic research 
institutions. The results will indicate how well a particular institution is licensing its 
technology, given its resources, relative to other universities. For this purpose, this study 
develops a research process (Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2: Research framework 
 
Assessment framework of the academic research institution 
technology commercialization (ARITC) 
Define university technology licensing 
process, and identify the characteristics related 
to the ARITC performance 
Assess the efficiency of U.S. ARITC  
Define the efficiency change patterns 
Identify characteristics of the  
ARITC performance 
Best practices in ARITC and their characteristics 
Identify time-lag effects among the inputs and 
outputs of ARITC  
Develop a process detecting the 
time-lag effects 
Develop a super efficiency DEA 
model resolving computational 
infeasibility and zero data issue 
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First, the process of ARITC and its input and output structure are defined through a 
literature review. The characteristics influencing the performance of ARITC are 
identified. 
 
Second, time-lag coefficients are identified through a suggested time-lag identifying 
process in order to incorporate into the ARITC efficiency model the duration between 
input and output variables. For this purpose, time-lag distribution functions and 
aggregated time-lag effects are defined. 
 
Third, the relative efficiencies of the ARITC are evaluated. The modified super-
efficiency Banker, Charnes, and Cooper (BCC) [12] DEA model is suggested to assess 
the technology licensing efficiencies of U.S. academic research institutions from 1991 to 
2007. Infeasibility and computation limitation due to zero data of the DEA model are 
discussed and a solution is provided. Time lag effect neutralized data are used for the 
analysis. 
 
Fourth, efficiency changes are observed and their patterns are identified. 
 
Finally, the relationships among characteristics and efficiencies and their changes are 
examined to define characteristic patterns and to understand the technology licensing 
practices of the observed institutions. 
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The links between research goals, questions, and methods are summarized in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Links among research objective, goals, questions, and approaches 
Research Objective: 
Contribute to the understanding of academic research institution technology 
commercialization (ARITC) activity by evaluating efficiencies and identifying patterns of 
change over time and exploring ARITC characteristics influencing licensing performance. 
    
 
Research Goals 
 
Research Questions 
 
Research Approaches 
G1: Identify the 
ARITC process 
and incorporate 
the time-lag 
effect. 
→ 
RQ1: What is the process 
of ARITC? 
RQ2: What is the input and 
output structure of ARITC?  
RQ3: What time lags exist 
among ARITC inputs and 
outputs? 
RQ4: What is the 
appropriate model to 
incorporate time-lag effects 
into the technology 
commercialization process? 
→ 
STEP 1: A model of the ARITC 
process and its input and output 
structure are defined based on 
the literature review. 
 
STEP 2: Time lags among input 
and output variables are 
identified by time-series 
analysis. A process identifying 
time lags among variables is 
developed and then validated by 
using simulated ARITC data. 
G2: Assess U.S. 
ARITC 
performance 
from 1991 to 
2007. 
→ 
RQ5: What are the 
efficiencies of U.S. ARITC 
from 1991 to 2007? 
→ 
STEP 3:  Aggregated time-lag 
effects of the ARITC are defined 
by time-lag functions and 
coefficients. 
 
STEP 4: Efficiencies of U.S. 
ARITC from 1991 to 2007 are 
evaluated using a modified 
super-efficiency DEA model and 
the Malmquist Index. 
G3: Identify 
changes in 
ARITC 
efficiency during 
the period 1991 
to 2007. 
→ 
RQ6: What patterns of 
change are found in U.S. 
ARITC efficiencies from 
1991 to 2007? 
→ 
STEP 5:  Performance 
(efficiency) changes are 
measured by average efficiency, 
efficiency change, and the 
Malmquist Index. 
G4: Identify the 
characteristics of 
the ARITC 
performance.  
→ 
RQ7: What relationships 
exist among ARITC 
characteristics and 
licensing performance?  
→ 
STEP6: Explore the 
relationships between 
performance and characteristics 
through statistical analysis. 
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 Major Findings and Contributions 1.4.
The present study provides insight into the licensing practices of an academic research 
institution and presents tools to measure the licensing time lags and the performance of 
academic researchers and licensing practitioners, thus filling gaps identified in previous 
research. 
 
 Gap 1: Lack of a study identifying the time-lag effect in licensing 1.4.1.
Licensing is a complicated process involving multiple organizations and time-consuming 
activities. When discussing licensing performance, existing studies do not identify 
processes and therefore do not consider time duration. Failure to determine when the 
actual input was delivered is a significant gap and leads to inappropriate interpretations of 
licensing output data and their implications. 
 
The limitations arise because licensing is a complicated process associated with the 
inherently high uncertainty of research and technology transfer activity, and because 
there is no tool or process to identify licensing time lags in a systematic and scientific 
way. Therefore, the present study develops a licensing-time-lag identification process 
based on time series theory and methods widely adopted in econometrics. The process 
was verified by multiple tests using simulated data that reflect actual licensing behavior, 
and then was applied to data on 46 U.S. academic research institutions. The process 
identified statistically significant time-lag effects between two licensing variables. The 
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overall time durations identified in the data, from research expenditure to licensing 
income, range from 2 years to 27 years. 
 
 Gap 2 and Gap 3: Difficulties in measuring relative licensing performance, 1.4.2.
and lack of understanding of changes in licensing performance over time 
Government and research institutions have been struggling to understand and define the 
licensing performance of research institutions, which is necessary to respond to 
government-facilitated technology transfer policy and institutions’ need to contribute to 
the economy and industry. The conflicting interests and understanding about research 
licensing as well as a lack of a concrete evaluation framework complicate performance 
measurement. Existing studies evaluating the relative licensing performances do not 
satisfy the need because 
 they measure the performance of the licensing office rather than the licensing 
performance of an institution; 
 their evaluation models apply different types of variables, such as influencing 
characteristics and licensing variables, which makes it difficult to interpret and 
understand the licensing performance; 
 they do not measure the different performances of efficient institutions, which 
is related to the limitation of the DEA method and is associated with 
computational infeasibility when the variable returns to scale super-efficiency 
model is applied; and 
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 they do not incorporate into their model time lags between the licensing 
variables. 
 
The present study defines the licensing process and related variables. In order to identify 
the licensing performance of an organization in a manner that provides clear 
understanding and avoids conflicting views of the result, the evaluation model used 
licensing variables associated with intrinsic licensing outcome and licensing quality. 
 
The study also overcomes the methodological limitations of DEA by comparing the 
strengths and weaknesses of current DEA approaches and by modifying a selected 
method to resolve the computational infeasibility and zero-data issues. The modified 
model was applied to the Malmquist Index (MI) to explore efficiency changes from 1991 
to 2007, and the licensing time lags identified in this study were incorporated into the 
evaluation model. The results show that all 46 research institutions improved their 
licensing performance during the period. The average annual improvement was 33%. 
Two distinct periods of licensing performance were identified. Catch-up efforts of the 
inefficient institutions were dominated in licensing practice associated with research 
expenditure from 1992 and 1996, whereas the efficient institutions further improved their 
performance from 1996 to 1998. 
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 Gap 4: Lack of understanding the characteristics influencing the 1.4.3.
performance and practice of licensing 
The existing studies provide limited understanding of the characteristics influencing 
licensing performance, which is measured without considering the time-lag effect. As a 
result, interpretation of identified relationships is limited. In addition, each study analyzes 
effects on a different type of performance, such as licensing income, average licensing 
income relative to research expenditure, or efficiency scores, and employs different data 
sets and institutions. Results therefore vary, depending on the performance types, data, 
and assumptions used in the studies. This makes it difficult to compare and interpret 
results. 
 
The present study describes the comprehensive relationships among the selected ARITC 
characteristics found in the literature review and among different types of licensing 
performance. The study applied three performance types identified in the literature: 
licensing income, licensing income relative to expenditure, and DEA efficiency scores. 
The results provide insight into the current debates about the value, direction, and 
perceptions of licensing efforts by exploring relationships among academic prestige, 
research intensity, technology transfer resources, and licensing performance. The study 
indicates that prior researchers’ different findings about the relationships between 
characteristics and licensing performance were due to the application of different 
performance metrics: Some measured the amount of licensing income whereas others 
measured the efficiency of licensing performance. 
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2Chapter 2. Literature Review 
There are several internal and external stakeholders of universities such as university 
administrations, faculties, technology commercialization offices, the federal government, 
and industry. This study will contribute to their understanding of university technology 
transfer by measuring the relative performances of academic research institution 
technology commercialization (ARITC) and enlightening the relationships between the 
performances and the influencing characteristics.  
 
For this purpose, the literature related to these issues has been reviewed in the following 
sequence.  
 The first section of the literature review is done to understand the overall 
characteristics of universities and motivation for university technology 
commercialization.  
 The second section is focused on studying the nature and process of university 
research and technology commercialization. 
 The current approaches of assessing the performance of technology 
commercialization are reviewed in section three.  
 Section four reviews the influencing characteristics of ARITC and their impact on 
performance and organizational commercialization practice. 
 Section five reviews the pattern diagram identifying ARITC efficiency change 
patterns. 
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 Section six reviews the method of data envelopment analysis (DEA), which is 
considered as the appropriate method for this study.  
 Finally, gaps between the current literature and the goals of this study are 
discussed in section seven. 
 
 Organizational Characteristics of Universities 2.1.
This section reviews the basic characteristics of a university as they relate to technology 
commercialization. 
 
 Missions, Goals and Services of Universities 2.1.1.
Universities have evolved from being traditional education centers to knowledge factories 
and will change to knowledge hubs, according to Youtie and Shapira [135]. As their 
mission evolves, their roles in industry and the economy are expected to increase.  
 
However, there are conflicts and debates about the missions and goals of universities. 
One side insists that universities should play a more direct role in assisting industries by 
commercializing their research, while the other side argues that more involvement with 
industry will damage the research and teaching done by universities [87, 103].  
 
Since the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, many universities seem  more concerned with 
introducing their knowledge to industry, and thereby contributing directly to the local 
economy [88]. Decter, et al. [36] identified the main roles of universities and the 
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perceived relative importance of them by a survey of 57 U.S. universities. They found 
that universities regarded teaching, publishing new information and basic research as the 
most important roles, followed by service to community, technology transfer, applied 
research, and patenting new technology.  
 
The traditional goal of science and technology colleges in a university is to provide 
advanced scientific knowledge to the public for various benefits as a service organization. 
Universities are the source of well-trained technicians, engineers, and managers. These 
experts support regional and urban economic growth [48, 56].  Another traditional 
mission of universities is research. Universities in the U.S. and Europe contribute to the 
development of knowledge-intensive clusters and play a major role in knowledge 
creation [65, 115].  
 
Hershberg, et al. [56] and Feldman and Desrochers [45] found that not all universities 
emphasize technology transfer. Florida [46] argued that universities are becoming 
aggressive at attempting to profit from industry-funded research, and industries are not 
comfortable with their behavior. He emphasized the importance of the traditional roles of 
universities:  education and research. Some of them try to contribute to the public benefit 
by opening their licenses.  
 
Kapczynski, et al. [61] gave related examples of providing university technologies for 
public benefits. Yale University and the University of Washington granted exclusive 
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license of high potency compounds to a non-profit drug company, One World Health, in 
2003. At the same time, they continued related research as partners. Stanford University 
also reserves an exclusive licensing agreement for both commercial and non-commercial 
research. In the case of the University of Wisconsin, licensing is reserved for only non-
commercial research.  
 
Different perceptions of technology transfer exist among university scientists, managers 
in technology licensing offices (TLOs), and industrial counterparts [18, 111]. These 
conflicts of interest lead universities to select different paths among traditional missions, 
programs, and their reputations, and the interests of firms seeking profits, growth, and 
competitive advantages. 
 
Therefore, universities may have different priorities for two different objectives: 
 Following  the traditional mission of teaching and research 
 Gaining a competitive advantage and growing 
 
These objectives influence the following major activities of universities: 
 Education and the service to the community 
 Applied and basic research 
 Commercialization 
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Public perception of university technology commercialization is complicated. Therefore, 
it is worthwhile to establish the right goals, and measure the performance of university 
technology commercialization in order to obtain public support and improve the activity 
[118]. 
 
  Organizational Structure 2.1.2.
Bercovitz, et al. [16] proposed that technology commercialization activities of processing 
an invention disclosure, licensing, seeking additional sponsorship of R&D projects, or a 
combination of the three, are shaped by the resources, reporting relationship, autonomy, 
and incentives of the TLO. They adapted organizational structures identified by Chandler 
[27] to the university structure in order to examine the influences of university 
organizational structure on technology commercialization performance.  
 
They defined organizational structures in terms of information-processing capacity, 
coordination capability, and incentive alignment. Four organizational structures are 
defined: unitary form (U-Form), multidivisional structure (M-Form), holding company 
(H-Form), and matrix structure (MX-Form). The U-Form has a top-down oriented 
decision structure and strong vertical control, while the M-Form structure adopts a 
divisional approach with central control over divisions. H-Form is similar in structure to 
M-From, but has a less centralized decision process with strong unit level incentives. 
MX-Form operates with both a functional and product hierarchy in which an individual 
and subunit are responsible for multidimensional functions.  Detailed definitions and 
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characteristics of the four forms are provided in Table 2. They found that different 
university structures have their own effective technology transfer capabilities such as 
coordination capability, information processing capacity, and incentive alignment.  
 
Table 2: Organizational structure [16] 
Organizational 
structure 
Information-
processing capacity 
Coordination 
capability (across 
units) 
Incentive alignment  
(across units) 
U-Form 
(Unitary) 
0 
Limited by HQ size; 
the need  to funnel 
decisions through top 
management group 
creates a bottleneck 
+ 
Coordination 
capabilities among 
sequential work units 
are relatively strong 
given vertical control 
+/0 
Difficult to create 
unit-level incentives 
compatible across 
units and in line with 
organizational goals 
H-Form 
(Holding 
Company) 
++ 
Decentralized 
decision-making 
leads to higher overall 
information-
processing capacity 
+/0 
Weak central body 
allows for limited 
top-down 
coordination across 
units 
+/0 
Strong unit-level 
incentives; sub-goal 
pursuit often 
problematic due to 
weak organizational 
ties 
M-Form 
(Divisional) 
++ 
Decentralized 
decision-making 
leads to higher overall 
information-
processing capacity 
within units 
+ 
Strong central body 
allows for moderate 
top-down 
coordination across 
units 
+ 
Strong unit-level 
incentives; sub-goal 
pursuit problematic 
but tempered by 
stronger 
organizational ties 
MX-Form 
(Matrix) 
+ 
Multiple dimension 
responsibilities may 
tax information 
processing capacity 
within units 
++ 
Dual dimension 
responsibilities drive 
coordinated action 
++ 
Dual incentives: 
Functional and 
product incentives 
are integrated to 
reflect organizational 
goals 
 
Note: Impact on Capabilities (0:weak, +: semi strong,  ++:strong) 
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Bercovitz, et al. analyzed three universities to examine the relationship between 
technology transfer activity and organizational structures. The coordination capability is 
measured by customer overlaps (number of transactions); information processing 
capacity by yield of disclosure, licenses, and sponsored research agreements; and 
licensing alignment by trade-off between licensing royalty rate and sponsored research 
dollars. The results are summarized in Table 3: however, they were measured 
subjectively by the authors, and statistical methods were not applied.  
 
Table 3: University organizational structure and technology transfer activity [16] 
University Structure 
Coordination 
Capability 
Information 
Processing 
Capacity 
Licensing 
Alignment 
Expect Result Expect Result Expect Result 
Johns Hopkins 
Univ. 
H-Form Low Low High High Low Low 
Duke Univ. 
MX-
Form 
High High Medium Medium High High 
Pennsylvania 
State Univ. 
M-Form Medium Medium High High Medium Medium 
 
 
 Overall Performance Indicator of Universities 2.1.3.
Quality assessment (or performance evaluation) of higher education institutions has been 
a major concern since the 1980s [49]. There are three quantitative approaches to the 
assessment of the overall performance of universities: performance indicators, cost 
function, and non-parametric [49]. Performance indicator (PI) focuses on the 
performance of teaching (teaching quality assessment, TQA) and research (research 
assessment exercise, RAE). The UK government, for example, published PIs of higher 
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education institutions and highlighted efficiency and PI as tools central to its policies [25]. 
The cost function is a classic economics tool applying economies of scales, marginal 
costs and economies of scope. However, this tool requires sufficient and reliable cost data 
for the individual university. Finally, a non-parametric approach uses a model of the 
inputs and outputs [49]. 
 
Both state and federal governments have tried to assess the performance of higher 
education institutions to develop and implement their policies [85, 118]. They developed 
performance indicators (PI) for universities. PIs assess the areas of general administration, 
teaching and research. The current studies and practices on the performance index 
measure combine indicators of mostly teaching and research. The PI components or 
check-list, which are generally developed by the coordinating body, include the 
organizational setting of the study program, student input numbers and characteristics, 
aims and curriculum, assessment methods, teaching and learning environment, study load, 
student progress, completion rates, student counseling arrangements, number of graduates 
and employment, educational policy, personnel policy, and internal quality [49]. 
 
For example, the Southern Regional Education Board (SREB) adopted legislation to 
collect and report information on the performance of higher education institutions in the 
region from the 1980s [118].  The South Carolina Commission on Higher Education 
(SCH) developed nine categories and 37 indicators of overall performance to assess 
teaching and research of universities in South Carolina. They applied some of the 37 
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indicators every year and used a scoring method to calculate overall PI. The categories 
consist of mission focus, faculty quality, classroom quality, collaboration, administration 
efficiency, entrance requirement, graduates’ achievements (graduation rate, employment 
rate, employer feedback, exams, and certificates), the user-friendliness of the institution, 
and research funding. 
 
Geva-May [49] identified 12 PIs which are related to the universities’ policies and goals. 
They include the increase in the number of graduate students, the increase in the number 
of students at the universities, drop-out rate, number of years of study, the increase in the 
number of senior faculty, faculty qualifications, ratio of faculty per number of graduates, 
number of publications, amount of research grants, budgets and expenditure, physical 
conditions (built area and related facilities), and answers to social/national needs.  Mollis 
and Marginson [85] in their study assessing overall performance of universities pointed 
out that university size, age, mission and public or private status should be considered 
when evaluating universities. 
 
 Summary 2.1.4.
Universities have different research environments and attitudes toward the 
commercialization of their discoveries than  the industry. These differences are inherent 
in the distinctive missions, roles, and organizational structures. Goals and missions of 
universities are becoming more complicated as the social need for economic 
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contributions of universities increase, along with their traditional services, such as 
knowledge creation/dissemination and education [17, 42]. 
 
 Technology Commercialization of University Research 2.2.
 Relationship between Teaching, Research and Technology 2.2.1.
Commercialization 
Generally, universities with high reputations are regarded as having high quality 
instruction and good research environments in which their faculties can spend less time 
and effort on teaching. However, studies show that research and teaching are not related 
[37, 44, 120]. 
 
Universities conduct more than half of the national basic research in the U.S. [61], and  
their research has served as an important source of scientific and technical knowledge for 
industrial firms [17]. Mansfield [75] provided evidence that the contribution of university 
research is considerable, especially in the areas of drugs, instruments and information 
processing. The author showed that about 10% of the new products and commercialized 
processes were based on university research in those areas between 1975 and 1985.  
 
 Motivation and Benefit of a University Commercializing a Technology 2.2.2.
Universities have actively facilitated technology commercialization because of 
quantitative and qualitative benefits as well as its encouragement by government policy. 
Some reasons U.S. universities are motivated to transfer their research results are 
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contribution to business, royalty income, good publicity for the university, financial 
support for research, satisfaction of disseminating technologies, and recruitment and 
retention of staff [36]. Entrepreneurs often finance further research at universities from 
which they originally spun off [98]. Reinforcement of campus reputations for excellence 
contributes to the recruitment of the smartest students and the brightest faculty [46]. 
Siegel, et al. [113] identified stakeholders’ primary and secondary motives for 
technology commercialization as shown in Table 4. 
 
Table 4: Stakeholders’ motivation for technology commercialization [113] 
Stakeholder Primary motives Secondary motives Perspective 
Scientist 
Recognition within 
the scientific 
community 
Financial gain and a desire 
to secure additional 
research funding 
Scientific 
Technology 
commercialization 
office 
Protect and market 
the university’s 
intellectual property 
Facilitate technological 
diffusion and secure 
additional research funding 
Bureaucratic 
Firm/Entrepreneur Financial gain 
Maintain control of 
proprietary technologies 
Organic / 
entrepreneurial 
 
McMillan [82] summarized the literature on the role and contribution of university 
research and public funding from the view of society and industry.  
 University research generates scientific publications. 
 Public funding of university research provides patents and innovations. 
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 University research provides opportunities for spillovers from the public sector to 
the private sector. 
 University technology transfer drives the movement of trained scientific 
personnel from academia to industry. 
 
Grimaldi and von Tunzelmann [53] summarized the benefits companies receive from 
university technology commercialization:  
 Economies of scale and scope in research 
 Reduction of product or process costs 
 Acceleration of R&D 
 Avoiding unnecessary duplication of research 
 Risk management 
 Financial support for costly projects or equipment 
 Access to research know-how networks and related technologies 
 Technology and knowledge transfer, assimilation and utilization 
 Hiring university students or graduates 
 Enhancement of reputation 
 
Decter, et al. [36] surveyed the importance of motivations for U.S. universities to transfer 
technology to business. They can be ranked as follows based on their survey result from 
highest to lowest. 
 Rank 1: satisfaction of disseminating technologies 
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 Rank 2: financial support for university research 
 Rank 3: recruitment and retention of staff 
 Rank 4: good publicity for the university 
 Rank 5: royalty payments to university 
 Rank 6: royalty payments to the  inventors 
 Rank 7: legislation 
 Rank 8: university support to business 
 
Grimaldi and von Tunzelmann [53] provided a comprehensive view of the benefits that a 
university could acquire by technology commercialization or university-industry 
collaborations as the following. 
 Greater research output through university publications and patents 
 Exploiting intellectual ideas 
 Experience of industrial applications to feed into teaching 
 Projects, funds and placements for students 
 Funding for laboratory equipment 
 Access to company equipment, industry know-how and technical advice 
 Adoption of new standards 
 Establishment of academic spin-off companies 
 Entry to international R&D programs 
 Reputation in general 
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Jackson [58] in his case study of the India University Advanced Research and 
Technology Institute provided four reasons for technology commercialization activities. 
 Providing additional revenue to the university through licensing activities 
 Enhancing university recognition and visibility in the business community 
 Providing additional outlets and incentives to attract and retain talented faculty 
 Affecting the employment landscape of the community through company and job 
creation via incubators, joint ventures and licensing activities 
 
In summary, universities transfer their research in order to acquire financial resources, 
facilitate internal growth, improve teaching and research, and provide service to their 
community. 
 
 Technology Transfer Mechanisms 2.2.3.
The outputs of the technology transfer mechanisms range from intangible to tangible 
outcomes. Patenting, licensing and start-ups are the most frequently discussed and 
important technology transfer methods in the literature, while a few studies emphasized 
the importance of other methods such as consulting, training, and exchange programs. 
This is consistent with the survey done by Siegel, et al. [111] about major outputs mostly 
recognized by the TLO. There are also informal ways to transfer knowledge to industry 
via meetings, telephone conversations, and conferences [2].  
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Siegel, et al. [114] also surveyed how different stakeholders defined the outcomes of 
technology transfer. The results are presented in Table 5. 
 
Table 5: Outcomes of university technology transfer identified by stakeholders [114] 
Outcomes 
TLO director 
and 
administrators* 
University 
scientists* 
Managers and 
entrepreneurs* 
Licenses 86.7 25.0 75.0 
Royalties 66.7 15.0 30.0 
Patents 46.7 20.0 10.0 
Sponsored research 
agreements 
46.7 0.0 5.0 
Startup companies 33.3 10.0 5.0 
Invention disclosures 33.3 5.0 0.5 
Students 26.7 15.0 25.0 
Informal transfer of know-
how 
20.0 20.0 70.0 
Economic development 20.0 0.0 35.0 
Product development 6.7 35.0 40.0 
 
Note: * = The number is the percentage of respondents who identified each item as on output 
 
Arvanitis, et al. [8] defined the technology transfer mechanisms as a wide range of 
knowledge and technology transfer including teaching, university research and research 
contracts with companies. They studied how those mechanisms contribute to innovation 
in Swiss industries. They found that reading of and referring to publications, attending 
conferences and workshops, and informal contacts are the most important knowledge and 
technology transfer activities. However, they didn’t consider direct technology transfer 
modes such as licensing. 
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Jensen and Thursby [59] surveyed how differently the technology commercialization 
office, university administration and faculty recognized the importance of each outcome. 
Their rankings are presented in Table 6. This result indicated that both the 
commercialization offices and university administrators regard the licensing income as 
the important outcome. On the other hand, faculties preferred sponsored research to 
licensing revenue.  
 
Table 6: Importance of technology transfer outcome [59] 
Outcomes 
Rank by 
commercialization 
office* 
Rank by 
university 
administration* 
Rank by faculty* 
Revenue 1 1 2 
Inventions commercialized 2 3 3 
Licenses executed 3 3 5 
Sponsored research 4 2 1 
Patents 5 5 5 
 
Note: * = Lower number means greater importance. 
 
In the case of sponsored research, there is an inconsistency in the result of Siegel, et al. 
[114] and Jensen and Thursby [59]. The survey of the former study showed that faculties 
didn’t consider sponsored research as an outcome of the university technology transfer, 
while the latter study found that faculties consider it to be the most important outcome. 
The reason for the difference in perception is due to the nature of the sponsored research 
as Thursby and Kemp [122] mentioned, “Sponsored research is, in part, an intermediate 
good as well as a final product.”  
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 Technology Commercialization Process from University to Industry 2.2.4.
Stakeholders of university technology commercialization are faculty inventors, the 
technology licensing office (TLO) in a university, and a firm/entrepreneur. Some studies 
identified their roles in the technology process. Licensing is identified as a major process 
in technology commercialization. 
 
Siegel, et al. [113] described the licensing process (Figure 3). After a scientific discovery, 
the faculty or researcher files an invention disclosure with the help of the TLO only if the 
disclosure has enough value to be transferred. It should be a significant breakthrough, fill 
market needs, and be mature enough to be used by a company [23]. The TLO evaluates 
its potential for commercialization and decides patenting strategies, including global or 
domestic patents. The TLO is in a stronger negotiation position when it seeks to market 
and commercialize the intellectual property. 
 
Finally, the TLO negotiates a licensing agreement and manages its financial benefits. 
However, as the authors pointed out, this linear process emphasizes the patent over the 
whole process. Some companies may prefer to obtain licensing before the technology is 
patented. 
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Figure 3  An example of technology commercialization from a university to a firm or 
entrepreneur (adopted from Siegel, et al. [113]) 
 
Rogers, et al. [102] included start-up companies in the technology process. Universities 
have two options of licensing or forming a venture company once a patent of the 
discovery is issued (Figure 4).  
 
 
Figure 4: Technology commercialization process (adopted from Rogers, et al. [102]) 
 
Jensen, et al. [60] provided an interesting licensing process with the view of a game of 
three stakeholders: faculty inventor, central administration, and TLO. They defined the 
TLO as a dual agent serving both the central administration of its university and faculty 
inventor. According to their model, the central administration decides the contract form 
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of commercialization, and the TLO looks for a path to commercialization according to 
the faculty inventor’s decision (Figure 5). They discovered how these three decision 
makers are working through the different stages of the research result. 
 
 
Figure 5: Disclosure and licensing process (adopted from Jensen, et al. [60]) 
 
 Time-Lag in the Technology Commercialization Process 2.2.5.
The Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM) reported that the Canadian 
Licensing Survey highlighted time-lags between research expenditure and two outputs of 
invention disclosures and patent applications using a graphical presentation [10]. They 
found that the research funding in 2000 is related to the invention disclosure in 2002 and 
patent in 2004.  
 
Heher [55] suggested typical time-lags among disclosure, license, patent, license income 
and start-up in Figure 6.  
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Figure 6: Typical phasing of the value chain [55] 
 
Thursby and Thursby [123] pointed out that more than 20% of disclosures at Stanford 
and the University of California System had been patented six years after disclosure. 
According to their findings, the most difficult part of measuring the time-lag is in 
licensing revenue. The top five inventions account for 76% of the license revenue of 
those universities. But the corresponding inventions were disclosed at least 10 years 
earlier. So, they excluded the licensing income from their model due to this issue. They 
found that total factor productivity (TFP) of license executed declined 1.7% per year. 
They explained the reason of negative growth could be lack of consideration of time-lags 
between disclosure and patent application and license agreements.  
 
Thursby and Kemp [122] in their study evaluating licensing performance of U.S. 
universities by DEA used 6-year average of the AUTM data and suggested that their 
result needs caution for interpretation because time-lags were not considered. 
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 Summary 2.2.6.
A. Conflicted perceptions on the roles and values of the licensing of academic 
research institutions 
There are a few studies discussing the relationships among teaching, research, and 
technology commercialization of universities. These studies show that there are some 
disagreements regarding the relationships among the three activities. Technology 
commercialization activity may have  both positive and negative impacts on teaching and 
research [99]. These complicated relationships and perceptions about the three major 
activities show that there is not a simple relationship among them. High research 
performance, for example, doesn’t necessarily mean good teaching and better technology 
commercialization. Some studies argue that one activity could even impede the other. 
This makes universities focus differently on teaching, research, and technology 
commercialization. Therefore, university technology commercialization should be 
incorporated in the university’s policies along with its missions and goals. 
 
B. Transfer Mechanism 
All technology transfer mechanisms mentioned by the literature are summarized in   
Table 7.  
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Table 7: Technology transfer mechanisms discussed in the literature 
Research 
Technology Transfer Mechanism 
Patent License 
Start-up / 
Spin-off 
Consulting Training 
Exchange 
Program 
McAdam, et al. [80]  X X    
Ndonzuau, et al. [86]   X    
Lee and Win [67]  X X X X X 
Perez and Sanchez [94]   X    
Lowe [71]  X X    
Mazzoleni [79] X X     
Libaers [69]   X    
Meyer [84]   X    
Siegel, et al. [28, 109-114] X X X    
Chapple, et al. [28]  X     
Anderson, et al. [6] X X X    
Thursby and Kemp [122] X X     
Markman, et al. [76, 77] X X X    
Powers [96] X X     
Mazzoleni [79] X X     
Bray and Lee [23]  X X    
 
 
C. Time-lags in licensing 
A time lag between university research and the commercialization of the resulting 
discovery is inevitable and is very important in assessing the performance of technology 
commercialization. Without considering the time lag, research on technology 
commercialization could lead to a misunderstanding of the university’s performance of 
the technology commercialization and influencing characteristics. However, there is not a 
quantitative study measuring the time-lags in licensing. 
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 Assessment of the Performance of University Technology Commercialization  2.3.
 
 Service Productivity Analysis 2.3.1.
Sherman and Zhu [108] surveyed 13 well-known techniques to measure and manage 
service productivity of the organization based on a literature review in the field of 
accounting, management control, and operations management. The benefits and 
limitations of those techniques in evaluating productivity of service are summarized in 
Table 8. 
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Table 8: Techniques for evaluating productivity of service organizations [108] 
Technique Strength Limitation 
Standard 
required 
Multiple 
aspects 
Standard Cost 
Systems 
Resolve most productivity 
issues with a good standard 
cost system. 
Focused on manufacturing 
rather than the service 
environment. Cost itself is 
not sufficient for 
productivity. 
Yes No 
Comparative 
Efficiency 
Analysis 
Good when there is no 
efficiency standard. 
Benchmark based on 
judgment, opinion, and past 
history. 
No Yes 
Ratio Analysis 
Adopt productive concept of 
input and output. 
Measures only a certain 
aspect of an operation. 
No No 
Profit and 
Return on 
Investment 
Measures 
Good to analyze business 
performance. 
Measures only capitalized 
asset. Cannot evaluate poor 
or outstanding productivity. 
Yes No 
Zero-base 
Budgeting 
Good when there are no 
comprehensive measures of 
profitability and no 
objective market prices. 
Could result in unexpected 
dysfunctional results such as 
bad service by focusing on 
budget. 
No No 
Program 
Budgeting 
Consider benefits of 
program with budget and 
provide a way to enhance 
productivity. 
Focus is only on budget as a 
way to improve productivity. 
No No 
Best Practice 
Analysis or 
Reviews 
Contribute to build service 
standard with various 
perspectives. 
Should compare similar 
units. No Yes 
Data 
Envelopment 
Analysis 
Highly objective and focus 
is on technical and scale 
efficiency. 
Excludes qualitative value. 
No Yes 
Peer Review 
Benefit from the knowledge 
of outside professionals. 
Subjective and depends on 
expert knowledge. 
No Yes 
Management 
Review and 
Audit 
More comprehensive than 
peer review. 
Subjective and depends on 
expert knowledge. No Yes 
Activity 
Analysis 
Define changes in job 
structure to make all units as 
efficient. 
Focus on employee time. 
No No 
Process 
Analysis 
Review details of process. Not applicable to 
organization whose activity 
could not be clearly defined 
as a process. 
No No 
Staffing Models 
Quickly assess the need for 
resources based on a 
projected level of activity 
Focus is only on human 
resources. Yes No 
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Generally, service organizations such as banks, hospitals and schools don’t have clear 
standard measurements to evaluate the performance of their operations [34]. Also, 
multiple perspectives should be considered for the evaluation. A good technique for 
evaluating productivity of service organizations should meet these criteria. Two review 
methods, peer review and management review and audit, also fit into this requirement, 
but they are not available if there are not proper experts. Table 8 shows that 
benchmarking techniques such as comparative efficiency analysis, best practice analysis 
or reviews, and DEA satisfy these requirements. Benchmarking is an appropriate and 
widely used approach to measure the productivity of those organizations.  
 
DEA, developed by Charnes, et al. [29], is a quantitative benchmarking technique applied 
in various areas. This technique is an excellent tool to measure and improve productivity 
of service business [108]. Therefore, DEA is used to measure efficiency of university 
activities. 
 
  Current Approach to the Evaluation of the Performance of University 2.3.2.
Technology Commercialization 
The literature assessing university technology commercialization can be categorized into 
five groups according their approaches: 
 Ranking the outputs of technology transfer [19], 
 Economic contribution and performance [23, 55], 
 Efficiency study using stochastic frontier estimation (SFE) [111], 
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 Efficiency study using data envelopment analysis (DEA) [6, 122, 123], 
and 
 Multi-stage model using both SFE and DEA [28]. 
 
One simple approach to assess the performance of university technology 
commercialization is to compare the major outputs such as number of patents, licensing 
income and number of start-ups of each university. Blumenstyk [19] discussed 
performance by rank of licensing income of U.S. universities based on the data published 
in the AUTM.  
 
Heher [55] evaluated the economic contribution to a university by using a combination of 
a university return on investment (ROI) model and a simple economic projection. The 
result shows that a positive range of return from an investment in research and 
technology commercialization can be gained in 10 years at the institutional level and 20 
years at the national level. 
 
The stochastic frontier efficiency (SFE) is a method developed by Aigner, et al. [4] and 
Meeusen and Van Den Broeck [83]. The method estimates an efficiency frontier by using 
the production function and estimates the production function parameters by using 
regression. The representative study using SFE was done by Sigel, et al. [111]. They 
evaluated technology commercialization efficiencies of 89 U.S. universities using AUTM 
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data from 1991 to 1996. They used licensing income for the dependent variable and three 
inputs such as invention disclosures, number of TLO staff, and legal fee for patenting.   
 
While SFE provides some benefits by allowing hypothesis testing and construction of 
confidence levels, DEA is used by other researchers [6, 122, 123]. The strength of the 
DEA analysis is that multiple inputs and outputs can be used in the DEA model, and 
DEA isn’t restricted by assumptions such as independence among independent variables 
[28]. Anderson, et al. [6] evaluated 54 high income universities in 2004. They used 
research expenditure for the input variable, and licensing income, number of licenses and 
options executed, number of start-ups, U.S. patents filed and U.S. patents issued for 
output variables. They also used the weighted value for patents issued over patents filed 
considering the relative importance of issued patents to filed patents. The result suggested 
that the total licensing income of 54 universities could be increased by $659 million 
considering efficient universities. Thursby and Kemp [122] used Malmquist indices, a 
DEA method, in order to trace efficiency change of university technology transfer from 
1991 to 1996. Thursby and Thursby [123] applied the three-stage process of the 
technology commercialization to the DEA model. The three corresponding DEA models 
for the stages were used to assess which input variables contributed to the growth of the 
outputs in each stage.  
 
Finally, some studies adopted the benefits of the SFE and DEA approaches [28]. They 
developed several stages, each applying SFE and DEA. For example, Glass, et al. [50] 
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evaluated the relative performance of technology commercialization of UK universities 
using both SFE and DEA. They developed a two-stage model. In stage one, they used 
DEA for initial evaluation of efficiency, and in stage two they decomposed efficiency 
from the first stage into environmental effects, managerial inefficiencies, and statistical 
noise. 
 
 Measuring the effectiveness of university technology commercialization 2.3.3.
Each university’s technology commercialization effectiveness is based on the 
performance evaluation of technology commercialization activity. Studies related to the 
effectiveness can be categorized into two groups. One is to analyze the financial benefit 
from several commercialization mechanisms and contribution to the organization. The 
second group is to understand and find characteristics related to the technology 
commercialization performance. 
 
Bozeman [21] suggested a contingent effective technology transfer model to organize the 
literature of technology transfer. He defined the impacts of technology transfer in terms 
of who is doing the transfer, how they are doing it, what is being transferred, and to 
whom. The five effectiveness criteria are out-the-door, market impact, economic 
development, political reward, and scientific and technical human capital. 
 
Bray and Lee [23] suggested that taking equity in a university’s start-up firm can give 
much higher financial return and reduce the time to get revenue compared to licensing. 
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Equity is a proper technology commercialization mechanism when the technology is not 
adequate for licensing. Also, TLO managers prefer equity since it provides them 
flexibility in making deals. According to their observations, the total equity value from 
16 university spin-offs was $1.4 million, while the average annual value of equity was 
$63.000 in 1996.  
 
Trune and Goslin [127] took a more quantitative approach to measure the effectiveness of 
ARITC by performing a profit and loss analysis. They evaluated 140 universities which 
received enough revenue from royalty payments to cover costs such as technology 
commercialization office cost, patent fees, legal expenses, and new research grants. They 
found that only 48.8% of these universities operated at a profit. The authors also pointed 
out that many universities do not operate technology transfer programs with a profit 
motive, but rather consider them as a necessary administrative function required to 
support faculty working on a research project with commercial potential.  
 
Another study evaluating the effectiveness of technology commercialization from the 
perspective of finance was done by Heher [55]. The author developed a forecasting 
model to estimate economic returns from the commercialization of university research 
using a combination of an institutional return on investment and an economic projection. 
He found that a portfolio of patents and licenses are needed to allow a university to 
receive reasonable probability of positive returns since the performance of a 
commercialized institution is highly variable and unpredictable.  
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Siegel, et al. [114] performed the most comprehensive survey on influencing 
characteristics in effective commercialization of university discoveries. One of their 
survey results suggests ways to improve the technology commercialization process as 
follows: 
 
 Universities and firms should devote more effort to developing a better 
mutual understanding. 
 Universities should align reward systems with UITT goals. 
 Universities should devote additional resources to UITT. 
 Universities should provide more education and community outreach to 
overcome informational and cultural barriers. 
 Universities should be less aggressive in exercising intellectual property 
rights. 
 
Markman, et al. [77] suggested a theory of the relationship between technology stage, 
licensing strategy, and transfer partner. They found that the most dominant licensing 
strategy was cash by 72 % of investigated universities. Equity and licensing exchange for 
sponsored research was 17% and 11% respectively. The structures included traditional 
university structure, for-profit private venture extension, and nonprofit research 
foundation. Their suggested theory built by ground study is presented in Figure 7. They 
aligned licensing strategy according to the technology stage and type of licensees. For 
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example, if a university’s discovery is at an early stage of development and has a low 
degree of technology resolution, a large firm is a good licensee. Sponsored research is 
proper for the licensing strategy.  
 
A newly disclosed invention has a wide range of technological maturity from its early 
state to the prototype, which is ready for commercialization. The different degree of 
maturity affects the licensing strategies of a university. According to the study by 
Markman, et al. [77], an invention in its early state of maturity is licensed for exchange 
of sponsored research, while equity is the preferred license strategy for proof of concept. 
Universities select the royalty as a licensing strategy for a technology in its prototype 
state.  
  
They also found that licensing strategies can be affected by a university’s mission and 
budget. 
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Figure 7: Association between technology stage, commercialization strategy, and the choice 
of licenses [77] 
 
However, those studies intend to improve the technology process or increase output, but 
they do not align or assess how the technology commercialization activity of a university 
fulfills its missions and goals.  
 
  Measuring efficiency of university technology commercialization 2.3.4.
 
The major difference between the two groups of studies, measuring the efficiency of 
university technology transfer and the technology licensing office (TLO), is how the 
variable of disclosure is used in the model. The study by Thursby and Kemp [122] used 
disclosure as an output variable to assess the efficiency of university technology 
commercialization, while two other studies, Siegel, et al. [111] and Chapple, et al. [28], 
defined it as an input variable for measuring the efficiency of the TLO. The reason can be 
found in the process of disclosing an invention and the role of the TLO. A 
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commercialization office can play a role, to some extent, in disclosing an invention, but 
university faculties have the authority to decide whether an invention will be disclosed or 
not [60]. Once a scientific discovery is disclosed for the purpose of technology 
commercialization, the technology licensing office takes over. The TLO’s responsibilities 
are to a) evaluate and valuate the disclosure; b) protect the technologies by patenting; c) 
sell licensing agreements to industry; and d) collect royalties and enforce contractual 
agreements with licensees [77]. Therefore, disclosure is an input variable when the 
objective of the model is to measure efficiency of the commercialization office [111]. On 
the other hand, disclosure should be considered as an output variable in the model for 
measuring the efficiency of commercialization activity in a university.  
 
Thursby and Thursby [123] suggested an intermediate input model with a three-stage 
process for ARITC in their study on whether the productivity of inputs or change in 
attitude of faculties and administrators toward the technology commercialization drove 
the increase of licenses.  They defined a disclosure as an output at the first stage and used 
it as an intermediate input at the second stage. The patent application was defined as an 
output at the second stage and the intermediating input at the third stage. However, they 
didn’t include the licensing income because of the complexity in the time-lag between the 
licensing income and other input variables. 
 
Variables regarding commercialization offices such as age and size could be considered 
as input variables for the model measuring the efficiency of a TLO. Both age and size of 
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the office are resources representing the experience of the office and effort of the 
university. Without considering other circumstances, increased age and size would be 
related to more output of commercialization activity. However, these effects and 
relationships should be considered as influencing characteristics but not input or output 
variables if the objective is to measure the UTCE. 
 
 
 Efficiency Scores of Technology Commercialization of U.S. Universities 2.3.5.
There are three studies [6, 113, 122] measuring efficiency of technology 
commercialization of U.S. universities. Two of them [6, 122] used DEA to measure the 
efficiency score of an individual university, while Siegel, et al. [113] applied SFE to 
study characteristics influencing performance. Therefore, the study with SFE didn’t 
provide individual efficiency scores of observed universities.  The efficient U.S. 
universities identified in two studies are listed in Table 9. However, the table requires a 
caution: different DEA methods, different years investigated, and absence of high 
performing universities in either of the two studies result in a significantly different list of 
efficient universities.   
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Table 9: List of efficient U.S. universities identified by different studies 
University 
Thursby and 
Kemp [122] 
Anderson, 
et al. [6] 
University 
Thursby and 
Kemp [122] 
Anderson, 
et al. [6] 
Univ. of Akron efficient N/A Univ. of Kentucky efficient N/A 
Univ. of Alabama 
Sys.: Birmingham 
efficient N/A Univ. of Maine Sys. efficient N/A 
Ball State Univ. efficient N/A 
Univ. of Maryland Sys.: 
Baltimore 
efficient N/A 
Boston Univ. efficient N/A Univ. of Miami efficient N/A 
Brigham Young 
Univ. 
efficient efficient Michigan State Univ. efficient inefficient 
Univ. of California 
Sys. 
N/A efficient 
Massachusetts Ins. of 
Tech. 
efficient efficient 
California Inst. of 
Tech. 
efficient efficient New Hampshire Univ. efficient N/A 
Carnegie Mellon 
Univ. 
efficient inefficient Univ. of New Orleans  efficient N/A 
Univ. of Central 
Florida 
efficient N/A NJ Inst. of Tech. efficient N/A 
Univ. of Chicago efficient N/A 
North Carolina State 
Univ. 
efficient inefficient 
Colorado State 
Univ. 
efficient N/A 
North Dakota State 
Univ. 
efficient N/A 
Columbia Univ. efficient N/A Northeastern Univ. efficient N/A 
Cornell Univ. efficient inefficient Northern Illinois Univ. efficient N/A 
Univ. of Dayton efficient N/A New York Univ. N/A efficient 
Univ. of Denver efficient N/A Ohio Univ. efficient inefficient 
Duke Univ. efficient inefficient Univ. of Oregon  efficient N/A 
Emory Univ. efficient N/A Penn State Univ. efficient N/A 
Florida Atlantic 
Univ. 
efficient N/A Princeton Univ. efficient N/A 
Florida State Univ. efficient inefficient Univ. of South Alabama efficient N/A 
Georgetown Univ. efficient N/A Univ. of South Florida efficient N/A 
Univ. of Georgia  efficient inefficient Stanford Univ. efficient inefficient 
Georgia Inst. of 
Tech. 
efficient efficient Temple Univ. efficient N/A 
Harvard Univ. efficient inefficient Tulane Univ. efficient inefficient 
Univ. of Illinois 
Sys.: Urbana-
Champaign 
efficient N/A Tulsa Univ. efficient N/A 
Illinois Inst. of 
Tech. 
efficient N/A Utah Univ. efficient N/A 
Illinois State Univ. efficient N/A Wake Forest Univ. efficient inefficient 
Indiana Univ. Sys. efficient N/A 
Washington Univ. in St. 
Louis 
efficient inefficient 
Iowa State Univ. efficient N/A 
Univ. of Wisconsin Sys: 
Madison 
inefficient efficient Johns Hopkins 
Univ. 
efficient inefficient 
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Both of the studies used the variable returns-to-scale (VRS) method. Thursby and Kemp 
[122] identified 54 efficient universities out of 112, which was 67%, while  the Anderson, 
et al. [6] study found 7 efficient universities out of 54, which was 13%. Four universities, 
Brigham Young University, California Institute of Technology, Georgia Institute of 
Technology, and Massachusetts Institute of Technology, were identified as efficient by 
both studies.   
 
Thursby and Kemp [122] also examined changes of the efficiencies from 1991 to 1996 
using the Malmquist Index. Fifty seven out of 112 universities were analyzed, excluding 
55 universities which didn’t respond to the survey during some years. The efficiencies of 
the 57 universities had increased during the period.  
 
 Summary 2.3.6.
A. Current approaches measuring licensing performances 
University technology commercialization has been an emerging research area since the 
mid 1980’s, when the Bayh-Dole Act began facilitating interaction between university 
and industry. Many public and private universities instituted technology licensing offices 
(TLOs) in their organizations and achieved quantitative growth in commercialization 
through licensing and founding new firms.  
 
A handful of studies have been conducted figure out how to evaluate this performance 
and understand the nature of technology commercialization in universities. Majority of 
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these studies focused on benchmarking commercialization performance of universities 
with major outputs such as licensing income, start-ups, and patents using stochastic 
frontier efficiency (SFE) or data envelopment analysis (DEA). Some of them examined 
organizational and external characteristics directly or indirectly influencing the 
performance of technology commercialization. However, relatively fewer studies have 
been done on how these recently increasing commercialization activities are related to the 
missions or policies of universities. 
 
B. Licensing performance 
Most studies on performance assessment of ARITC and TLO evaluate their relative 
performance. Their detailed research methods and findings are summarized in Table 10. 
The study by Thursby and Kemp [122] used DEA model of eight input and five output 
variables. Their model defined 54 efficient universities out of 112, which is about 50%. 
The number of efficient universities is due to much higher variables (model dimension). 
Therefore, caution is needed when input and output variables are designed for a DEA 
model.   
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Table 10: Measuring efficiency of university technology commercialization and the 
commercialization office 
Research University Method Input Output Finding 
Thursby 
and Kemp 
[122]* 
 
 
112 U.S. 
universities 
DEA TLO size 
Federal support 
Bio. faculty 
Eng. faculty 
Phys. faculty 
Bio quality 
Eng. quality 
Phys. quality 
Industry 
support 
Royalties 
Disclosures 
New patent 
app. 
Licenses 
Expansion of frontier is 7.5% 
while catch-up of inefficient 
universities is only 0.4%. 
Suggesting the expansion of 
the frontier stems from a 
change in the 
commercialization 
environment involving a 
reallocation of inputs, a change 
in market demand TLOs. 
Anderson, 
et al. [6]* 
57 U.S. 
universities 
DEA Research 
expenditure 
License 
income 
Licenses 
executed 
Start-up 
U.S. Patents 
filed 
U.S. Patent 
issued 
DEA can effectively be used as 
a productivity evaluation tool 
to assess ARITC efficiency. 
Private universities are more 
efficient than their public 
counterparts in terms of 
technology commercialization. 
Thursby 
and 
Thursby 
[123] 
64 U.S. 
universities 
DEA 
(3 stages) 
Stage 1: 
Federal and 
industry support 
TLO personnel 
Stage 2: 
Disclosures 
Faculty quality 
Stage 3: 
Disclosures 
Patent 
applications 
Stage 1: 
Disclosures 
 
Stage 2: 
Patent 
applications 
 
Stage 3: 
License and 
option 
agreements 
The increased positive attitude 
of faculty and administrators to 
the technology 
commercialization increased 
the number of licenses. 
Siegel, et 
al. [111]** 
80 U.S. 
universities 
SFE Disclosures 
TLO Size 
Legal Fees 
License 
agreements 
Licensing 
income 
Larger TLO staff is related to 
more licensing agreements but 
less licensing revenue. 
Chapple, et 
al. [28]** 
98 UK 
universities 
DEA 
SFE 
Research 
income 
Disclosures 
TLO Size 
Legal Fees 
Licensing 
income  
License 
agreements 
TLOs exhibit low levels of 
absolute efficiency and they 
need to be reconfigured into 
smaller units. TLOs need to 
upgrade the business skills and 
capabilities of U.K. TLO 
managers and licensing office. 
 
Note: * =  Studies assessing relative performance of the ARITC; ** = Studies assessing the relative 
performance of the TLO  
 
 52 
 
 Characteristics Influencing to Licensing Performance 2.4.
 University Characteristics and Technology Commercialization 2.4.1.
A study [95] investigating the effect of university characteristics on faculties’ interaction 
with industry indicated that a certain level of university characteristics affect the behavior 
of the faculties. For example, more industry R&D funds increased faculties’ interaction 
with industry, and also recruited more master’s students by grants. More funds also 
decreased the positive effect of affiliation with a university research center on the 
interaction with industry. The academic qualities of universities were negatively related 
to the interaction with industry. This study shows that university characteristics indirectly 
affect the technology commercialization activity. 
 
The results of current studies regarding the effect of university characteristics mostly 
failed to identify their significant influence, or their results were not consistent. The 
studies used the characteristics as control variables or independent variables. They failed 
to understand how those university characteristics influence the performance indirectly. 
Universities in different organizational situations set their technology transfer 
organization, licensing policy, and strategy differently, which directly influence the 
operation of technology commercialization. Therefore, university characteristics such as 
technology licensing office, licensing policy and strategy are expected to indirectly 
influence the technology commercialization performance. 
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A. Mission and goal of a university 
As technology commercialization activity becomes more intensive, universities seem to 
have a dilemma between two different goals. Nelson [87] pointed out that the traditional 
goal of a university is to provide advanced scientific knowledge to the public for various 
benefits as a service organization, but instead universities began to act like profit 
organizations, making money from their knowledge. The different views of transferring 
their knowledge are applied to their missions and goals, which then influence technology 
commercialization activities. The operations of ARITC depend on the policy and strategy 
at the highest level of the universities. Their priorities are influenced by other 
organizational characteristics [24]. Studies on the impact of commercialization activity 
on the university mission are rare. Most studies on this issue discuss the relationships 
among university mission, policy and performance of commercialization, or selection of 
a transfer mechanism [9, 28, 77, 87, 115, 132, 133].   
 
The policy of commercialization is another important organizational characteristic such 
as the reward system toward faculty’s contribution to commercialization, and licensing 
strategy favorable to university policy. This affects the responsibilities and structure of 
the TLO. For example, TLOs of most universities have traditional structure, which places 
the office under the university organization [77]. The responsibilities and roles of the 
director of a commercialization office in this type of university are limited, and a vice 
provost or vice president has more responsibilities for commercialization activities. They 
will establish and operate the office in line with the university’s objective [114].  
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Therefore, the university’s mission and goal toward the technology commercialization 
are indirectly related to technology commercialization performance by setting TLO, 
licensing policy and strategy differently. 
 
B. Public vs. Private Universities 
The public or private status of a university has been an interesting topic to researchers 
regarding technology commercialization. There are basic differences between the two 
types of universities in terms of income sources and operational flexibility.  The private 
universities are more dependent on student fees, gifts, and research grants and contracts 
than public universities [1].  
 
According to Powers [96], the level of state support for public universities influences 
both public and private universities with unexpected directions. Well-supported public 
universities do not have as much pressure to find extra revenue sources. Therefore, 
technology commercialization activities have not been focused as an additional budget 
source. In regards to the economic condition, Powers explained that increased state 
support results from a state’s good economic situation. Thus, private universities would 
have the benefits of getting more opportunities of technology commercialization. Also, 
the demand of students on public universities with good state support was getting high, 
which resulted in high financial pressure on private universities. Therefore, private 
universities enforced technology commercialization.  
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The study also investigated the effect of industry and federal R&D support on technology 
commercialization which influenced only patents, with no significant effect on license 
agreements and license income. Federal sponsorship was typically granted for basic 
studies, which had fewer opportunities for industry application and thereby less relevance 
to licenses.  
 
On the other hand, the study done by Lach and Schankerman [64] is remarkable. They 
studied the influencing characteristics of university technology commercialization in 
terms of private vs. public. Their results are summarized in Table 11. Royalty shares of 
both public and private universities influenced licensing income positively, and the public 
and private status itself didn’t influence licensing income. Private universities were more 
influenced by TLO age than public. Private universities exploited the local high-tech 
density more than the public. There was no difference between public and private in the 
effect of research orientation. Faculty size was positively related to license income in 
both public and private universities, but there was no difference between the two groups 
of universities. 
 
Table 11: Influencing characteristics and university status 
Output 
Effect of characteristics for public and private 
Royalty 
share 
TLO size TLO age 
Local high-
tech density 
Technology 
fields 
Faculty 
size 
Licensing 
Income 
Public (+) 
Private (+) 
Public (NE) 
Private (+) 
Public (NE) 
Private (+)  
Public (+) 
Private (+) 
Public (NE) 
Private (NE) 
Public (+) 
Private (+) 
 
Note: NE =  no effect 
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Regarding the relationships between public/private status and the performance of 
university technology commercialization, current studies show two findings. First, there 
were three studies [6, 111, 122] that compared public and private universities in terms of 
technology commercialization efficiencies. All of them indicated a negative relationship 
between public universities and efficiencies of technology commercialization activities. 
Therefore, private universities are expected to perform technology commercialization 
activity more efficiently. Second, other researchers [76, 96, 111] studying the relationship 
between commercialization outputs and public or private status showed that private 
universities had more license agreements and income.  
 
Therefore, the public or private status of a university is expected to indirectly influence 
the technology commercialization performance depending on other characteristics. 
 
C. Universities with medical schools 
Trune and Goslin [127] in their 1998 study of financial profitability and loss of university 
technology commercialization in the U.S. found that only 68 (40.5%) out of 168 
institutions (140 universities and 28 hospitals) received enough royalties to make up for 
the operation costs of their commercialization offices. Baldini, et al. [11] found a weak 
but positive relationship between medical schools and patents, while Powers’s  [96] study 
concluded no relationship. In case of licenses of UK institutions, Chapple, et al. [28] 
found positive relations with the presence of medical schools. Siegel, et al. [111] and 
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Anderson, et al.’s [6] studies showed a negative relationship but statistically insignificant 
when U.S. universities were explored.  
 
D. Academic prestige 
The highly qualified scientists and engineers of universities are important mediums of 
technology transfer [104]. Hicks, et al. [57] studied the relationship between patents in 
the area of technology development and the quality of university research. They found 
that U.S. research papers which are in the top 1% of cited papers, are much more cited by 
U.S. patents. They emphasize the importance of excellent science in universities because 
mediocre research would contribute to neither science nor innovation. While most TLOs 
have failed to gain a significant income, only the universities with high prestige had 
received multi-million dollar incomes from their licensing [100]. 
 
Therefore, it can be assumed that recognized academic prestige is linked to higher 
research quality and more research funds. Hence, it indirectly influences the outcomes of 
technology commercialization. 
 
E. University size 
Studies on the influence of university size are rare. Baldini, et al. [11] studied the impact 
of university size on technology commercialization outcomes by logistic regression. They 
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measured the size by the total budget of a university and found that the size of a 
university is positively related to the patent but is not statistically significant.  
 
Therefore, the size of a university is expected to be indirectly related to the relative or 
absolute performance by influencing TLO and IP policy. 
 
 Technology Licensing Office (TLO) 2.4.2.
The technology licensing office (TLO) plays an important role as a facilitator of 
technology commercialization within a university, as well as an intermediary outside of 
the organization. The TLO fills the gap among university, industry and government [99]. 
However, some problems in TLOs and related barriers have also been identified in the 
literature [96, 110, 113, 114, 136].  
 
Among those studies, Yusuf [136] listed three difficulties regarding TLOs. The first 
barrier is the lack of marketing skills of TLOs. The second is poor links between 
universities and companies. The third is the difficulty in developing an embryonic 
technology further and finding the proper market place of the technology. A well-
organized process of technology commercialization could help to overcome these 
limitations. Thus, the TLO, business incubators, and science parks play important roles in 
transferring university knowledge to industry [72, 77, 107, 111, 114, 115, 128].   
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A. Size and age of TLOs 
There have been some studies examining the effect of experience and intensity of TLOs 
by looking at their size and age. While all the studies of TLO size [64, 76, 96] showed a 
positive effect on the outcomes of technology commercialization, there were 
inconsistencies in the results of the effect of a TLO’s age.  
 
Siegel, et al. [111], Powers [96], and Lach and Schankerman [64] found positive 
relationships between the age of a TLO and licenses. On the other hand, Markman, et al. 
[76] found a weak negative effect of the age of a TLO on the number of licensing 
agreements but a positive effect on the starts-up. Chapple, et al. [28] also found that the 
increased age of a TLO was related to less licensing activities. However, these studies 
showing negative relationships were not statistically significant.  
 
A university’s effort to enhance technology commercialization activity by increasing a 
TLO’s size could improve the performance of technology commercialization. Most 
studies showed a positive impact of TLO size on the license activities [11, 64, 76]. 
 
B. TLO structure 
The structure of the TLO is another important characteristic. The functions of the TLOs 
are limited to IP protection and licensing contracts if they are under the traditional 
organization structure [77]. Some extended forms of TLOs, as well as public institutions, 
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have been instituted to overcome these limitations. These intermediary organizations 
could facilitate the linkage between a university and industry [63]. 
 
A new organization called a proof of concept center established by MIT and UCSD was 
introduced by Gulbranson and Audretsch [54]. The centers were to facilitate the 
technology commercialization by funding excellent research in its early state, and 
promoting a collaboration network for the research. They found that their success 
depended on the skill and social network structure of the staff. The knowledge integration 
community (KIC) is also another organization that the Cambridge-MIT institute 
developed to improve knowledge sharing between universities and industry [3].  
 
Markman, et al. [77]  studied how TLOs were housed and how those structures were 
related to licensing strategies. They studied 128 U.S. universities. The results indicated 
that 52% conformed to the traditional structure, 41% had nonprofit research foundations, 
and only 7% were for-profit venture extensions.  The result of their correlation analysis 
between the structures and licensing strategies is presented in Table 12. Sponsored 
research was positively related only to the traditional structure. The licensing for cash 
strategy, which was the most preferable commercialization strategy, was negatively 
related to a for-profit structure. 
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Table 12: Correlation between TLO structures and licensing strategies [77] 
TLO structure Startups 
Startups in 
process 
Sponsored 
research 
License for 
cash 
License for 
equity 
Traditional - (SI) - (SI) + + (SI) + 
Non profit + (SI) + (SI) - - (SI) + (SI) 
For profit extension + + - (SI) - + 
 
Note: SI = statistically insignificant 
 
Therefore, characteristics regarding a TLO such as size, age, and structure are expected to 
directly influence the commercialization performance.  
 
C. Licensing Policy and Strategy 
The mission of a university drives its TLO to pursue different licensing policies and 
strategies. Based on their literature review, Djokovic and Souitaris [38] suggested that the 
quantity and quality of start-ups are related to the institutional structure and strategic 
objectives of universities and TLOs. Gopalakrishnan and Santoro [52] also found that the 
university supporting systems such as the policy for IPR, patent protection, ownership 
and licensing facilitate both knowledge and technology commercialization of university 
research. 
 
Some universities may consider technology commercialization activity and related IP 
protection as a way to contribute to regional economic growth and knowledge diffusion, 
while others emphasize licensing revenue from patenting their technologies [130]. Most 
universities are inclined to grant exclusive licenses and obtain more revenue from them. 
Stanford University, for example, reserves rights for both commercial and 
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noncommercial research so that the university contributes to further research for both 
other institutions and itself [61].  
 
Three licensing strategies, cash, licensing exchange for sponsored research and equity, 
are identified. Markman, et al. [77] in their theory of the relationship among technology 
stage, licensing strategy and transfer partner suggested that licensing strategies should be 
aligned according to the technology stage and type of licensees. The study also indicated 
that most universities selected the strategy of licensing for cash more than the other two 
strategies. 
  
Therefore, licensing policy and strategy will affect the technology commercialization 
operation and its performance, but they should be understood within the organizational 
contexts. 
 
 Faculties and managers in the TLO 2.4.3.
Personal skill levels, training and experience are very important characteristics because 
technology or knowledge transfer is a human-embodied activity [22]. Two major 
personal players in commercialization activity, university researchers and managers of 
TLOs, are identified in the literature. 
 
The faculties producing a new invention and the practitioners in the TLO are the main 
entities for transferring the technology to industry. Faculties have an important role even 
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after an invention is disclosed, by conducting further research and development of the 
invention. Some of them also become the entrepreneur of a venture using the technology. 
Powers [96] found that better faculty quality influenced more patents, licenses, and 
licensing income. Lach and Schankerman [64] studied the relationship between the 
number of faculties and licensing income in public and private universities. Their results 
showed that in both private and public universities, more faculties were related to more 
technology commercialization activity.  
 
The faculty’s interaction with industry was also identified as an important characteristic 
in the studies [95, 113, 114]. Faculties with more personal relationships with companies 
had more opportunities to get sponsored research and cooperate more actively during the 
commercialization process. Martinelli, et al. [78] studied faculties’ relationships with 
industry through a case study of Sussex University in which a considerable number of 
researchers were involved in technology commercialization activities despite its late start 
in commercialization activity. They found that more faculties in life science, science and 
engineering departments interacted with industry than those in the humanities and social 
sciences. There were also differences in the way faculties in life sciences and science and 
engineering interacted with industry. Faculties of life sciences linked to industry though 
collaborative research, while faculties in science and engineering preferred consultancy 
agreements. 
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Regarding personnel in TLOs, Chapple, et al. [28] and Siegel, et al. [111] found that their 
business skills were important and needed further improvement. Their marketing skills 
promote licensing by introducing a new invention to a firm and being able to take a good 
position in negotiations. More specifically, Colyvas, et al. [32] suggested that an 
invention which is less attractive to industry requires more active marketing. Industry 
actively monitors university inventions through networks in the scientific community, 
and thus acquires promising and interesting academic inventions through those channels 
rather than the commercialization office.  
 
Faculties and managers in the TLOs are the major stakeholders who facilitate the 
technology commercialization events. Therefore, their expertise and quality are expected 
to directly influence the performance of the university technology commercialization. 
 
 Environmental Characteristics 2.4.4.
A few studies identified the relationship between the environmental characteristics and 
the technology commercialization performance. Those characteristics are categorized as 
industry and government support in terms of supporting start-up and funding university 
research, the local economy, and high-tech activity in a state.  
 
A. Venture capital and entrepreneurial climate of a state 
Powers [96] performed a comprehensive study of the effects of external environmental 
characteristics on the technology commercialization performance by using regression 
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models, which used patents, number of license agreements and license income as 
dependent variables. He found that venture capitalization of a state was positively related 
to the number of licenses, but had a negative relationship with the licensing income of the 
universities. He explained that the strategy of technology commercialization of the 
universities caused the different relationship. The universities with weak venture capital 
in the state would try to find opportunities for technology transfer from well-established 
companies which would contribute to the greatest income in the short term. On the other 
hand, universities with good venture capital would transfer their technologies to small 
companies, yielding a small licensing income.   
 
The second external characteristic, the entrepreneurial climate of a state, related 
positively to the number of license agreements. Powers explained that universities with a 
healthy entrepreneurial climate, meaning they may have good opportunities for licensing 
to small companies, got small but better technology transfer opportunities than 
universities with a weak climate. Finally, the study found that strong state support of 
higher education was negatively related to licensing income of public universities, but 
positively related to income of private universities.  
 
B. Industry and government support 
More sponsored research could result in more scientific inventions, where the university 
technology commercialization process begins. Therefore, both in industry and 
government, sponsored research would be related to the positive performance of 
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technology commercialization. However, they are expected to influence the individual 
outcomes in different ways.  Government sponsored research tends to focus on basic 
research, while companies want to invest in applied science or the development of a 
mature technology that is ready to commercialize, which helps to solve their technical 
problems. As a result, the research output of federally sponsored research may tend to 
stay in the early state of maturity and result in patents. On the other hand, industry 
sponsored research may have a higher likelihood of producing more license agreements 
and income. Powers [96] in his empirical study indicated that both of them are positively 
related to the number of patents, but have no relationship with licenses or income. 
Boardman and Ponomariov [20] showed that government funded research was also 
positively related to the more active interaction between university researchers and 
industry. However, this study didn’t show if their interactions actually resulted in any of 
the technology commercialization outcomes. 
 
Therefore, more organizational characteristics should be considered to find their impact 
on the technology commercialization performance. 
 
C. R&D intensity of a state and local economy 
Wright, et al. [95] studied the technology commercialization of universities located in 
areas of average  R&D intensity and economic activity in the UK, Belgium, Germany, 
and Sweden.  They suggested that those universities should generate world-class research 
and critical mass in certain areas of expertise. Chapple, et al. [28]  found that the regional 
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economy positively influenced the licensing income and number of license agreements, 
but license agreement was not statistically significant.   
 
In most related studies, the environmental characteristics were considered as control 
variables in the models because of their exogenous nature in technology 
commercialization. These variables are not expected to be directly linked to the 
commercialization performance. However, the situation in which the universities are will 
influence the performance. Therefore, both direct and indirect relationships should be 
examined along with university characteristics.  
 
Current studies of the external characteristics are summarized in Table 13. 
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Table 13: External characteristics from the literature 
Research Characteristics Influence 
Chapple, et 
al. 2005 
[28]* 
 Regional GDP 
+(SI, LICENSES) 
+(INCOME) 
 Regional R&D intensity of industry firms 
+(LICENSES) 
-(SI, INCOME) 
Powers, 
2003 [96] 
 Entrepreneurial climate within a state  
+ (SI, LICENSES, 
INCOME) 
-(SI, patent, INCOME) 
 The level of venture capitalization within 
a state 
- (LICENSES, INCOME) 
+(SI, patent) 
 State support for (public) higher 
education 
- (for public Univ.) 
+(for private Univ.) 
 Federal and industry R&D support 
+(patents) 
O(LICENSES, INCOME) 
Baldini, et 
al. [11]** 
 Geographical locations (in terms of 
degree of industrialization) 
+(SI, patent) 
Lach and 
Schankerm
an [64] *** 
 Geographical locations (in terms of 
degree of high-tech activities, public vs. 
private) 
+( INCOME, Public < 
Private) 
 
Note: SI = statistically insignificant, + =  positive relation, - = negative relation, M = mentioned as 
important by the survey, LICENSES = number of license agreements, INCOME = license income 
* = U.K. universities were studied. 
** = Italian universities were studied. 
*** = U.S. and Canadian universities were studied 
 
 Summary 2.4.5.
Internal characteristics and influences on technology commercialization identified by the 
literature are summarized in Table 14, Table 15, and Table 16. 
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Table 14: Organizational characteristics related to university technology commercialization 
from the literature 
Research Characteristics Influence on TT 
Anderson, 
et al. [6] 
 Presence of a medical school -(SI, efficiency of TT) 
 Public (vs. private) -(efficiency of TT) 
 Siegel, et 
al. [111]  
 Presence of a medical school 
-(SI, LICENSES, SFE)  
+(SI, INCOME, SFE) 
 Public (vs. private) 
- (SI, LICENSE, SFE) 
- (SI, INCOME, SFE) 
 TLO age 
+(SI, LICENSES, SFE) 
+(INCOME, SFE) 
 TLO size 
-(LICENSES, SFE) 
+(SI, INCOME, SFE) 
 Mutual understanding between university and 
corporation 
M 
 Reward system for researchers M 
 Skill of TLO  M 
 Less aggressive attitude toward intellectual right M 
 Low degree of bureaucracy and flexibility of university 
administrators 
M 
 Personal relationship  between university and company  M 
 Powers 
[96] 
 Presence of a medical school  -(SI, patent) 
+(SI, LICENSES, INCOME)  Presence of engineering school 
 Public (vs. private) 
+(SI, patent) 
-(SI, LICENSES, INCOME) 
 TLO age 
+(patent, LICENSES) 
+(SI, INCOME) 
 TLO size 
+(SI, patent) 
+(LICENSES, INCOME) 
 Quality of faculty 
+(patent, LICENSES, 
INCOME) 
Thursby, et 
al. [121] 
 Early development stage of disclosure (proof of 
concept without prototype or with lab scale) 
+(INCOME, frequency of 
sponsored research) 
 Number of disclosures +(LICENSES, patent) 
 Presence of a medical school +(SI, LICENSES) 
 TLO size +( LICENSES) 
 Licenses 
+(INCOME, sponsored 
research tied to license) 
Decter, et 
al. [36] 
 Communication and stronger relationship M 
 Greater availability of experienced personnel in TLOs M 
 Less bureaucracy of university administration M 
 Greater autonomy of TLO M 
 
Note: SI = statistically insignificant, + = positive relation, - = negative relation, M = mentioned as 
important by the survey, LICENSES = number of license agreements, INCOME = license income 
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Table 15: Organizational characteristics related to university technology commercialization 
from the literature (continued) 
Research Characteristics Influence on TT 
 Markman, et 
al. [76] 
 Public (vs. private) 
-(LICENSES) 
-(SI, Start-up) 
 TLO age 
-(SI, LICENSES) 
+(Start-up) 
 TLO size +(LICENSES, Start-up) 
 TLO structure (traditional within university 
structure) 
-(LICENSES, Start-up) 
 TLO structure (for profit) 
-(SI, LICENSES) 
+(SI, Start-up) 
 Chapple, et 
al. [28]* 
 Presence of a medical school 
+(SI, LICENSES) 
-(INCOME) 
 TLO age 
-(LICENSES) 
-(SI, INCOME) 
 TLO personnel’s skill in business M 
Thursby and 
Kemp [122] 
 Faculty quality (bioscience, input variable) -(efficiency of TT) 
 Faculty quality (engineering, input variable) -(efficiency of TT) 
  TLO size (input variable) -(efficiency of TT) 
 Presence of a medical school -(efficiency of TT) 
 Public (vs. private) -(efficiency of TT) 
Baldini, et al. 
[11]** 
 University size (measured by the budget; most of 
the budget used for salaries) 
+(SI, patent) 
 Presence of a medical school +(SI, patent) 
Lach and 
Schankerman 
[64] *** 
 Royalty share to inventors (public vs. private)  
+(private, Income) 
+(SI, public, Income) 
 Incentive effect (public vs. private) +(Income, both) 
 Faculty size (public vs. private) +(Income, public=private) 
 Faculty quality  +(SI, Income) 
 TLO size and age (public vs. private) +(Income, Public<Private) 
Friedman 
and 
Silberman 
[47] 
 TLO age 
+(License generating 
income, Licenses with 
equity, Income) 
+(Start-up) 
 Public (vs. private), presence of a medical school (SI, All) 
 
Note: SI = statistically insignificant, + =  positive relation, - = negative relation, M = mentioned as 
important by the survey, LICENSES = number of license agreements, INCOME = license income 
* = U.K. universities were studied. 
** = Italian universities were studied. 
*** = U.S. and Canadian universities were studied 
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Table 16: Organizational characteristics related to university technology commercialization 
from the literature (continued) 
Research Characteristics Influence on TT 
Gopalakrishnan 
and Santoro 
[52] 
 Stable & direction-oriented culture +(TT activity)  
 Flexible & change-oriented culture +(TT activity) 
 Firm’s trust of university partner +(TT activity) 
 Support systems (policy for IPR, patent 
protection, ownership and licensing 
+(TT activity) 
Arvanitis, et al. 
[7] 
 Applied research -(LICENSE) 
 Engineering 
+(patent) 
-(SI, LICENSE) 
 Natural science 
+(patent) 
-(SI, LICENSE) 
 Medicine 
+(patent) 
-(SI, LICENSE) 
 Teaching 
-(LICENSE) 
+(Start-up) 
 
Note: SI = statistically insignificant, + =  positive relation, - = negative relation, M = mentioned as 
important by the survey, LICENSES = number of license agreements, INCOME = license income 
  
Characteristics influencing licensing performance identified from literature are 
summarized by technical, organizational, personal, and external environmental 
perspectives in Table 17. 
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Table 17: Summary of the characteristics influencing licensing performance 
Perspective Category Characteristics 
Technical Disclosure Development state of discovery 
Organizational 
University 
Universities mission and goals 
An Institution’s Private or Public Status 
The existence of Medical school 
Academic prestige 
University size (budget) 
TLO 
Size  
Age 
Structure 
Licensing 
Policy 
Non-exclusive 
Exclusive 
Licensing 
strategy 
Licensing for cash 
Licensing for equity 
Licensing for sponsored research 
Personal People 
Faculties’ relationship with industry 
Faculty quality 
TLO personnel’s skill 
External 
Environmental 
Support 
Federal R&D support 
Industry R&D support 
Economy Regional GDP 
High-tech 
activity 
Technical intensity 
 
 Process and Influencing Characteristics of Academic Research Institution 2.5.
Technology Commercialization 
In this section, the academic research institution technology commercialization (ARITC) 
process and its structure of input and output variables are defined. Characteristics which 
are suggested to be influencing the ARITC performance in the literature are discussed.  
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 ARITC Process 2.5.1.
A number of researchers [15, 91, 107, 123] emphasized that academic research institution 
technology commercialization (ARITC) should be understood as several distinct stages 
rather than occasional events of a sequential process. Parker, et al. [91] defined ARITC 
stages by functions of a technology commercialization office (TLO) contributing to net 
income: discovery, development, manufacturing, and marketing. They understood a 
TLO’s operation as similar to the process of product development of a manufacturing 
company.  
 
ARITC is a multi-stage process which should be the defined by the functions of TLO, 
outcomes of ARITC, and resources and characteristics involved. The multi-stage view of 
TLO functions can provide deep insight into ARITC practices and, thereby, suggest 
approaches to improve their processes along with other influencing characteristics. In this 
study, the ARITC process suggested by Kim, et al. and Anderson, et al. [6, 62] are 
adopted as shown in Figure 8. The research expenditure is the measure of research 
activity which yields technologies for the potential licensing. This includes both private 
and public research funds. The first step of commercialization of the technology is for a 
faculty or researcher to disclose their invention through the TLO. Then, the TLO 
proceeds with patenting after evaluating the value of the technology. Licensing can take 
place at any stage from disclosure by different commercialization methods such as an 
exclusive or non-exclusive licensing, and start-up. Finally, licensing income is the result 
of the licensing agreements or equity from a start-up company throughout multiple years. 
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These processes include different paths and time-lags among the commercialization 
stages. 
 
 
Figure 8: ARITC Process [6, 62] 
 
 Definition of the ARITC Activity 2.5.2.
A. Research expenditure 
Research support from government, industry and faculties is an important resource for 
research which yields inventions (sources of disclosures). Jensen and Thursby [59] 
indicated that 63% of inventions were funded by the federal government, 17% by 
industry and 20% unsponsored. Less than half of them were licensed, and only 31% of 
licenses were either exclusively or nonexclusively used in the field. Scientific inventions 
by faculties are important resources of technology commercialization. There is no doubt 
that more and better quality disclosures about the inventions result in a higher possibility 
of technology commercialization success. Therefore, research expenditures are inputs of 
the ARITC process. 
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B. Disclosure 
The first step of the commercialization is to evaluate and screen the valuable inventions 
created by faculties. TLOs actively seek and identify university scientists and their ideas 
which are potentially marketable. TLOs encourage faculties to disclose their research 
results if they consider the inventions to be valuable to the market.  
 
TLO size is a resource influencing the performance at this stage. The complexity of the 
invention and the willingness of the inventor play important roles in helping TLO 
personnel determine the potential of the invention [91]. TLO personnel’s contact with the 
inventors is important to seek related information and encourage them [115] [91]. 
Therefore, the bigger the TLO, the more opportunities to find new inventions, and 
thereby more inventions may be disclosed.  
 
Faculties’ relationships with industry and the personalities of entrepreneurs result in more 
disclosures from their research and higher success of commercialization. They should be 
understood as characteristics influencing research, disclosures, or any other output 
variables.  
 
The TLO skills of identifying applications and market potential are important at this stage. 
Technology commercialization is more challenging if the disclosure is oriented to the 
basic research. For example, Palmberg [90] found that Finnish university researchers and 
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companies had different perceptions of nanotechnology. The problems came from the 
identification of commercial applications and the low business skills of university 
researchers for a technology which is immature and uncertain. 
 
Tornquist and Kallsen [126] suggested that universities with more resources, a longer 
history of applied research, and higher faculty salaries produce results which better fit 
industrial needs. They also found that higher quality universities with excellent faculties 
generate more suitable research results for commercialization.  
 
C. Patent 
The TLOs yield both patents filed and issued from disclosures. TLOs perform more 
detailed evaluation of the disclosures for market potential and legal protection, and they 
submit patent applications. Not all of the disclosures are secured by patents because of 
the cost of securing IP [39, 115]. Therefore, TLOs assess the market potential and value 
for technology commercialization of the disclosures. A more formal and detailed 
evaluation process focusing on marketability and return on invest is applied at this stage 
than in the previous stage.  
 
Most universities file patent applications and recover legal fees from license agreements 
once they recognize the disclosures are worth the investment, while some do not file until 
they find a licensee [91]. At this stage, TLOs tend to find a potential licensee and 
investigate market potential in more detail to avoid sunk costs of legal fees. Unreasonable 
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transaction costs for holding patents would make an institution unprofitable to transfer 
the technologies [89]. Therefore, the legal fee paid by a TLO is another input of this stage 
to understand a TLOs’ patenting operations. 
 
Traditionally, there have been two different ways of operating intellectual property in 
TLOs. One is to maintain in-house legal staff, the other is to contract the service to 
outside vendors [91]. As the transactions and complexity of university technology 
commercialization increase, universities institute three types of TLO structures: 
traditional university structure, non-profit research foundation, and for-profit venture 
extension [77]. Baldini, et al. [11] found that the patenting activities of the Italian 
universities with internal IPR regulations have increased almost three times during the 
1990s. They also found that larger universities and universities close to industry-intense 
locations are involved in more patenting activities. Therefore, different resources, 
legitimacy, and mission of the universities influence patent activity. 
 
D. License & option executed and start-up 
TLOs look for a licensee opportunity inside or outside of their organizations where the 
technologies are transferred, and negotiate the contract details. Disclosure as well as the 
patent application are input resources at this stage and are issued because some 
inventions are licensed before the patent is filed [47, 123].  
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TLO managers must have excellent business skills to obtain a good position in the 
contract. Also, the goal and mission of the university influence the licensing strategy of 
TLOs at this stage. The license strategies for university IP include an exclusive or non-
exclusive license for the sponsored research, cash, and equity. These are defined as 
outputs at this stage.  
 
Most disclosures (88%) were too embryonic to use commercially at the time of licensing. 
Therefore, they needed further development before they could be used commercially. For 
this purpose, cooperation between licensees and inventors was suggested as a very 
important characteristic for successful commercialization [59, 105]. Therefore, 
interaction between faculty and industry will influence the TLO’s operation at this stage. 
 
Universities employ different policies and effort toward licensing, depending on their 
goals toward public contribution, by distributing the knowledge, securing IP, and 
obtaining research funds from it [45, 46, 56, 61]. These different perceptions of 
technology commercialization and IP policy affect TLO organizational culture and 
structure that universities institute [77]. Therefore, TLO structure influences the licensing 
strategy.  
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E. Licensing Income 
TLOs monitor and manage licensing income from various licensing contracts. They 
optimize the licensing portfolio to both maximize the profits and correspond to the 
organizational policy. 
 
Considering the scale of licensing income, which is only 2.3% of research expenditure, 
the licensing income can be neither a major source of research funding nor by itself 
contribute to the institution. However, it could be an important source of funding for the 
technology commercialization transaction costs of licensing, patenting, and maintaining 
the TLO [24]. Additionally, some universities consider it as an important financial source 
in addition to other non-monetary benefits [96, 107]. Universities receive royalty on sales 
and equity in start-up companies which receive equity of a start-up, royalty, or one time 
cash from the licensing in compensation for transferring their intellectual property. 
Depending on the licensing types, the profit occurs for the different range of years.  
 
Intellectual properties of universities are licensed in several different ways: licensing in 
exchange for sponsored research, licensing for equity, up-front license fees, and royalties 
on sales [23, 77]. Bray and Lee [23] found that license fees range from $10,000 to 
$50,000, and $250,000 for a matured technology in a market. Royalties range from 2% to 
5% on sales. They suggested that equity can provide the TLO flexibility to make more 
deals and higher returns than royalty. While cash is still the most preferred strategy, the 
use of equity has increased significantly. 
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Finally, TLO structures (traditional university structure, non-profit research foundation, 
and for-profit venture extension) will influence licensing income by building up different 
licensing portfolios and management. 
  
 Characteristics influencing the Commercialization Practice 2.5.3.
Powers [96] suggested that ARITC is a process involving  various resources such as 
quality of faculties, the presence of particular programs and infrastructure, the amount of 
R&D support, and other characteristics.  
 
The process of the ARIC includes non-serial activities, time-lag, resources and 
influencing characteristics. The technology commercialization process yields disclosures, 
patents, license agreements, startups, and licensing income by transferring university 
knowledge or technology to industry throughout each transferring stage. The TLO is the 
agency operating and managing this process given the university’s resources. The 
outcomes of each stage will vary according to the quantity and quality of resources and 
influencing characteristics. In order to understand and evaluate the performance of a TLO 
through the ARIC process, the related characteristics are identified for further analysis 
through the literature review. 
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A. TLO skills 
Current studies of TLO skills showed inconsistencies in their impact on outcomes. While 
most researchers expect better business skills to enhance ARITC activity, some studies 
[28, 76] resulted in negative relationships with outcomes. TLO skills are essential and 
could improve the ARITC activity, but a TLO by itself cannot overcome the limitations 
which universities may have such as low market attractiveness, low interest of university 
researchers in commercialization, organizational culture, and policy. It would be difficult 
to find conclusive relationships between TLO skills and final results such as license and 
licensing income. Therefore, TLO skills should be understood for how they facilitate the 
commercialization process and how they influence the result along with other 
characteristics. 
 
B. TLO size 
TLO size was negatively related only to the licensing income but was not statistically 
significant in the Siegel, et al. [111] study. Except for that study, TLO size is the only 
characteristic that almost all surveyed studies concluded had a positive relationship to 
patent, license agreement, and licensing income. It could be understood in two ways. 
First, universities need more TLO expertise to deal with increasing numbers of ARITC 
transactions. Second, universities have invested in the TLO to enhance the ARITC 
process and, therefore, as a result more outcomes could be acquired. Whichever is correct, 
it is clear that TLO size is positively related to more outcomes. However, our interest 
here is to understand how efficiently and effectively universities operate their ARITC 
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processes. One interesting finding by Siegel, et al. [111] was that TLO size had constant 
returns-to-scale to the licensing agreements. They used SFE and F-test to check returns-
to-scale, but their result was not statistically significant. However, it would be worth 
investigating further if TLO size has a certain optimal point for effective ARITC by 
examining scale efficiency of DEA. 
 
C. Presence of a medical school 
Presence of a medical school is also another characteristic for which relationships with 
outcomes such as patent, license agreements, and licensing income varied in several 
studies [11, 28, 96, 111]. There have been conclusive views of the impact of the medical 
school on the ARITC outcomes. Thursby and Kemp [122] explained that the negative 
relationship between presence of a medical school and efficiency was due to the heavy 
service commitments of medical schools. This reduced technology commercialization 
efficiency even though the university produced significant amounts of licensing for 
biomedical inventions. Another explanation could be found in the study by Bekkers and 
Freitas [14] exploring technology transfer channels from university to industry. The study 
found that technologies in the areas of biomedical and computer sciences were 
transferred by more collaborative and contract research, while inventions in material 
sciences and chemical engineering had more licenses and patents. The firms preferred 
these different channels based on their strategies of innovator or early adopter. Therefore, 
the existence of a medical school is expected to be related to other characteristics which 
indirectly influence the technology commercialization performance. 
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D. University’s public or private status  
Private universities were found to be efficient in ARITC and produce relatively more 
license agreements and income than public universities [6, 76, 96, 111, 122]. Lach and 
Schankerman [64] provided better insight regarding the impact of the university status by 
examining it along with other characteristics. They found that TLO size and age was 
more positively related to licensing income for private schools than public. However, in 
order to understand why private schools are more effective in technology 
commercialization, their influence should be investigated. 
 
E. Institutional prestige 
Academic prestige is related to the university ARITC. An academic institution of high 
prestige could have an advantage in licensing because a potential buyer easily recognizes 
its technologies [116]. Academic prestige and quality of faculty influence licensing 
income. Thursby and Thursby [123] found that the top five inventions yield about 76% of 
the total licensing revenue. This implies that only a few valuable inventions by 
outstanding faculties in high prestigious universities could obtain remarkable success in 
markets  [96] [123]. Sine, et al. [116] provided a comprehensive study of the influence of 
institutional prestige on the ARITC. Their exploratory study indicated that institutional 
prestige increases licensing activities, and this positively influences a university’s 
research and disclosures. 
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 Summary 2.5.4.
In this section, the licensing process and characteristics influencing characteristics which 
will be used in the analysis are defined based on literature review. 
 
The licensing process includes: 
 Research expenditure, 
 Disclosure, 
 US patent filed, 
 US patent issued, 
 License & option executed, 
 Start-up, and 
 Licensing income. 
 
The characteristics include: 
 TLO skills, 
 TLO size, 
 Presence of a medical school, and 
 Institutional prestige. 
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 UTCE Pattern Diagram 2.6.
There have been very active and significant studies done in the area of ARITC. One 
interesting topic among them was to measure the performance of the ARITC. Data 
envelopment analysis (DEA) had been regarded as an appropriate approach to measure 
university technology commercialization efficiency (UTCE). However, current studies 
only identify efficient and inefficient universities and related output or input variables. 
On the other hand, Kim, et al. [62] provided an interesting approach to further 
understanding how the efficient universities are categorized according to their 
efficiencies and how the efficiencies of the universities change over time. The study [62] 
suggested the efficiency pattern diagram to identify changing patterns of the technology 
transfer of 17 efficient universities out of 51 U.S. universities from 2001 to 2004. Five 
efficiency patterns were identified by this study:  “newly emerging,” “strengthening,” 
“strong,” “weakening,” and “declining.”  
 
 Pattern Diagram 2.6.1.
In order to get a comprehensive view of efficiency and reference patterns using three 
measures-change in efficiency, reference frequency, and reference change-a two- 
dimensional diagram was developed. The horizontal axis represents change of efficiency, 
while the vertical axis explains change in reference. For example, the northeast of the 
diagram indicates improved efficiency and an increased number of references. On the 
other hand, a university plotted on the southwest area means declining efficiency and 
decreased references. A university near the origin was stable in both efficiency and 
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reference count. Three sizes of circles were adopted to indicate the degree of frequency 
of reference. The efficiency diagram was applied to 17 efficient universities as shown in 
Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9: The efficiency pattern diagram of 17 efficient universities from 2001 to 2004 
 
Five groups of the 17 efficient universities were identified based on their locations on the 
efficiency pattern diagram. Group one and five consist of low reference frequency 
universities. Universities in the second and fourth group were medium frequency 
universities. The third group included high frequency universities. There were six 
universities which don’t belong to these groups. They were expected to have different 
circumstances compared with the universities in the five groups. For example, the 
University of California System was a strong and stable efficient university. However, its 
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incomparably large scales of input and output of technology commercialization prevented 
inefficient universities from referring to it as a target. The other five universities, 
including Johns Hopkins University and Washington University, had been efficient just 
for one or two times during the period. Because of their short history of efficiency, they 
could not show enough trends to characterize themselves. Therefore, these six 
universities were regarded as outliers of patterns in the efficiency pattern diagram.  
 
 The Five U.S. UTCE Patterns from 2001 to 2004 2.6.2.
Using the pattern diagram of the 17 efficient universities, five patterns were identified. 
 
A. Pattern 1: Newly Emerging University 
University of Georgia (UG), Georgia Institute of Technology (Georgia Tech), and North 
Carolina State University (NCSU) were on the northeast of the efficiency diagram. They 
emerged into the frontier line of the efficiency in 2004. The group was characterized as 
having a low frequency of references, which is less than 10 times, and increasing 
reference. 
 
B. Pattern 2: Strengthening University (two universities) 
New York University (NYU) and University of Wisconsin at Madison (UWM) were 
located in the northeast. They also belonged to the medium frequencies of reference 
group. Their efficiencies and reference frequencies were increasing. 
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C. Pattern 3: Strong University (two universities) 
Two universities belong to this category: California Institute of Technology (Caltech) and 
Brigham Young University (BYU). These universities had strong and stable efficiencies 
during the period. Caltech and BYU were referred to 34 and 31 times during the period, 
which was the greatest amount. Almost all inefficient universities referenced the two 
universities as targets. 
 
D. Pattern 4: Weakening University (two universities) 
MIT and Stanford University (SU) were in the medium size of reference groups as were 
NYU and UWM, but MIT and Stanford University were located in the middle-south area 
on the efficiency diagram. This indicates that their reference frequencies were decreasing. 
Even though they had been efficient for three and four years respectively, they might not 
remain efficient in the near future according to the efficiency diagram. 
 
E. Pattern 5: Declining University (two universities) 
Florida State University and University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill were on the 
southwest corner of the diagram. Their efficiency and number of references decreased 
during the period. The result showed that most of the outputs of the two universities had 
decreased. Therefore, the result indicated that their performances were declining and the 
trend was expected to continue over the next year. 
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 Summary 2.6.3.
This study [62] has limitations and therefore indicates important issues which will be 
studied further in the dissertation. 
 
First, the study used changes in efficiency, reference frequency, and reference change to 
categorize efficiency changes on the pattern diagram. However, the number of references 
does not necessarily present a robust trend of efficiency change. Many other 
characteristics can result in changes in the number of references. Therefore, more reliable 
measures which could explain efficiency changes should be used. 
 
Second, the model assumes that the potential time-lag from 2001 to 2004 didn’t affect the 
result, so the data of the same year was used. However, more investigation about time-
lags is required by examining a wider time frame to build a more robust model.  
 
Third, the study suggested a new approach, the pattern diagram, to identify and 
understand possible patterns of efficiency changes. However, it excluded other inefficient 
universities. The diagram should include all universities, including inefficient universities, 
to examine comprehensive patterns of both efficient and inefficient universities.  
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Fourth, the study observed data from 2001 to 2004. In order to generalize the patterns, a 
further study should investigate a wider time frame. This dissertation will investigate 
about 100 universities from 1996 to 2006. 
 
Finally, the patterns showed how efficiency had changed during the period and which 
variables drove those changes. However, they didn’t explain what organizational 
characteristics were related to the changes. Therefore, organizational characteristics 
which were identified by the literature review will be linked to the patterns.  
 
 Literature Gaps 2.7.
The literature was reviewed in the areas of 1) the nature and process of teaching, research, 
and technology commercialization in higher education, 2) the organizational perspective 
of licensing of academic research institutions, 3) current approaches to assess the 
licensing efficiency, 4) characteristics influencing licensing performance, and 5) a new 
approach, the efficiency pattern diagram. 
 
There are a number of studies evaluating the performance of technology 
commercialization of academic research institutions. They measured efficiencies of the 
technology commercialization or the performance of the TLO. However, some 
limitations of the current studies have been identified. The four major gaps are identified 
through the literature review as summarized in Table 18.   
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Table 18: Linking the identified gaps to the research goals. 
Topics Gaps Research Goals 
Time-lag  GAP 1: Time-lag effect 
• Current studies do not properly 
incorporate the time-lag effect of 
variables on the efficiency model. 
• No exploratory studies on identifying 
time-lag in licensing exist. 
G1: Identify the 
ARITC process 
incorporating the 
time-lag effect  
Measuring 
performance of 
academic research 
institution 
commercialization 
(ARITC) 
GAP 2: Measurement of ARITC. 
• Current study doesn’t explain managerial 
issue regarding changes of the licensing 
performance over time.  
• There is not a study providing changing 
pattern of the licensing performance.  
• Some outcomes of ARITC are excluded 
in the efficiency models. 
GAP 3: ARITC change pattern 
• Unreliable measures were used for the 
efficiency changes. 
• Organizational characteristics of the 
patterns were identified. 
G2: Assess the ARITC 
from 1991 to 
2007. 
 
G3: Identify the 
efficiency and 
change patterns 
during the period. 
ARITC and their 
Characteristics 
GAP 4: Identification of the characteristics 
influencing to the performance and efficiency 
change of ARITC 
• Inconsistencies exist in the effect of the 
characteristics throughout the current 
studies. 
• Lack of comprehensive and systematic 
view of the characteristics. 
G4: Identify the 
relationships 
between 
characteristics and 
the licensing 
performances.  
 
 
A. Gap 1: Time-lag effect 
Current studies on the performance of university technology commercialization do not 
appropriately incorporate time-lag among output variables in their models. At best, they 
used averaged value of variables for the purpose. This is due to the lack of an exploratory 
study to identify the time-lags. Without considering time-lag in the model, the evaluation 
result could cause misunderstanding of the practices and performance of the ARITC [55]. 
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The current method from econometrics doesn’t fit to the licensing data and lag behavior 
(see 3 for detail discussion) 
 
B. GAP 2: Measurement of the technology commercialization efficiency  
A performance index of the ARITC can provide a yardstick which a commercialization 
office at an individual institution or policy maker at the national level could use for 
assessing the status and impact of the ARITC. Therefore, an approach for measuring the 
performance index will be provided in this study. 
 
There are, however, a few benchmarking studies of the ARITC. They measure the 
efficiency of the commercialization office or technology commercialization itself. 
However, most studies, except Anderson, et al. [6], used the characteristics as input or 
output variables. Therefore, the input and output structure should be built based on the 
clear and robust process definition of the ARITC. 
 
There are computation limitations, infeasibility and zero data, in super-efficiency VRS 
DEA model. The current solutions to the infeasibility don’t consider the problem in zero 
data (see 3 for detail discussion).  
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C. GAP 3: Efficiency and efficiency change of ARITC 
The preliminary study [62] suggesting a pattern diagram used unreliable measures for the 
efficiency changes. The number of references and their changes which were used as the 
Y-axis and Z-axis don’t necessary represent a certain direction or reasonable reasons for 
efficiency changes. Therefore, more robust measures should be used to measure the 
changes of ARITC performance. Second, the study didn’t identify meaningful 
organizational characteristics of the patterns. In order to provide manageable implications 
to an institution by the patterns, related characteristics and relations to their practices 
should be provided. 
 
D. GAP 4: Identification of the characteristics influencing the performance and 
efficiency of ARITC  
There are a handful of studies on characteristics influencing the practice of ARITC. Some 
of them examine relationships between characteristics and efficiency scores of ARITC 
and others between characteristics and a single output such as patents and licensing 
income by regression analysis. They find some influencing characteristics, but most of 
them are statistically insignificant. Indeed, some of their results are inconsistent with 
others. ARITC involves complex and diverse interests among university administrators, 
faculties, and relationships with industry. However, current studies focus on only the 
direct impact of characteristics on a certain output of ARITC. Therefore, a more 
comprehensive and systematic approach to identifying those direct and indirect impacts 
of the ARITC performance characteristics is required. 
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3 Chapter 3. Research Methodology and Model Development 
 
 Research Objective, Goals, and Questions 3.1.
The objective of this study is to provide a better understanding of academic research 
institution technology licensing activity by evaluating both efficiencies and efficiency 
changes. Seven research questions and corresponding sub-questions designed to achieve 
the research objective are outlined in Table 19. 
 
Table 19: Research goals and corresponding research questions 
Research Goals Research Questions 
 Goal 1:  
Identify the academic 
research institution 
technology 
commercialization (ARITC) 
process, incorporating the 
time-lag effect.  
Research Question 1: What is the process of ARITC? 
Research Question 2: What is the input and output structure 
of ARITC? 
Research Question 3: What time lags exist among ARITC 
inputs and outputs? 
Research Question 4: What is the appropriate model to 
incorporate time-lag effects into the technology 
commercialization process? 
Goal 2:  
Assess U.S. ARITC from 
1991 to 2007. 
Research Question 5: What are the efficiencies of U.S. 
ARITC from 1991 to 2007? 
Goal 3:  
Identify the change of ARITC 
efficiency during the period 
1991 to 2007. 
Research Question 6: What patterns of change are found in 
U.S. ARITC efficiencies from 1991 to 2007? 
• Research Question 6-1: What trends exist in technology 
commercialization process inputs and outputs over time? 
• Research Question 6-2: What trends exist in the 
technology commercialization efficiencies of U.S. 
academic research institutions from 1991 to 2007? 
Goal 4:  
Identify the characteristics of 
ARITC performance. 
Research Question 7: What relationships exist among ARITC 
characteristics and efficiency changes? 
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 Research Approach 3.2.
The research steps and methods are outlined in Figure 10. 
 
 
Figure 10: Research steps and methods 
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A. Goal 1: To identify the ARITC process and incorporate the time-lag effect 
 Step 1: A model of the ARITC process and its input and output structure are 
defined based on the literature review. 
 Step 2: Time lags among input and output variables are identified by time-series 
analysis. A process identifying time lags among variables is developed and then 
validated by using simulated ARITC data. 
 
B. Goal 2: To assess U.S. ARITC performance from 1991 to 2007 
 Step 3: Aggregated time-lag effects of the ARITC are defined by time-lag 
functions and coefficients. 
 Step 4: Efficiencies of U.S. ARITC from 1991 to 2007 are evaluated using a 
modified super-efficiency DEA model and the Malmquist Index. A modified 
output-oriented super-efficiency VRS model is developed to resolve infeasibility 
and zero-data issues in the VRS DEA model. 
 
C. Goal 3: To identify changes in ARITC efficiency during the period 1991 to 2007 
 STEP 5: Performance (efficiency) changes are measured by average efficiency, 
efficiency change, and the Malmquist Index. 
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D. Goal 4: To identify the characteristics of ARITC performance 
Step 6: Explore the relationships between performance and characteristics through 
statistical analysis. 
 
 Developing a Time-Lag Distribution Model (Goal 1) 3.3.
An exploratory study was performed to identify the time lag between the ARITC input 
and output variables. For this purpose, hypothetical time-lag models of expenditure, 
disclosure, patent receipt, license agreements, start-up, and license income were built, 
based on the findings from the literature review. The suggested time-lag regression 
models were then tested. Finally, a time-lag distribution function for each variable is 
suggested to incorporate the time lags into the DEA model of ARITC. 
 
The time lag between academic research and disclosure of the invention is difficult to 
infer because the wide range of academic fields and technical maturity of research 
complicates the duration variances. Given a government-sponsored research period of 2 
to 5 years, the average time lag from research expenditure to disclosure could be 3 years. 
Payne and Aloysius [93], in their study of the effect of public funding on university 
research, insisted that there was a gradual effect of research funding on research outputs. 
They took the average over 3 years to incorporate a 3-year lag from funding to published 
articles. 
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Heher [55] suggested a typical delay in the technology commercialization process. 
According to his model, patents generally are filed within 1 year of disclosure and are 
approved within 4 years. When the TLO appreciates enough commercial value of the 
invention, they file a patent without delay to protect the invention. Therefore, most 
disclosed technologies will be filed for patents within 1 year of disclosure. Thereafter, it 
takes an average of 1.5 to 3 years until the patent is approved and issued [127]. 
 
Disclosures are expected to be licensed during the patenting process. Licensing income 
begins to be collected after about 2 years. A start-up company can be formed after the 
second year, but this usually happens between 4 and 7 years after disclosure. Markman, 
et al. [76], in their study of the effect of innovation speed on the outcomes of university 
technology commercialization, found that the average lag between disclosure and start-up 
was 4.27 years. Mansfield [74] found that the time lag between academic research 
findings and the first commercialization based on the research is about 7 years. 
 
Time series analysis in econometrics provides an advanced method of identifying 
relationships among time series subjects that rarely has been applied to the engineering 
management field. Sophisticated econometrics methods—such as a distributed lag model 
with unrestricted lag, arithmetic lag, polynomial lag, or geometric lag structures—and 
dynamics model theories enrich the analysis of long-term economic data and their lasting 
effects. However, observations in the engineering management field, which tends to have 
highly uncertain time effects and relatively insufficient time series, hinder the application 
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and benefits of time-lag analysis, which is very important to understanding the dynamic 
behavior of subjects in this field. Therefore, this section revisits and compares selected 
time series approaches and suggests a process for identifying the time-lag coefficients of 
licensing input and output variables. The verification of this process is performed in 
Chapter 4, using a simulated data set to represent university technology licensing 
activities. 
 
In addition to the process used to identify time-lag coefficients, an approach of 
combining each pair of lag coefficients with the complicated multiple paths from 
licensing to licensing income is provided. 
 
 Time Series Models and Their Limitations 3.3.1.
The current time-lag identification process in econometrics has several limitations when 
applied to licensing data. First, the models assume continuous lags over time. Second, 
their effects are prolonged for a long period and diminish over time. Finally, the lags are 
assumed to be effective at the beginning of the occurrence of the investigated subject. 
The models select length of time lags in such a way as to minimize Akaike’s information 
criterion (AIC) or Bayesian information criterion (BIC) statistics. Although the models 
can measure time-lag effects of subjects in which the coefficients follow a certain pattern, 
such as linear, polynomial, or geometric change over a long period, these assumptions are 
not appropriate for licensing data for which discontinuous and short-term time-lag effects 
exist. 
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The current time series models are summarized in Table 20. 
 
Table 20: General time series models and their limitations 
Time Series Model Model Specification Limitation 
Autoregressive (AR) 
model 
AR (p) 
   =   +        +        +
⋯ +      +     
The concept of self-
growing is not applicable 
to licensing theory 
Autoregressive moving 
average (ARMA) 
model 
ARMA (p, q) 
   =   +        +        +
⋯+       + ∑       
 
      
Where   	 is defined by 
   =   +        +        +
⋯ +      +     
Autoregressive 
integrated moving 
average (ARIMA) 
model 
ARIMA (p, d, q) 
Distributed lag model    =   +      +        +
⋯ +      +     
Explains the licensing 
theory 
Selected as licensing lag 
model 
 
 
 A Process for Identifying Time-Lag Coefficients 3.3.2.
Time lags among the licensing data are examined by using a distributed lag regression 
model. The distributed regression model, a well-known and widely used time series 
analysis in economics, estimates causal effects on two subjects. For this purpose, a series 
of statistical processes has been developed. The five steps for identifying time-lag 
coefficients are presented in Figure 11. 
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Figure 11: Process to identify time-lag distribution coefficients 
 
A. Step 2-1: Stabilize the Data 
In time series analysis, the data should be stationary in order to create a model that will 
correctly predict future behavior, means, variances, and correlation with other variables 
based on the past data [40, 119, 131]. To say that data is stationary means that statistical 
STEP 2-1 Stabilize the Data 
Evaluate panel data if they are stationary. 
STEP 2-2 Construct Model 
Define the structure of the relationship 
between input and output of regression 
model 
STEP 2-3 Identify Potential Lag Period 
Identify potential lag periods of each 
regression model 
STEP 2-4 Determine Lag Period 
Identify significant lag periods 
STEP 2-5 Estimate Coefficients 
Estimates lag coefficients with the 
identified significant lag periods 
Augmented Dickey 
Fuller (ADF) Test 
LLC Test 
Conceptual Model 
Time-Series Model 
Selection 
Correlation 
OLS Model 
OLS Regression Analysis 
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properties such as means and variances are all constant over time. If there is a systematic 
change, such as a trend, the data should be transformed to eliminate the trend. 
 
For example, consider the first-order autoregressive model    =       +   , where t = 
1…∞  and error term    =  (0, 
 ). If    = 1 and    = 0 are assumed,     is equal to 
   + ∑   
 
     by repeated substitution. Then, the variance of    ,    (  ), becomes 
    ∑   
 
     =   
  . As a result, the variance is time dependent and the regression 
model causes problems in predicting the future. To avoid this problem in this example, 
therefore,   should not be 1. 
 
The augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test is the most common method to test whether a 
time series data is stationary. Continuing with the previous example, the ADF tests 
whether parameter   is 1 by testing ∇   = (  − 1)     +    , using the Dickey-Fuller 
table [119]. The Levin-Lin-Chu (LLC) test determines whether cross-sectional panel data 
is stationary [68, 131]. The present study used the Stata package to conduct ADF and 
LLC tests. 
 
If the data is not stationary, the first order difference, diff(1) =    −      , is applied to 
the data and then the test is repeated. 
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B. Step 2-2: Construct Model 
The time lags are defined by the significant relationship between an output variable at a 
certain year and corresponding input with intervals of time. The 21 regression models 
representing the potential relationships among time-lagged input and output licensing 
variables are tested to find significant relationships. 
 
For this purpose, the distributed lag model is suggested as an appropriate regression 
model to detect time lags in licensing data. The distributed lag equations present the 
dependent variable    at time t and is the result of a weighted sum of the past value of 
independent variable X from time t to   −   [5, 13, 92], as follows: 
 
  , =     , + 	    ,   +     ,   + ⋯+      ,   +   , ,      .....................................  (1) 
where 
  = output technology licensing variable (disclosure, patent application, patent issued, 
licenses and options executed, start-up, and licensing income); 
   = input technology licensing variable (expenditure, disclosure, patent application, 
patent issued, licenses and options executed, and start-up); 
  =  th institution (  = 1, 2,… 46); 
  = year; 
  =  th year before  ; 
  ,  ,…,    = coefficients corresponding to input variable   in the current year (  , ), 
the previous year (  ,   ), and the  
th year earlier (  ,   ); and 
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  ,  = residual (error term). 
 
There are four ways to estimate the coefficients of the distributed lag model: through 
unrestricted lags, through linearly declining lags, through polynomial lags, and through 
geometrically declining lags. Each method assumes a unique coefficient structure of the 
lags over time (Figure 12). 
 
 
Figure 12: Coefficient structures of time series models 
 
Unrestricted time-lag coefficients are estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS). The 
OLS estimation suffers from limitations such as imprecise, large standard errors, but the 
approach helps when no structure is assumed with finite lags. Arithmetic or linearly 
declining lags assume that the effect of the independent variable eventually reaches zero 
and that the effect of each lag is less than the effect of the previous one. The coefficient 
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structure follows an arithmetic series,    =    +  (  − 1). It benefits from simple 
estimation of only one parameter and presents a more reliable result than unstructured lag, 
with straightforward interpretation. However, if the restriction of the lag structure is not 
true, the estimators will be biased and inconsistent. 
 
Polynomial lag, or Almon lag, requires the assumption of finite effect and zero at the end 
of the period. The coefficients are dependent on each other, as arithmetic lag, but they 
don’t have a uniform pattern. The coefficient structure is    =    +     +    
  …    
 . 
This model has fewer parameters to estimate but is more precise than the unrestricted lag 
structure.  
 
Geometric lag, or Koyck lag, is used when the lag length is infinite and the lag 
coefficients follow a geometric pattern. The equation of the coefficient structure is 
   =   
  , where | |< 1  and     > 0 . It requires an estimate of only    and   , but 
geometric lag transformation is required for the estimation. It doesn’t allow a 
heterogeneous or unsmooth declining lag structure. 
 
Linearly and geometrically declining lag structures are not considered. The models 
assume that the effect of an independent variable is high at year zero and diminishes as 
time goes on, but this doesn’t represent the nature of licensing variables. Some licensing 
variables are expected to result from other, independent licensing variables after a certain 
number of years have passed, and the overall distribution of the lag effects will have a 
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convex curve shape. Therefore, unrestricted and polynomial lag structures are considered 
for the lag structure of the licensing. 
 
The following section describes a test to identify which structure fits better with the 
licensing data and lag behavior, using a simulated data set. The result shows that the 
unrestricted lag structure fits the data better than a polynomial structure. Therefore, the 
unrestricted lag model with OLS estimation is applied in this study.  
 
C. Step 2-3: Identify Potential Lag Period 
The maximum lag period in the distributed lag regression models is determined by 
goodness-of-fit statistics. The statistics used for this purpose are mean square error, 
Akaike’s information criterion, and Bayesian information criterion [13, 92, 119]. Both 
AIC and BIC measure the trade-off between accuracy and complexity of information in 
the model by adding more lag periods. If more lag periods or parameters are included in 
the models, the model’s goodness of fit is increased, but it also results in overfitting. The 
lower value of the two criteria implies fewer independent variables (lag periods) and a 
better fit. These methods identify the maximum lag period when the independent 
variables effect continuously over a time period.  
 
In this paper, an exploratory approach is utilized to identify significant lag periods. Based 
on the findings of the study, the time-lag periods are defined in two steps; identifying 
potential lag period and define significant lag period. First, the correlations among the 
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independent variables (lag periods) and the dependent variables are examined. The lags 
that have positive correlation with the dependent variable are selected as potential lags. 
The lags showing negative correlations are excluded because it is assumed that, in 
licensing, an increase (or decrease) of an independent variable results in an increase (or 
decrease) of a dependent variable. Therefore, the negative correlation of a lag with a 
dependent variable indicates that it is not associated with change in the dependent 
variable, as demonstrated in the test with simulated data. The following describes the 
second step of defining significant lag period. 
 
D. Step 2-4: Determine Lag Period 
Second, the lags with positive correlation with the dependent variables could be either 
true lags, representing actual lags in licensing, or coincident events. Therefore, the 
distributed time-lag models with the identified potential lags are tested to define which 
lags are significant. The lags with a statistically significant level of 1% from the 
regression analysis are selected as final lag periods for each pair of independent lag 
variables and the dependent variable of licensing. 
 
E. Step 2-5: Estimate Coefficients 
The final distributed lag models with the lag periods identified in the previous step are 
tested to observe actual lag effects on a dependent variable. 
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 Process for Calculating the Aggregate Total Time Lag 3.3.3.
Performance evolution of universities’ licensing practices has received favorable interest 
in the literature. However, the existing studies implicitly or explicitly state their limitation 
of ignoring time-lag effects of the licensing variables, such as expenditure, patents, and 
start-up licensing income. A statistical process to identify the time-lag coefficients of 
licensing variables with regard to U.S. research institutions provided insight into the time 
lags of each pair of licensing variables. 
 
The present section employs an approach that incorporates multiple paths in the licensing 
process, with the time-lag coefficients. The identified time lags include both direct and 
indirect relationships presenting time duration among licensing activities. As a result, 
multiple time-lag relations are involved in multiple paths from a licensing activity to 
another activity. Using the identified time-lag effects for the evaluation of the entire 
licensing process requires an approach that will connect the lag effects of all other 
licensing variables to the output variable in the final licensing process. For this purpose, a 
time-lag transform function is defined and applied to all possible licensing paths, 
generating total time-lag effect neutralized licensing data. The overall process is 
presented in Figure 13. 
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Figure 13: Time-lag aggregation process using time-lag coefficients 
 
A. Step 3-1: Define Time-Lag Function and Transform Function 
A transform function combines two paths in order to extract an intermediating variable. 
 
1) Definition of the time-lag function 
Let    and   denote values of technology commercialization input   and output   at year 
 , and       denote the value of input   prior to   years; time lag  . The output    at year 
t is defined as a result of the prior inputs of     ,     ,     , …,     , if there are time 
lags of 0,1, …,  years from input   to output  . Assuming no other intervening input 
between   and   , the input,   ∗ , represents the time lag aggregated input value of  , 
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Define Direct Lag Functions of Each Path 
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functions 
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 110 
 
incorporating all the time lags into a single year  . The time aggregated input   ∗  is 
calculated by time-lag function     , which is defined as 
  ∗ =    (    ,     ,     ,…,     )      ........................................................................  (2) 
=        +	       +	       +	…+	      	   
= ∑       
 
    ,   
where 
     = time lag function presenting the relationship between output variable   at year   
and input variable   at      lag, and 
   = standardized time lag coefficients at  
    lag,    + 	   + 	  +,…, 	 + 	   = 1. 
 
The time-lag coefficients   ,   ,   ,…,     are equivalent to the normalized standard 
coefficients of the multi-regression model by dependent variable ∆    and independent 
variables ∆    	,	∆    	,	∆    	, …, ∆    	, where N is the time range considered in the 
time-lag analysis.  
 
2) Time-lag transform function with a intervening variable 
Let   be an intervening variable that is an output from input   and then an input for the 
next result,  . When the prior time lags of     between   and  , and posterior time lags of 
     between    and    are observed, the time lags from    to   ,     , are defined by 
transforming time-lag function    ⨂    , as shown in Figure 14. 
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Figure 14: Time-lag transposing function at PATH i 
 
The transform function    ⨂     is defined as follows: 
   
    	  =      	   	        ⨂         	   	         =      ..............................  (3) 
   ⨂f   =   ∗ =      =    ( 
∗) =    ( )
    	 , 
where 
       ( ), 	   (   ), 	   (   ), … , 	   (   )  = prior time-lag function from   to   with lag 
 ,   + 1,…,   +  , 
       ( ), 	   (   ), 	   (   ), … , 	   (   )   = posterior time-lag function from    to   
with lag  ,   + 1,…,   +  , 
   
    	  = transform function from   to   through PATH  , 
PATH	  =	 ith path from   to   via  , 
  = an intervening variable between   and  , and 
 ∗ =  
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧  
∗
  ( ) =         (   ), 	   (     ), 	   (     ), … , 	   (     ) , 	
 ∗  (   ) =        (     ), 	   (       ), 	   (       ), … , 	   (       ) , 	
⋮
 ∗  (   ) =        (     ), 	   (       ), 	   (       ), … , 	   (       ) ⎭
⎪
⎬
⎪
⎫
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Because the time-lag coefficients are the normalized standard regression coefficient, the 
time-lag aggregated value   ∗  from      is an approximation of the regression model 
   =        +       . The time-lag aggregated value   ∗ is equal to 
 
     
(=  )  , and 
  is defined as follows: 
Time lag coefficients    =
  
     
 and    =
  
     
                                           
    =   ∗ =        + 	       =
  
     
     +
  
     
          .......................................  (4) 
= 	
 
     
(       +       ) =
 
     
(  ) = 	   ~	    
 
For example, given time-lag function    (    ,     ,     , … ,     ) = 0.2     + 0.8     
and    (    ,     ,     , … ,     ) = 0.3     + 0.7    , the time lag transform function of 
     can be defined as 
    =    ⨂    =     (    ,     ) =      
∗	       .........................................................  (5) 
 
The   ∗  can be substituted for    . Then,       is equivalent to  (   )∗ = 0.2     +
0.8    ,  and       is equivalent to  (   )∗ = 0.2     + 0.8     . This transform is 
summarized as follows: 
 ∗ =  
 ∗    = 0.2   (   ) + 0.8   (   )	
 ∗    = 0.2   (   ) + 0.8   (   )	
   
 
Finally, the transposed time-lag function     (    ,     ,     , … ,     ) is defined as 
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    (    ,     ) =      
∗	  =    ( 
∗
   ,  
∗
   )       ..................................................... (6) 
= 0.3 ∗    + 0.7 
∗
     
= 0.3(0.2     + 0.8    ) + 0.7 	0.2     + 0.8       
= 0.06     + 0.38     + 0.56      
 
The transform function combines the prior and posterior time-lag functions in a way that 
extends the lags to the sum of maximum lag lengths of each lag period and smooths the 
two lag distributions by multiplying them as illustrated in Figure 15.  
 
    
(a) Time lag function:                    (b) Time lag function:      
 
 (b) Transposed time lag function:      
Figure 15: Example of transform function of the time lags 
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B. Step 3-2: Identify All Paths from Input to Output 
To identify all paths from each input to licensing income, direct and indirect paths are 
defined as illustrated in Figure 16. The direct path is the first-degree path between two 
licensing variables. The indirect path is associated with an intermediating variable 
between the two variables, with multiple distance degrees of more than two. The 
licensing paths are defined using all possible paths from each variable to the licensing 
income. 
 
 
Figure 16: Definition of paths 
 
C. Step 3-3: Define Time-Lag Functions in the Paths 
Calculate new time-lag functions between the two licensing entities in the paths, using 
time-lag coefficients as demonstrated in Step 3-1. 
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D. Step 3-4: Define Direct Lag Functions of Each Path 
Define the direct lag function from each input to licensing income, using the transform 
function. After transform functions are applied to all paths in the licensing activity, all 
associated intermediating variables are eliminated and only a direct path from variable of 
interest to the licensing variable remains. 
 
Figure 19 presents an example of multiple paths from an input variable, X, to an output 
variable, Y. Two intermediating variables, Z1 and Z2, are associated in the paths. 
Therefore, the indirect Path 1 (  , 
  ) from X to Y requires two transform functions 
(    ⨂	f    ⨂	f   ), and the indirect Path 2 (  , 
 ) is defined by one transform function 
(    ⨂	f    ).  
 
 
Figure 17: Example of multiple paths from an input to output variable 
 
The direct path indicates either an actual lag effect from X to Y or a virtual effect, 
presenting overall lag effects of indirect Path 1 and Path 2. For example, patents (X) are 
licensed for cash (Y), or patents (X) are licensed to a start-up (Z1), and then yield 
 116 
 
licensing income (Y). Lags from expenditure to licensing income could be a virtual effect 
representing all other ways to be licensed. 
 
E. Step 3-5: Define a Total Aggregated Time-Lag Effect 
Sum up and standardize transformed direct lag functions, incorporating all lag effects 
from all the paths. 
 
Lag coefficients (  , ) of the direct path, which are observed in the regression model, 
represent the most significant effect (in case of virtual effect) or the most important effect 
(in case of actual effect) out of time lags in all paths. In both cases, adding up the three 
transformed lag functions (first-degree functions) in the paths, 	  , 
 
 +	  , 
 
+	  , 
 
, 
provides a reasonable way to integrate the paths by giving more weight to these important 
lags. 
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 Measuring the Performance of Academic Research Institution Technology 3.4.
Licensing (Goals 2 and 3) 
The efficiencies of university technology commercialization show certain patterns over 
time [62]. Thus, ARITC practices could be better understood by examining those 
changing patterns and finding characteristics related to the changes. The changes in the 
efficiency scores could result from either the improvement of the institution or changes in 
the efficiency frontier. The Malmquist Index, comprising efficiency change (EC) and 
technical change (TC), provides a way to measure both changes in efficiency and the 
frontier of best practices over time. 
 
In the present study, the output-oriented super-efficiency model is applied to measure the 
efficiencies and the Malmquist Index. However, both super-efficiency and the Malmquist 
Index models have an inherent computational infeasibility when a variable returns to 
scale is applied. Therefore, the computation limitation and related approaches to the issue 
are explored. Finally, a new method of resolving the issue for both super-efficiency and 
the Malmquist Index model is suggested. 
 
 Data Envelopment Analysis 3.4.1.
Data envelopment analysis is a benchmarking technique developed to evaluate the 
performance of organizations in service sectors [108]. DEA is a mathematical 
programming tool and model to evaluate the performance of peer units, using multiple 
 118 
 
inputs and outputs [34]. Since it was introduced by Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978) 
[29], more than 2,000 related articles have been published [34]. 
 
A. Basic Mathematical Model  
DEA is used to find the set of coefficients (  ,  ) that make the highest possible 
efficiency ratio (θ ) of input (   ) and outputs (   ) for all decision-making units (DMUs) 
(DMUj; j = 1…n) [108]. The basic form of DEA is presented in (7). 
 
Maximize      =
      	      ⋯       
      	      ⋯        
=
∑      
 
   
∑      
 
   
      ................................................  (7) 
Subject to   
∑      
 
   
∑      
 
   
≤ 1																																			  = 1,2,…,  
  , …,   > 0  
v ,…,    ≥ 0  
 
This model calculates the relative efficiency ratio (θ ) of the DMUo. If the value of θ  is 
less than 100%, the DMUo is inefficient. 
 
B. Multiplier Model 
The general model (7) as presented is nonlinear; therefore, it must be changed to a linear 
form, multiplier problem, using the following transformation [34]: 
  = (∑      
 
    )
   = 1,   =          ...........................................................................  (8) 
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The transformed input-oriented model is presented in (9). 
 
Maximize   ∑      
 
          ............................................................................................  (9) 
Subject to   ∑      − ∑      ≤ 0
 
   
 
    															i = 1,2,…,  
∑      = 1
 
    																																						r = 1,2,…,    
  ,   ≥ 0																																																j = 1,2,…,   
 
The variables   	and	   are decision variables and are called output and input multipliers. 
 
C. Input- and Output-Oriented Models 
There are two approaches in DEA to identify the efficiency frontier line. One is to 
minimize input (the input-oriented model) and the other is to maximize output (the 
output-oriented model). The input-oriented multiplier model is presented in (10) by 
applying the dual linear program to the multiplier model (9). 
 
Minimize          .........................................................................................................  (10) 
Subject to   ∑ λ x  	≤ 	θx  																				  = 1,2, …, 
 
     
∑      ≥    																								  = 1,2, …, 
 
      
  ≥ 0																																										  = 1,2, …,    
 
The relative efficiency of the jth DMU of the input-oriented model is represented by   . If 
the DMU is efficient, the value of   is 1. Otherwise, the value is less than 1. 
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The output-oriented multiplier model is presented in (11). 
 
Maximize           ........................................................................................................  (11) 
Subject to   ∑      	≤	   ,																						  = 1,2,…,  
 
     
∑      ≥      ,																				  = 1,2,…,  
 
      
  ≥ 0																																										  = 1,2, …,    
 
The efficiency of the output-oriented model is   . The value of    of an inefficient DMU 
is greater than 1. 
 
D. Input and Output Data Envelopment Analysis Slack: Two-Stage Model 
DEA slack is defined as the amount of reduction, or the increase of an input or output 
variable, of an efficient DMU, which is on the efficient frontier facet. This DMU is called 
a weakly efficient unit [108]. In order to check the DEA slack, the two-stage model is 
used. In the first stage, efficiency scores are calculated by the input- or output-oriented 
DEA model. At the second stage, the DEA slack model is applied. The input- and output-
oriented second-stage slack models are presented in (12) and (13) holding the efficiency 
score from the first phase constant, respectively. 
 
3) Input-oriented second-stage slack model 
Maximize   ∑   
  +	∑   
  
   
 
         .............................................................................. (12) 
Subject to   ∑      +	s 
  	≤	θ∗   													  = 1,2,…, 
 
     
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∑      −	s 
  ≥    																		  = 1,2,…,  
 
      
  , s 
 ,s 
  ≥ 0																																		  = 1,2,…,    
 
4) Output-oriented slack model 
Maximize   ∑   
  +	∑   
  
   
 
         .............................................................................. (13) 
Subject to   ∑      +	s 
  	≤	   																  = 1,2,…,  
 
     
∑      −	s 
  ≥   ∗   												  = 1,2,…,  
 
      
  , s 
 ,s 
  ≥ 0																																	  = 1,2,…,  ,  
where   
 and   
  represent input and output slack, respectively. The optimal solution of 
each input- and output-oriented DEA, θ∗ and   ∗, is calculated by the multiplier model (8, 
9) before slack models are applied. 
  
E. Returns to Scale 
The DEA models discussed above assume that the input and output variables have a 
constant returns to scale (CRS) relationship. This means that a change in input results in a 
change in output with a certain linear ratio. For example, if input x increases to α*x, then 
output y also increases β*y, while α = β [34]. On the other hand, if α ≠ β, then it has one 
of two relations: α > β or α < β. Increasing returns to scale is the case of α < β, if both α 
and β represent increase. Decreasing returns to scale is the case of α > β, if both α and β 
decrease. Variable returns to scale represents either increase returns to scale or decrease 
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returns to scale. To incorporate VRS into the DEA model, one more constraint, ∑   =
 
   
1, can be added. 
 
F. Super-Efficiency Model and Infeasibility 
The super-efficiency DEA model excludes from the reference set of the DEA model a 
DMU under evaluation. The result is that the (output-oriented) score of an efficient DMU 
is usually greater than 1 [34, 137]. The output-oriented BCC super-efficiency DEA model 
is presented in (14). 
 
Maximize               ................................................................................................  (14) 
Subject to   ∑      	≤	   ,																												  = 1,2,…, 
 
   
   
 
∑      ≥  
        
 
   
   
,																  = 1,2,…,   
∑   
 
   
   
= 1, 
  ≥ 0																																																  ≠    
 
In the model (14), if the output value of an evaluated DMU is smaller than a convex 
combination of the other DMUs, the output constraint cannot be satisfied, therefore 
resulting a computational infeasibility [106] [134] [30] [70] [31] [33, 66]. 
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G. Productivity Change 
The Malmquist productivity index was developed in 1953 by Sten Malmquist [73] and 
has been proven to be a good tool for measuring productivity changes [34]. It measures 
changes in both the frontier and the efficiencies of DMUs. MI requires two single-period 
and two mixed-period measures. The input-oriented CRS DEA models are used, for 
example, in (15-18) [34]. 
 
The first CRS DEA model in time period t =   
 	(  
 ,  
 ) 
 
  
 	(  
 ,  
 )=         	        ...................................................................................  (15) 
Subject to   ∑      
  	≤	     
  ,																								  = 1,2,…,        
∑      
  ≥    
  ,																														  = 1,2,…,        
  ≥ 0																																																	  = 1,2, …,   
 
The second CRS DEA model in time period t + 1 =   
   	(  
   ,  
   ) 
 
  
   	(  
   ,   
   )=         	       .........................................................................  (16) 
Subject to   ∑      
   	≤	     
    
    ,																	  = 1,2, …,  
∑      
    ≥    
   ,																								  = 1,2,…,         
  ≥ 0																																																	  = 1,2, …,   
 
The first mixed CRS DEA model is   
 	(  
   ,  
   ) 
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  
 	(  
   ,   
   )=         	        ............................................................................  (17) 
Subject to   ∑      
  	≤	     
    
    ,																					  = 1,2,…,  
∑      
  ≥    
   ,																											  = 1,2,…,        
  ≥ 0																																																  = 1,2, …,   
 
The second mixed CRS DEA model is   
   	(  
 ,  
 ) 
 
  
   	(  
 ,  
 )=         	        ...............................................................................  (18) 
Subject to   ∑      
   	≤	     
  ,																				  = 1,2,…,       
∑      
    ≥    
  ,																										  = 1,2,…,         
  ≥ 0																																																  = 1,2, …,   
 
Finally, the input-oriented MI is defined by the following equation: 
M   =  
  
 	   
 ,  
  
  
 	   
   ,  
    
×
  
   	   
 ,  
  
  
   	   
   ,  
    
 
 
 
      ...................................................................  (19) 
 
The index,   , measures productivity change between t and t + 1. If    > 1 , it means 
productivity declines. When	   = 1, it remains unchanged. MI is also used to calculate 
the change of efficiency and the movement of the frontier in terms of a specific DMU. 
For this purpose, MI is decomposed to the technical efficiency change and the shift in the 
frontier (technical change) between t and t + 1 [34]. 
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EC  =
  
 	   
 ,  
  
  
   	   
   ,  
    
      .............................................................................................  (20) 
If EC  is less than 1, it means that efficiency improves; if it is equal to 1, it means 
efficiency is unchanged; if it is greater than 1, it means that efficiency declines. 
TC  =  
	  
      
   ,  
    
  
 	   
   ,  
    
×
  
   	   
 ,  
  
  
 	   
 ,  
  
 
 
 
      ....................................................................  (21) 
If TC  is greater than 1, it means regression in the frontier. The frontier progresses if TC  
is less than 1. 
 
 Infeasibility in the Malmquist Index and the Super-Efficiency Model 3.4.2.
Seiford and Zhu [106] explored the details of the necessary and sufficient condition of 
infeasibility in the super-efficiency model. The issue is applicable only to nonconstant 
returns to scale, such as non-increase, nondecrease, and variable returns to scale. The 
conditions of infeasibility, along with the types of returns to scale, are summarized in 
Table 21. 
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Table 21: Infeasibility of the super-efficiency data envelopment analysis models 
Super-Efficiency DEA 
Models 
Model Specification of the Condition 
Conditions of 
Infeasibility 
Output 
oriented 
VRS 
ℎ∗ = min ℎ 
s.t. ∑      ≤ ℎ
 
   
   
   
      ∑   
 
   
   
= 1,    ≥ 0,   ≠  . 
If and only if 
ℎ∗ > 1 
NIRS 
(DRS or 
CRS) 
Always feasible 
NDRS 
ℎ∗ = min ℎ 
s.t. ∑      ≤ ℎ
 
   
   
   
      ∑   
 
   
   
> 1,    ≥ 0,   ≠  . 
If and only if 
ℎ∗ > 1 
Input 
oriented 
VRS 
 ∗ = max   
s.t. ∑      ≤  
 
   
   
   
      ∑   
 
   
   
= 1,    ≥ 0,   ≠  . 
If and only if 
 ∗ < 1 
NIRS 
 ∗ = max   
s.t. ∑      ≤  
 
   
   
   
      ∑   
 
   
   
< 1,    ≥ 0,   ≠  . 
If and only if 
 ∗ < 1 
NDRS Always feasible 
 
Source: Adapted from from Seiford and Zhu [106] 
Note: CRS = constant returns to scale; DEA = data envelopment analysis; DRS = decrease returns to scale; 
NDRS = non-decrease returns to scale; NIRS = non-increase returns to scale; VRS = variable returns to 
scale, * = optimal solution  
 
The infeasibility always occurs at an extreme data point where no other decision-making 
units can be compared. For an illustration of infeasibility, the output-oriented VRS super-
efficiency model with one input x and one output variable y is used: 
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Maximize               ................................................................................................  (22) 
Subject to   ∑      	≤	   
 
   
   
,                           = 1,2, …,   
∑      ≥  
        
 
   
   
,                 = 1,2, …,    
∑   
 
 =1
 ≠ 
= 1  
  ≥ 0	,																																														  = 1,2,…,  ; 		  ≠   
 
In Figure 18, if B is the evaluated DMU, the frontier line is formulated as the line from B 
to C. Then the virtual point, B*, which is an equivalent performance based on the other 
frontier points, A and C, is set by the two convex combinations,	     +      	≤	  	, d 
     +      	≤	  ∗  and    +    = 1, in the model. The super-efficiency of B,   
     , 
can be defined by the distance between B and B*. 
 
Figure 18: Super-efficiency of B in the output-oriented super-efficiency variable returns to 
scale data envelopment analysis model 
 
However, when DMU A is evaluated, the frontier line,       , forms the feasible boundary, 
which is defined by the area of points B', B, and C. As a result, the DMU A is located out 
of the area. The computational error occurs because there is no way to satisfy the 
A 
B 
C 
Input 
Output 
B
* 
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constraints      +      	≤	    and    +    = 1. In other words, the virtual DMU, A
*, 
which will be compared to A, cannot be defined (Figure 19). In the case of the input-
oriented model, the DMU is the extreme point and is infeasible. 
 
 
Figure 19: Infeasibility of A in the output oriented super-efficiency variable returns to scale 
data envelopment analysis model 
 
 Selecting a Super-Efficiency Model to Resolve Computational 3.4.3.
Infeasibility 
There have been several approaches to resolving the computational infeasibility issue in 
the Malmquist Index or super-efficiency model when a nonconstant returns to scale is 
used. One application of the super-efficiency model is to rank the efficient DMUs. The 
ranking of an infeasible DMU cannot be considered. Xue and Harker [134] suggest an 
approach to ranking infeasible DMUs by adopting the classification of efficient DMUs by 
Charnes, et al. [30]. Xue and Harker [134] defined an infeasible DMU as a strongly 
super-efficient DMU. According to their definition and their finding from the surplus 
slacks of input (in the output-oriented model) or output (in the input-oriented model) of 
the infeasible DMU, the efficiency of the strongly super-efficient DMU is superior to that 
A 
B 
C 
Input 
Output 
B' 
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of the strongly efficient DMU, which is followed by efficient and weakly efficient DMUs, 
in order. However, this approach cannot be considered an ultimate solution for 
infeasibility.  
 
Lovell and Rouse [70] suggested an interesting approach to calculating the super-
efficiency scores of infeasible DMUs. If a DMU is infeasible in the output-oriented 
super-efficiency model, a ratio,  , is applied to the DMU, putting the virtual DMU into 
the feasible area of the model’s constraints. 
 
  = {max	(  ,…,  )}
  , where    =  
        
        
  + 1      .............................................  (23) 
 
Their modified output-oriented super-efficiency model is as follows: 
 
Maximize    ′      .......................................................................................................  (24) 
Subject to   ∑      +      	≤	   
 
   
   
,            = 1,2,…,    
∑      + β      ≥ β    ′
 
   
   
,     = 1,2,…,   
∑   
 
 =1
 ≠ 
+   = 1  
  ≥ 0 ,                                           = 1,2,…,  ;  ≠   
 
The super-efficiency condition in the model is released, and a general efficiency score,   , 
is calculated. Then, the original super-efficiency score (      ∗) is equivalent to   ∗  . 
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Figure 20 illustrates how the frontier line is formed using the scale  . The DMU A is an 
infeasible extreme point in the general super-efficiency model. The DMU is projected to 
A' by multiplying the scale ( ). Then, the general efficiency model forms a frontier line 
by the convex combination of A', B, and C, with the result that the efficiency score of A' 
is 1. Therefore, the modified super-efficiency score of the DMU A becomes the same 
value as that of the scale ( ). 
 
 
 
Figure 20: Modified output-oriented super-efficiency model by Lovell and Rouse [70] 
 
This method has two good properties. First, its computation is robust and always feasible 
because it doesn’t use the constraint required for the super-efficiency model. Second, all 
other feasible DMUs have exactly the same efficiency scores in the super-efficiency 
model. However, the scale ( ) Lovell and Rouse [70] defined is arbitrary and results in 
the same super-efficiency scores when there are multiple infeasible DMUs. In an extreme 
case where the output variable (yA) is a very small number, less than 1, the super-
efficiency score becomes an unrealistically big number because it relies on the ratio of yC 
to yA. 
B (xB, yB) 
 
A 
(xA, yA) 
 
C (xC, yC) 
Input 
Output 
A' (xA, yA*	 ) 
  =  (
  
  
+ 1) 
  
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On the other hand, Chen [31] used a different approach to define the super-efficiency 
scores of the infeasible DMUs. She considered an output surplus of a super-efficient 
DMU in the output-oriented model, and input saving in the input-oriented model. 
Consider the DMUs A, B, C, and D in Figure 21. The evaluated DMU, B, is projected to 
B*1, which is a convex combination of A and C in the output-oriented super-efficiency 
model. In this case, the super-efficiency (      ∗) of B is defined by the output distance 
between B and B*1, which is an output surplus. In the same way, the input-oriented super-
efficiency (      ∗) represents the input savings between B and B*2. 
 
 
Figure 21: Chen’s [31] solution to an infeasibility 
 
However, in the case of the DMU A, no convex combination can be defined for project A 
when the output-oriented super-efficiency model is applied. Therefore, Chen [31] 
suggested that the DMU D, which is an efficient DMU, be projected to the same level of 
input as A, and she defines the super-efficiency of A as the output surplus from A to D'. 
The inefficient DMUs are projected using the CRS input-oriented (or output-oriented) 
model in the case of an output-oriented (or input-oriented) super-efficiency model. This 
A 
B 
C 
Input 
Output 
B
*1 
B
*2
 
D D' 
 132 
 
method is significant in that it provides more reasonable measures of the efficiency of an 
infeasible DMU using output surplus and input savings, compared with the approach by 
Lovell and Rouse [70]. However, this method is not applicable if there is no DMU such 
as DMU D, which is smaller than DMU A. Chen [31] defined the super-efficiency in this 
case as 1. 
 
There are two other studies [33, 66] adopting Chen’s [31] input savings and output 
surplus of the infeasible DMUs, but in a different way. Cook, et al. [33] defined the 
super-efficiencies by moving the evaluated DMU B to both directions of input and output, 
but with a different priority to project to each direction. In the case of the output-oriented 
VRS super-efficiency model, an evaluated DMU is projected to the output direction first, 
until it reaches the frontier line. If the DMU cannot be projected to the frontier line by 
moving it only to the output direction, it is shifted to the input direction and then again to 
the output direction. 
 
For example, the DMUs A, B, and C, using an output-oriented VRS super-efficiency 
model, are illustrated in Figure 22. The evaluated DMUs, A and B, are projected to the 
frontiers,        (a) and        (b), by moving 1 -   to the output direction and 1 +   to the 
input direction. In the case of the DMU B,   is greater than 1 and   is zero because there 
is no need to move to the input direction, as shown in the left graphic (a) of Figure 22. 
However, the infeasible DMU A should increase both its input and output by 1 +   and   
1 -  , respectively. Therefore,   is less than zero and   is greater than zero. 
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Figure 22: Input saving (or output surplus) in an output-oriented (or input-oriented) model 
 
A user-defined large positive weight, M, is used in the model specification of the DEA 
model in order to incorporate these preferred movements to input and output. The output-
oriented modified VRS super-efficiency model is as follows: 
 
Minimize     +  ×        ...........................................................................................  (25) 
Subject to   ∑      
 
   
   
≤ (1 + δ)   ,               = 1,2, …,  
∑      
 
   
   
≥ (1 − γ)   ,              = 1, 2,…,   
∑   
 
 =1
 ≠ 
= 1  
δ ≥ 0,   ≥ 0 ,                                = 1,2, …, ;  ≠   
 
In the case of M = 0, then this is equivalent to the standard output oriented super-efficient 
model with ∅ = 1 -		γ∗. On the other hand, as M goes to infinity, the model approaches 
that of the input oriented super-efficiency model with ∅ =  1 + 	δ∗. 
Input 
B (xB, yB) 
Output 
A 
C 
B
*1 
B*1 = (xB
*, yB
*=yB
 (1 −  )) 
(a) Feasible 
case 
A 
(xB, yB) 
Input 
B 
Output 
C 
A*1 = (xA
*= xA(1+  
∗), 
yA
*=yA
 (1 −  ∗)) 
(b) Infeasible 
case 
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If the model is feasible, the super-efficiency scores are equivalent to 1 -		γ∗ . In the 
infeasible cases, the super-efficiency scores should be modified because the original 
location of the evaluated DMU is moved by the amount of input saving (1 + 	δ∗). Cook, 
et al. [33] defined the modified super-efficiency score of an infeasible DMU as                 
1 +  ∗ + 1/(1 −  ∗). 
 
Although Cook, et al. [33]’s study provides an advanced approach, applying the concepts 
of input saving in the output-oriented VRS super-efficiency model and output surplus in 
the input-oriented model, it suffers another computational limitation because of the 
arbitrary number of M. The results of the model depend on how a user defines the value 
of M. 
 
Lee, et al. [66], adopting Cook, et al. [33], suggested two stages for the modified super-
efficiency VRS model. At the first stage, the DEA model calculates the input savings (in 
the output-oriented model) or the output surplus (in the input-oriented model), and at the 
second stage, the savings and surplus are incorporated into the DEA model, calculating 
the super-efficiency. The output-oriented model of the input savings at the first stage is 
 
Minimize   ∑   
 
          .................................................................................................  (26) 
Subject to   ∑      −      	≤	   
 
   
   
,              = 1,2, …,   
∑   
 
 =1
 ≠ 
= 1  
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  ≥ 0 ,                                           = 1,2,…,  ;  ≠   
   ≥ 0 ,                                           = 1,2, …, , 
where    is the input slack of the i
th input variable of the evaluated DMU. 
 
The second stage determines the distance of the shifted target DMU to the frontier by 
holding the input savings constant from the first stage using the model 
 
Maximize            .......................................................................................................  (27) 
Subject to   ∑      −      	≤	   
 
   
   
,              = 1,2, …,   
∑      ≥	      
 
   
   
,                      = 1,2, …,  
∑   
 
 =1
 ≠ 
= 1  
  ≥ 0 ,                                          = 1, 2,…, ;  ≠  . 
 
Finally, the modified super-efficiency score,   , is calculated using 
 
if   ≠ Φ ,  
 
   
=  
∑
      
∗   
   
 ∈ 
| |
+
 
   
∗,      ......................................................................... (28) 
if   = Φ , 
 
   
=
 
   
∗,     .................................................................................................  (29) 
where   = { |  
∗ > 0}. 
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If an evaluated DMU is super-efficiency feasible, there is no input savings (  
∗= 0) and 
the efficiency score (  ∗) at the second stage is equivalent to the modified super-efficiency 
score (  ). This method doesn’t require a user defined arbitrary number while Cook, et al. 
[33] used a user defined number M. 
 
Another difference between the two methods is in the way they define the modified 
super-efficiency scores using the input savings and output surplus. In the output-oriented 
model, for example, Cook, et al. [33] applied the radial input savings and output surplus, 
which results in a single value of savings and surplus each, whereas Lee, et al. [66] used 
the nonradial model. The latter method uses the average of multiple savings (in the 
output-oriented model) or surplus (in the input-oriented model). As a result, the modified 
super-efficiency scores of an infeasible DMU from Lee, et al.’s [66] method tend to be a 
little bit higher than the ones from Cook, et al. [33]. 
 
For a detailed comparison of the three methods (Lovell and Rouse [70], Cook, et al. [33] 
and Lee, et al. [66]), the super-efficiency scores are tested using published data from 
Cook, et al. [33] for both input- and output-oriented models (Table 22). (See [33] for 
detailed information about the data.) 
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Table 22: Data to test the three methods 
Decision-
Making Unit 
(City) 
Input Variables Output Variables 
House 
price 
Rental Violent Income 
Bachelor’s 
degree 
Doctorate 
1 Seattle  586 581 1,193.06 46,928 0.6534 9.878 
2 Denver  475 558 1,131.64 42,879 0.5529 5.301 
3 Philadelphia  201 600 3,468 43,576 1.135 18.2 
4 Minneapolis  299 609 1,340.55 45,673 0.729 7.209 
5 Raleigh  318 613 634.7 40,990 0.319 4.94 
6 St. Louis  265 558 657.5 39,079 0.515 8.5 
7 Cincinnati  467 580 882.4 38,455 0.3184 4.48 
8 Washington  583 625 3,286.7 54,291 1.7158 15.41 
9 Pittsburgh  347 535 917.04 34,534 0.4512 8.784 
10 Dallas  296 650 3,714.3 41,984 1.2195 8.82 
11 Atlanta  600 740 2,963.1 43,249 0.9205 7.805 
12 Baltimore  575 775 3,240.75 43,291 0.5825 10.05 
13 Boston  351 888 2,197.12 46,444 1.04 18.208 
14 Milwaukee  283 727 778.35 41,841 0.321 4.665 
15 Nashville  431 695 1,245.75 40,221 0.2365 3.575 
 
Source: Cook, et al. (2009) [33] 
 
The super-efficiency scores of the four methods, including the general model, are 
summarized in Table 23. Three cities, including Philadelphia, Washington, and Boston, 
are infeasible according to the general super-efficiency model. Lovell and Rouse’s [70] 
super-efficiency scores for the three cities are identical, and the magnitude seems to be 
unrealistic. The scores from the other two methods (Cook, et al. [33] and Lee, et al. [66]) 
are very close and present different performances for all the DMUs. The scores from the 
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three cities that are infeasible DMUs are higher in Lee, et al. [66] than those in Cook, et 
al. [33]. 
 
Table 23: Comparisons of the results from the four super-efficiency methods 
Decision-
Making Unit 
(City) 
General SE VRS 
Lovell and Rouse 
(2003) 
Cook, et al. 
(2009) 
Lee, et al. (2011) 
IO SE 
(theta) 
OO SE 
(1/phi) 
IO SE 
(theta) 
OO SE 
(1/phi) 
IO 
SE 
(theta) 
OO 
SE 
(1/phi) 
IO 
SE 
(theta) 
OO 
SE 
(1/phi) 
1 Seattle  1.44 1.09 1.44 1.09 1.44 1.09 1.44 1.09 
2 Denver  1.02 1.05 1.02 1.05 1.02 1.05 1.02 1.05 
3 Philadelphia  Infeasible Infeasible 6.85 8.26 2.89 3.52 2.93 3.52 
4 Minneapolis  1.23 1.09 1.23 1.09 1.23 1.09 1.23 1.09 
5 Raleigh  1.17 Infeasible 1.17 8.26 1.17 2.08 1.17 2.08 
6 St. Louis  1.52 Infeasible 1.52 8.26 1.52 2.77 1.52 2.83 
7 Cincinnati  0.95 0.90 0.95 0.90 0.95 0.90 0.95 0.90 
8 Washington  Infeasible 1.53 6.85 1.53 2.54 1.53 2.45 1.53 
9 Pittsburgh  1.05 Infeasible 1.05 8.26 1.05 2.08 1.05 2.08 
10 Dallas  0.93 0.95 0.93 0.95 0.93 0.95 0.93 0.95 
11 Atlanta  0.77 0.81 0.77 0.81 0.77 0.81 0.77 0.81 
12 Baltimore  0.74 0.80 0.74 0.80 0.74 0.80 0.74 0.80 
13 Boston  Infeasible 1.32 6.85 1.32 2.59 1.32 2.60 1.32 
14 Milwaukee  1.07 1.03 1.07 1.03 1.07 1.03 1.07 1.03 
15 Nashville  0.80 0.87 0.80 0.87 0.80 0.87 0.80 0.87 
 
Note: IO = input oriented, OO = output oriented, SE = super-efficiency; VRS = variable returns to scale.  
 
In the present study, Lee, et al.’s [66] modified VRS super-efficiency model is adopted 
because of its computational reliability and the sound logical approach of using the input 
savings or output surplus of each variable. 
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 Three-Stage Variable Returns to Scale Super-Efficiency Model  3.4.4.
The strengths and limitations of the various super-efficiency models are summarized in 
Table 24. 
 
Table 24: Strengths and limitations of the current super-efficiency models 
Model Strength Limitations 
Lovell and 
Rouse 
(2003)  
The model is easy to use and robust 
in terms of computation, and 
identifies infeasible decision-making 
units. 
The super-efficiency scores of the 
infeasible decision-making units are 
not comparable to other super-
efficiency scores because the scores 
depend on the ratio of the data. 
Cook, et 
al. (2009) 
The model generates reasonable 
super-efficiency scores for infeasible 
decision-making units using both 
input savings and output surplus.  
The model is not robust and results 
can be different depending on how 
one defines the arbitrary number in 
the objective function. 
Lee, et al. 
(2011) 
The model produces reasonable 
super-efficiency scores for infeasible 
decision-making units, using input 
savings (in the output-oriented 
model) or output surplus (in the 
input-oriented model) of all input 
variables (in the output-oriented 
model) or output variables (in the 
input-oriented model).  
The model is reliable in 
computation but no zero-data issue 
is addressed. 
 
Although each method provides unique benefits in finding the super-efficiency scores, 
none of them is applicable if zero values are associated with the data. The licensing of the 
U.S. academic research institution technologies in the early 1990s was not active, and 
there were several institutions that didn’t have experience with start-up companies. If 
these data are applied to any of the super-efficiency models, it will result in infeasibility 
or zero-efficiency scores. Therefore, this study employs a three-stage DEA model (Figure 
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23) that allows zero values in data and resolves the general infeasibility issue by adopting 
the nonradial model (Russell measure) of Färe and Lovell [42] and the modified super-
efficiency model of Lee, et al. [66]. 
 
 
 
Figure 23: A new three-stage data envelopment analysis model 
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A detailed description of the three-stage DEA model process is presented in Figure 24. 
 
 
Figure 24: A new output-oriented super-efficiency variable returns to scale model 
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and     
∗
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∗
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∗
 
Type 1:  Infinity when an 
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∑      
 
   
   
≥    (    = 0)  
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   
∗
=
∑ ∅
∗
   ∈ 
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where   = { |0 < ∅ ∗   <   }, 
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 
   
=
⎩
⎨
⎧∑
   +  
∗   
   
 ∈ 
| |
+
 
 
 
∗ ,	  	  ≠ ∅
 
 
 
∗ ,																							  	  = ∅
  
Where   = { |  
∗ 	> 0}  
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(Lee et al., 2011) 
 
Non-Radial Super 
Efficiency model 
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    
∗
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No 
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A. Step 4-1: Identify infeasibility 
Lee, et al.’s [66] output-oriented VRS super-efficiency model is applied to measure the 
super-efficiency scores of the licensing activities of 46 U.S. academic research 
institutions. Their two-stage model is as follows. 
 
1) Stage I: input saving   
∗ 
Minimize   ∑   
 
          ...........................................................................................  (30) 
Subject to   ∑      −      	≤	   
 
   
   
,         = 1,2,…,     
 ∑   
 
 =1
 ≠ 
= 1  
   ≥ 0 ,                                     = 1, 2,…, ;  ≠   
   ≥ 0 ,                                    = 1,2,…,  , 
where 
xi,j = the i
th input of the jth university, 
o = the institution being evaluated in the iteration, 
λj = the coefficient of university j used in creating a performance target for university o,  
ti = the input saving of i
th input of the oth university, 
m = the number of input variables, and 
n = the number of output variables. 
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2) Stage II: efficiency    
∗
 
Maximize            .................................................................................................  (31) 
Subject to   ∑      −   
∗   	≤	   
 
   
   
,       = 1,2,…,    
∑      ≥       
 
   
   
,                   = 1,2,…,  	 
∑   
 
 =1
 ≠ 
= 1  
  ≥ 0 ,                                       = 1,2,…,  ;  ≠  , 
where 
ti
* = the input savings of ith input of the oth institution calculated at Stage I, 
yrj = j’s output of the institution j, and 
s = the number of outputs. 
 
B. Step 4-2: Identify zero issue 
If   ∗ of a DMU from Stage I is bounded to zero or infinite, the DMU is associated with 
zero data in its output variable. The case of zero data in the input variable is excluded 
from the discussion because there is no research expenditure of zero in the licensing data. 
The infinite or zero efficiency scores result from the models when the output variable of 
the evaluated DMUo is zero (Type 1) or one of the evaluated DMUk has zero data in its 
output variable (Type 2). 
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Type 1: Infinite when the evaluated DMUo has a zero for one or more outputs. 
∑      
 
   
   
≥    (    = 0)      .....................................................................................  (32) 
 
If the output variable r of the evaluated DMUo is zero,      increases infinitely to 
maximize it because the left-hand side of the constraint is always greater than the right-
hand side. 
 
Type 2: Bounded to zero efficiency when zero is in the referenced DMUk; 
(   = 1)(    = 0) ≥             .................................................................................  (33) 
 
In cases when the output variable r of the DMUk (the only DMU referenced) is zero,     
is restricted to zero because the left-hand side of the constraint is zero. 
 
C. Step 4-3: Modify   ∗ using the nonradial super-efficiency model 
In his study presenting a slacks-based measure (SBM) of efficiency, Tone [124] 
identified a similar issue with regard to zero data. He assumed that the DMU may have 
no function to produce output, or it may have the capability to function but may not be 
utilized yet. In the first case, the associated slack variable is excluded from the objective 
function. If the latter case is plausible, a small positive number replaces the zero. This 
approach allows one to measure an approximate efficiency score of a DMU that doesn’t 
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have an output value in one or some of the output variables, using the nonradial 
efficiency of each output variable. 
 
Therefore, this study employs a method to deal with the zero issue by using a nonradial 
DEA model. The licensing data fits into Tone’s [124] second case, the assumption of a 
DMU with zero data. It cannot be assumed that any institution is prohibited from 
producing a certain licensing output or doesn’t intend to patent or license its technologies 
at all. In such a case, Tone suggested assigning a small number for the variable. However, 
this will result in arbitrary efficiency scores. Therefore, the present study excludes the 
nonradial super-efficiency score of the output variable if it is zero or infinite, and uses the 
average of other DMU efficiency scores. This approach is similar to the solution Tone 
adopted for the first case. 
 
For this purpose, a nonradial super-efficiency model is used, adopting both the super-
efficiency model of Lee, et al. [66] and the output-oriented nonradial slack-based super-
efficiency model of Cooper, et al. [35]. 
 
Cooper, et al. [35] adopted the slack-based model developed by Tone [125] and 
suggested following the output-oriented nonradial slack-based DEA model as follows: 
 
Minimize   
 
(
 
 
)∑ ∅  
 
   
      .....................................................................................  (34) 
Subject to   ∑      	≤	   
 
   
   
,                     = 1,2, …,   
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 ∑      ≥ ∅      
 
   
   
,                = 1,2,…,  	 
   ≥ 0 ,                                      = 1,2,…,  ;  ≠   
 
Applying nonradial specifications to the model by Lee, et al. [66], the nonradial super-
efficiency model is as follows: 
 
1) Stage I: input saving   
∗ 
Minimize   ∑   
 
          ...........................................................................................  (35) 
Subject to   ∑      −      	≤	   
 
   
   
,         = 1,2,…,     
 ∑   
 
 =1
 ≠ 
= 1  
   ≥ 0 ,                                      = 1,2,…,  ;;    ≠   
    ≥ 0 ,                                       = 1,2,…,   
 
2) Stage II: efficiency ∅  
∗ for a DMU with zero data in output 
Minimize   
 
(
 
 
)∑ ∅  
 
   
      .....................................................................................  (36) 
Subject to   ∑      −   
∗   	≤	   
 
   
   
,        = 1, 2,…,   
 ∑      ≥ ∅      
 
   
   
,                 = 1, 2,…, 	 
 0 ≤ ∅    ≤M 
 ∑   
 
 =1
 ≠ 
= 1  
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   ≥ 0 ,                                      = 1,2,…,  ;  ≠  , 
where 
∅    = the output r efficiency score of a DMUo , and 
M = a user-defined large number to limit unbounded efficiency due to the Type 1 zero-
data issue. 
 
The efficiency score (∅  ) is allowed from 0 to the large number M in order to represent 
Type 1 and Type 2 zero data. 
 
The previous super-efficiency score (   
∗
), which is associated with zero data, is replaced 
by the average nonradial efficiency scores, excluding an efficiency of zero or M, using 
   
∗
=
∑ ∅∗   ∈ 
| |
,    = 1,2, …, ; = 1,2, …, ,     ........................................................  (37) 
where 
  = { |0 < ∅ ∗   <   }, and 
| | = cardinality of Z. 
 
D. Step 4-4: Modify super-efficiency scores 
Finally, the modified super-efficiency scores incorporating both efficiencies from Step 1 
and nonradial efficiencies, which are replaced due to the zero issue at Step 3, are 
calculated using the term defined by Lee, et al. [66]: 
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if   ≠ Φ ,  
 
   
=
∑
      
∗   
   
 ∈ 
| |
+
 
   
∗,      ..........................................................................  (38) 
if   = Φ , 
 
   
=
 
   
∗,     .................................................................................................  (39) 
where   = { |  
∗ > 0}. 
 
 Malmquist Index 3.4.5.
The Malmquist Index measures the difference in the relative distances of a DMU from 
time t to t + 1. The index tells us how the technology changes over time. The Malmquist 
decompositions can explain in detail whether the change is due to the efficiency change 
or to technical change. The traditional Malmquist Index was suggested by Caves, et al. 
[26] and Fare, et al. [41], who further developed it to incorporate a variable returns to 
scale, which became the widely used Malmquist Index. 
 
Fare, et al. [41] suggested two and three decomposition of the Malmquist Index. The 
former decomposes the Malmquist Index into efficiency change and technical change, 
whereas the latter decomposes it into EC, TC, and scale efficiency change. Ray and Desli 
[101] also provided a method for three decompositions. The difference in the two 
approaches is that Fare, et al.’s (1978) [42] EC and TC are based on variable returns to 
scale and constant returns to scale, respectively, whereas Ray and Desli’s (2000) EC and 
TC are both based on the VRS model. As a result, their scale efficiency changes have 
mathematically different forms. In the present study, the original approach of the 
decomposition by Fare, et al. (1978) is used to measure changes in university technology 
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commercialization efficiency. The two and three decompositions of the Malmquist Index 
by Fare, et al. are as follows: 
 
The two decompositions are: 
M =
  
   (    ,	    )
   
 (  ,	  )
×  
  
 (    ,	    )
   
   (    ,	    )
×
  
 (  ,	  )
   
   (  ,	  )
 
 
 
= EC  × TC       ..........................  (40)  
EC  =
  
   (   )
   
 ( )
      .....................................................................................................  (41) 
TC  =  
  
 (   )
   
   (   )
×
  
 ( )
   
   ( )
 
 
 
      ...................................................................................  (42) 
 
The three decompositions are: 
M  (x
 ,	y , x   , 	y   )= M  (x
 ,	y , x   , 	y   )× ε      ..............................................  (43) 
=	EC  ×
    (    ,	    )
  (  ,	  )
× TC  ×
   
   
		  
 = EC  × TC  ×
    (    ,	    )
  (  ,	  )
	 
 S (x ,	y ) =
  
 (  ,	  )
   
 (  ,	  )
      ............................................................................................  (44) 
 
Where 
D = efficiency, equivalent to ∅ 
   (  , 	  )=    ( ): distance (efficiency) of a technology (  , 	  ) to the frontier at 
time t, 
  (  ,	  ) = scale efficiency change of a technology (  , 	  ), 
EC - efficiency change, 
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TC - technical change, 
subscript v = DEA model based on VRS (variable returns to scale), and 
subscript c = DEA model based on CRS (constant returns to scale). 
 
A simple example of the Malmquist decomposition by Fare, et al. (1994) shows how the 
index indicates the efficiency changes of an institution (A) (Table 25). The DEA 
efficiency of the institution is defined by the distance from A to the frontier line (F). 
Therefore, the efficiency of A could remain the same or could change (increase or 
decrease), depending on the change in the location of the institution and the change of the 
frontier in the following year t + 1. Twelve cases are defined along with the changes of 
the institution (A) and frontier (F) from t to t + 1, in the table. To simplify the example, it 
is assumed that the frontier doesn’t retract at t + 1. 
 
Table 25: Changes in the location of the institution and frontier from t to t + 1 
 
Changes of the frontier from t to t + 1 
No change Expand High expand 
Changes 
of the 
location of 
A from t 
to     t + 1 
No change 
At  = At+1 
Ft = Ft+1 
At  = At+1 
Ft < Ft+1 
At  = At+1 
Ft << Ft+1 
Close to F 
At  < At+1 
Ft = Ft+1 
At  < At+1 
Ft < Ft+1 
At  < At+1 
Ft << Ft+1 
Very close to F 
At  << At+1 
Ft = Ft+1 
At  << At+1 
Ft < Ft+1 
At  << At+1 
Ft << Ft+1 
Far from F 
At  > At+1 
Ft = Ft+1 
At  > At+1 
Ft < Ft+1 
At  > At+1 
Ft << Ft+1 
 
Note: A = DMU A, F = frontier  
 
The distance from the institution (A) of the year t and t + 1 to the frontier (F) of the year t 
and t + 1 is defined as D(frontier year) (institution year) for each case. For example, the 
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distance from A at t + 1 to the frontier at t is Dt (t + 1). The values of the efficiency 
changes, technical changes, and Malmquist Index of the twelve cases are provided in 
Figure 25. 
 
 
Figure 25: Demonstration of Malmquist Index, efficiency changes, and technical changes for 
the twelve cases 
 
The example shows that the EC is influenced by the TC even though there is no change 
in outputs of the institution. The DEA efficiency scores in nature present the relative 
efficiency of institutions, and the changes in the efficiency score of an institution can be 
influenced by any change in both the evaluated institution and other institutions. For 
example, even though the institution stays at the same level of outputs as the previous 
year, the efficiency decreases if the other efficient institutions improve, so the frontier 
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expands. Therefore, caution is required when interpreting the result of the EC by itself. 
On the other hand, the Malmquist Index provides a more reliable indication of the change 
of an institution by compensating the amount of efficiency change caused by frontier 
expansion (TC). 
 
 Verification of the Present Study 3.5.
This is an exploratory study identifying relationships between characteristics and 
licensing efficiency and, through data analysis, evaluating changes in the licensing 
performance of 46 U.S. academic institutions. For this purpose, two methods have been 
developed: a time-lag identifying process and a modified VRS super-efficiency DEA 
model of the Malmquist Index. First, the time-lag method is verified by testing several 
simulation data sets designed to emulate licensing lag behavior. The current econometrics 
approach also is compared to the suggested methods to discuss its limitations. Second, 
the DEA model and coding are verified by testing the published data set and comparing it 
with current models. 
 
One licensing expert (a technology transfer lawyer) was selected to verify the identified 
time lags. The expert was asked to review the licensing process defined and the time lags 
observed in this study. The expert checked whether the identified time lags between each 
pair of licensing variables reflected real cases, based on his experience and patent law. He 
confirmed that all the time lags reflect reality. 
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4 Chapter 4. Verification of the Process Identifying Time-Lag Coefficients Using 
Simulated Data 
The current econometric methods identifying lag effects of an event of interest using 
regression model are not appropriate for licensing in nature, as described in the 
methodology chapter. In this section, an exploratory approach testing simulated data is 
applied to understand the behavior of the distributed lag model with two coefficient 
restriction models, the unstructured and polynomial models, and to verify the suggested 
time-lag identifying process. Also discussed are the limitations of the lag period 
determination methods, AIC and BIC, and the polynomial coefficient structure used for 
the licensing data. 
 
In order to verify the time-lag approach developed in this dissertation, the following 
additional research questions are explored. 
 What does a negative correlation mean in the distributed lag model? 
 Does the model correctly reflect the changes of the independent variables at single 
or multiple periods? 
 Which coefficient structure is appropriate for the licensing data, the unstructured 
model (unrestricted lag) or the polynomial structure (polynomial distributed lag 
[PDL])? 
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 Assumptions 4.1.
Several lag effects patterns in licensing are assumed to generate data sets reflecting the 
real situation of licensing activities. First, unlike in economics, which is one of the 
popular applications of the time-lag model, the time-lag effect of licensing activity could 
be either continuous or discontinuous. Second, there exists a delay between a change in 
licensing activity and the resulting outcome. The time-lag identifying process should be 
able to detect these two different lag behaviors correctly. 
 
 Distributed Lag Model and Lag Structure Setting 4.2.
Two cases are explored through the tests to understand how the lag patterns affect 
regression coefficients. The time-lag relationship between the independent and dependent 
variables is predefined. 
 
Time t is defined as 1991 to 2007. The distributed lag model is 
   =   +      +        +        +        +        +   ,      ................................. (45)  
where    is the result of licensing activity   at year t;   …     are lagged independent 
variables from t to t - 3;    …	     are time-lag coefficients; and    is a regression error 
term following an N(1, 0) distribution. 
 
Data for both independent variables, from lag 0 to lag 3 of a licensing input, and a 
dependent variable of licensing outcome from 1991 to 2007 are generated in such a way 
as to produce the lag behaviors defined below. 
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 Case 1: Continuous lag effects 4.2.1.
First, an evenly distributed (uniform) lag effect of 20% during the lag periods from t (lag 
0) to t - 4 (lag 4) are defined as shown in Figure 26.  
 
 
Figure 26: Uniform lag structure of Case 1 
 
Second, an asymmetric lag effect is applied to the continuous case. A dependent variable 
at year t,   , is a result of 20% of independent variable   at year t, 50% at year t - 1, 20% 
at year t - 2, and 10% at year t - 3. Therefore, the estimated lag coefficient values of   , 
  ,    , and     from the time-lag identifying process should be 0.2, 0.5, 0.2, and 0.1, 
respectively, as shown in Figure 27. 
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Figure 27: Non-uniform lag structure of Case 1 
 
 Case 2: Discontinuous lag effects 4.2.2.
To test whether the time-lag identifying process using the unrestricted model can identify 
true lags, discontinuous lag effects are also assumed. Data for Case 2 is generated in such 
a way that 20% of the independent variable at year t - 1 (lag 1), 50% at t - 3 (lag 3), and 
30% at t - 4 (lag 4) are associated with the value of the dependent variable at year t. The 
coefficient structure of the second case is illustrated in Figure 28. 
 
 
Figure 28: Lag structure of Case 2 
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 Data Generation for the Test 4.3.
The data sets for the examination are generated by the relationships between the 
independent variables with lag coefficients and the dependent variable. In the case of the 
continuous lag effect, three data sets are generated. The first data set is the basis of the 
other data sets, which adds variances on the basis for the independent variables. The 
second data set includes an increase of independent variables at a certain time. The third 
data set includes two independent variables that have increases at two time periods and 
are the same in other periods. In addition to these three data sets, the fourth data set is 
added to analyze the discontinuous case. 
 
The data for the dependent variables are calculated using the equations for the predefined 
lag relationships. The time period is defined from 1991 to 2007, reflecting actual 
licensing data from the Association of University Technology Managers, to be analyzed 
later. The data sets of both independent and dependent variables include random numbers 
representing error terms with a normal distribution, N (mean, standard deviation). The 
equations used to generate the data set are as follows: 
 
The simulated data of the independent variables at time t is generated by 
   =  ( , 1)      .........................................................................................................  (46) 
 
The simulated data of the dependent variables at time t is generated by 
   =      +        +        +        +        +  (0,0.01)      ...........................  (47) 
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The   value and its changes, along with years and data sets, are illustrated in Figure 29. 
 
 
Figure 29:   values of the four data sets 
 
Finally, the simulated data sets used are presented in Table 26. 
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Table 26: The three data sets for case 1 
Year 
Case 1: Continuous Lag Effect Case 2: Discontinuous 
With Non-Uniform Lag 
Structure  Case 1.1: Uniform with 
no change 
Case 1.2: Non-uniform lag structure 
Data set 1 Data set 2 Data set 3 Data set 4 
Independent 
variable 
(x1) 
Dependent 
variable 
(y1) 
Independent 
variable 
(x2) 
Dependent 
variable 
(y2) 
Independent 
variable 
(x3) 
Dependent 
variable 
(y3) 
Independent 
variable 
(x4) 
Dependent 
variable 
(y4) 
1991 9.09  11.01  9.22  7.61  
1992 9.96  10.74  9.69  10.79  
1993 9.72  10.58  8.86  11.08  
1994 9.64  10.01  11.15  10.41  
1995 8.14 9.31 9.12 10.03 11.35 10.59 9.03 9.76 
1996 8.23 9.13 11.52 9.92 8.78 10.55 9.55 10.57 
1997 9.68 9.09 9.73 10.55 9.97 9.77 12.35 10.44 
1998 11.63 9.48 9.99 10.07 30.27 13.91 29.86 10.10 
1999 9.81 9.51 11.36 10.37 10.03 19.98 9.51 13.46 
2000 9.68 9.82 49.10 18.48 48.67 21.80 50.02 10.94 
2001 9.66 10.09 9.68 29.76 10.13 31.38 10.97 28.62 
2002 8.84 9.93 10.70 17.94 9.68 17.73 8.89 15.90 
2003 11.43 9.89 9.02 13.99 10.83 13.91 11.76 29.65 
2004 9.13 9.76 10.00 9.61 10.07 10.39 10.48 22.87 
2005 9.55 9.72 11.06 10.08 10.06 10.18 9.34 9.84 
2006 8.21 9.44 8.62 10.15 10.31 10.17 9.89 10.42 
2007 8.48 9.37 9.72 9.47 8.81 9.93 11.14 10.75 
 
 160 
 
 Results 4.4.
 Unit Root Test Using Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test and Data 4.4.1.
Transformation 
The ADF test was applied to see whether the simulated data has a unit root. The statistics 
package Stata was used for the test. The null hypothesis of the test is that the data include 
a unit root and is therefore nonstationary. The null hypothesis is rejected if the p-value is 
greater than 0.05. The result shows that all dependent variables in the four data sets are 
stationary (Table 27). Because all data follow the stationary process, the data can be used 
for further time series analysis without taking first-order difference (delta). 
 
Table 27: Augmented Dickey-Fuller test result for data set 1 
Data Set Test Statistic, Z(t) P-Value Result 
Data Set 1 (y1) -1.17 0.67 Stationary 
Data Set 2 (y2) -1.70 0.43 Stationary 
Data Set 3 (y3) -1.49 0.54 Stationary 
Data Set 4 (y4) -2.42 0.14 Stationary 
 
 Time-Lag Period 4.4.2.
The suggested time-lag identifying method, using correlation, is compared with the 
current method, using AIC and BIC. 
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A. Akaike’s Information Criterion and Bayesian Information Criterion 
In the model, the two information criteria, AIC and BIC, decline as more lags are added, 
as summarized in Table 28. If AIC and BIC are used for the lag period, the maximum lag, 
6 years, is selected, regardless of which data sets are used because both AIC and BIC are 
minimum at lag 6. Therefore, both information criteria are not applicable to the licensing 
data. 
 
Table 28: Result of Akaike’s Information Criterion and Bayesian Information Criterion 
tests 
Data Set / Statistics 
Model (Independent Variables From Lag 0 to Each Duration) 
Lag 0 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6 
Data Set 1 
Adjusted 
R2 
0.04 0.09 0.28 0.56 1.00 1.00 1.00 
AIC 8.12 8.06 5.71 -0.07 -85.19 -75.15 -81.46 
BIC 9.25 9.76 7.97 2.75 -81.80 -71.76 -78.28 
Data Set 2 
Adjusted 
R2 
-0.01 0.81 0.96 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
AIC 85.02 63.75 45.49 -78.08 -76.84 -68.47 -59.85 
BIC 86.15 65.44 47.75 -75.26 -73.45 -65.08 -56.67 
Data Set 3 
Adjusted 
R2 
0.00 0.84 0.96 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
AIC 87.38 64.39 46.72 -71.68 -72.11 -64.41 -58.33 
BIC 88.51 66.08 48.98 -68.85 -68.72 -61.02 -55.15 
Data Set 4 
Adjusted 
R2 
-0.05 0.11 0.02 0.69 1.00 1.00 1.00 
AIC 90.98 89.59 91.53 77.15 -84.20 -78.27 -70.29 
BIC 92.11 91.28 93.79 79.97 -80.82 -74.87 -67.11 
 
Note: AIC = Akaike’s information criterion; BIC = Bayesian information criterion 
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B. Correlation Matrix 
Correlations among the dependent variable and independent variables with time lags 
from 0 to 6 are summarized in Table 29.  
 
Table 29: Correlation between the output variable and time lag of the independent variable 
Data Set 
Time Lag of Independent Variable x 
Lag 0 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6 
Data Set 1 y1 0.13 0.29 0.51 0.34 0.07 -0.13 -0.22 
Data Set 2 y2 0.25 0.86 0.25 0.02 -0.21 -0.18 -0.21 
Data Set 3 y3 0.26 0.83 0.25 0.29 -0.17 -0.27 -0.32 
Data Set 4 y4 -0.28 0.47 -0.10 0.82 0.31 0.03 -0.05 
 
The time-lag variables showing positive correlations with the dependent variable are 
selected as potential time-lag periods. The results show that the time-lag periods selected 
by correlation are consistent with the predefined time-lag periods, except in the case of 
Data Set 4, as shown in Table 30. The results of Data Set 4 include the fault period, lag 5. 
 
Table 30: Comparison of selected lag periods and predefined lag periods 
Data Set 
Selected Time-Lag Periods by 
Correlation 
Predefined Time-Lag Periods 
Data Set 1 Lag 0–4 Lag 0–4 
Data Set 2 Lag 0–3 Lag 0–3 
Data Set 3 Lag 0–3 Lag 0–3 
Data Set 4 Lag 1, 3, 4, and 5 Lag 1, 3, and 4 
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C. Regression Model to Define Correct Lag Periods 
The following regression model, using only selected potential lag periods for each data 
set, is tested to identify correct lag periods from among the potential lag periods produced 
by correlation. The regression model of each data set is as follows: 
 
Model 1 for Data Set 1: 
 1  =   +    1  +    1    +    1    +    1    +    1    +         ....................  (48) 
 
Model 2 for Data Set 2: 
 2  =   +    2  +    2    +    2    +    2    +        ......................................  (49) 
 
Model 3 for Data Set 3: 
 3  =   +    3  +    3    +    3    +    3    +        ......................................  (50) 
 
Model 4 for Data Set 4: 
 4  =   +    4    +    4    +    4    +    5    +         ..................................  (51) 
 
The results of the regression are summarized in Table 31. All the potential lag periods in 
data sets 1, 2 and 3 are significant. Therefore, they are defined as actual time lags to be 
analyzed for lag effects. In these three cases, the regression coefficients of the lags 
represent actual lag effects because all of the lags are significant. Therefore, no further 
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regression is required. However, the regression results for Data Set 4 show that the 
potential lag 5 is not significant and should be excluded. 
 
Table 31: Regression results of potential lag periods 
Variables / 
Statistics 
Models 
Data Set 1 Data Set 2 Data Set 3 Data Set 4 
Lag 0 
0.20 
(0.00) 
0.20 
(0.00) 
0.20 
(0.00) 
- 
Lag 1 
0.20 
(0.00) 
0.50 
(0.00) 
0.50 
(0.00) 
0.20 
(0.00) 
Lag 2 
0.20 
(0.00) 
0.20 
(0.00) 
0.20 
(0.00) 
- 
Lag 3 
0.20 
(0.00) 
0.10 
(0.00) 
0.10 
(0.00) 
0.50 
(0.00) 
Lag 4 
0.20 
(0.00) 
- - 
0.30 
(0.00) 
Lag 5 - - - 
0.00 
(0.22) 
Probability > F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Adjusted R2 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 
 Time-Lag Coefficients 4.4.3.
A. Nonstructured Regression Model (Ordinary Least Squares) 
The potential lag periods in Data Set 4 include a fake lag period, t - 5, as shown in the 
previous regression. Therefore, time-lag coefficients for Data Set 4 are defined using a 
regression model with lags 1, 3, and 4 only. 
 
Model 5 for Data Set 4: 
 4  =   +    4    +    4    +    4    +         ....................................................  (52) 
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The regression results show that the three lag periods are significant (Table 32). 
 
Table 32: Time-lag coefficients for data set 4 
 
Variables 
Lag 1 Lag 3 Lag 4 Constant 
Coefficients 
0.20 
(0.00) 
0.50 
(0.00) 
0.30 
(0.00) 
0.00 
Statistics Probability > F: 0.00, R2: 1.00 
 
The time-lag coefficients from Table 31 and Table 32 were compared with the predefined 
time-lag structure (Table 33). The observed lag structures using the suggested process 
successfully identified the actual lag periods and their effect. 
 
Table 33: Predefined and observed lag structures 
Lag Periods 
Predefined Lag Structure Observed Lag Structure 
Data 
Set 1 
Data 
Set 2 
Data 
Set 3 
Data 
Set 4 
Data 
Set 1 
Data 
Set 2 
Data 
Set 3 
Data 
Set 4 
Lag 0 0.20 0.20 0.20 - 0.20 0.20 0.20 - 
Lag 1 0.20 0.50 0.50 0.20 0.20 0.50 0.50 0.20 
Lag 2 0.20 0.20 0.20 - 0.20 0.20 0.20 - 
Lag 3 0.20 0.10 0.10 0.50 0.20 0.10 0.10 0.50 
Lag 4 0.20 - - 0.30 0.20 - - 0.30 
Lag 5 - - - - - - - - 
 
B. Polynomial Distributed Lag Method 
Polynomial lag structure is similar to the behavior of the time-lag effects of the licensing 
data, as described in Chapter 3. Therefore, the PDL method is tested to determine 
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whether it can measure the time-lag effect of licensing, although the data is different from 
the data in typical applications of the PDL method, such as economic and agriculture data. 
 
Polynomial coefficient of the regression is expressed as follows [81, 92]: 
   = ∑    
  
    ,     .................................................................................................  (53) 
where 
d = the degree of the polynomial (k=0, 1, .., d), 
m = the lag index (m = 0, 1, …, n), and 
    = the new parameters of the PDL model. 
 
If the second degree (d = 2) is assumed, then the PDL regression model using the 
polynomial structure is 
 
   =   + (  )   + (   +    +   )     +      ............................................................  (54) 
(   + 2   + 4  )     + ⋯+ (   +     +  
   )     +     
 
McDowell [81] provided a Stata package procedure to estimate the PDL model. This 
study adopts the script language and estimates the PDL coefficients using data sets 3 
(continuous lag) and 4 (discontinuous lag). The script language is provided in Appendix 
A. Different polynomial degrees and lag periods are applied to test their applicability to 
the licensing data. 
 
 167 
 
1) Continuous time-lag effect (Data Set 3) 
The results of the PDL regression models using the continuous lag case of Data Set 3 are 
provided in Table 34. The PDL model requires at least four lag periods, so lag periods 4 
and 5 with second- and third-degree polynomials are applied. None of the models 
perfectly matches the predefined lag structure, which is 0.2 at lag 0, 0.5 at lag 1, 0.2 at lag 
2, and 0.1 at lag 3, but they are close to the setting. Although the model in the second 
column (n = 4 and d = 3) has the highest adjusted R2 value, the last model (n = 5 and d = 
3) presents a better fit to the actual lag structures if nonsignificant coefficients are 
excluded. 
 
Table 34: Results of polynomial distributed lag regression models applied to data set 4 
(continuous lags) 
Variables / 
Statistics 
Polynomial Distributed Lag Model Specification (Lag Period = n, 
Polynomial Degree = d) 
n = 4, d = 2 n = 4, d = 3 n = 5, d = 2 n = 5, d = 3 
Lag 0 
0.20 
(0.01) 
0.17 
(0.00) 
0.25 
(0.00) 
0.16 
(0.01) 
Lag 1 
0.32 
(0.00) 
0.45 
(0.00) 
0.27 
(0.00) 
0.41 
(0.00) 
Lag 2 
0.31 
(0.00) 
0.31 
(0.00) 
0.25 
(0.00) 
0.33 
(0.00) 
Lag 3 
0.18 
(0.00) 
0.05 
(0.28) 
0.18 
(0.00) 
0.10 
(0.02) 
Lag 4 
-0.07 
(0.34) 
-0.03 
(0.50) 
0.06 
(0.25) 
-0.08 
(0.11) 
Lag 5 - - 
-0.10 
(0.28) 
-0.01 
(0.93) 
Probability > F 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 
Adjusted R2 0.80 0.91 0.78 0.88 
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The difference between the predefined time-lag structure (the result of the nonstructured 
regression model) and the result of the PDL regression model using Data Set 3 is 
illustrated in Figure 30. 
 
 
Figure 30: Lag coefficients by polynomial distributed lag regression model with Data Set 3 
(continuous lags) 
 
2) Discontinuous time-lag effect 
The coefficients resulting from the PDL regression model using the discontinuous time-
lag case in Data Set 4 are summarized in Table 35. All of the models have the highest 
coefficient value at lag 5, which is consistent with the predefined lag structure. However, 
their coefficient values at t (lag 0) are negative, and their overall structure is different 
from the predefined lag structure. 
 
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Lag 0 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5
Non-Structured Model (or pre-defined lag structure) PDL Model (n=5, d=3)
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Table 35: Results of polynomial distributed lag regression models applied to data set 4 
(discontinuous lags) 
Variables / 
Statistics 
Polynomial Distributed Lag Model Specification (Lag Period = n, 
Polynomial Degree = d) 
n = 4, d = 2 n = 4, d = 3 n = 5, d = 2 n = 5, d = 3 
Lag 0 
-0.08 
(0.51) 
-0.06 
(0.63) 
-0.09 
-0.06 
(0.69) 
Lag 1 
0.14 
(0.05) 
0.07 
(0.53) 
0.15 
0.11 
(0.34) 
Lag 2 
0.27 
(0.00) 
0.27 
(0.00) 
0.28 
0.25 
(0.01) 
Lag 3 
0.31 
(0.00) 
0.37 
(0.00) 
0.30 
0.33 
(0.00) 
Lag 4 
0.26 
(0.04) 
0.24 
(0.06) 
0.23 
0.27 
(0.02) 
Lag 5 - - 0.05 
0.02 
(0.89) 
Probability > F 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.07 
Adjusted R2 0.57 0.54 0.66 0.49 
 
The best-fitting PDL regression model (n = 5 and d = 2) is compared to the actual time-
lag effect (Figure 31). The PDL regression model estimates coefficients using a concave 
curve and doesn’t identify the discontinuous period, lag 2. 
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Figure 31: Lag coefficients by polynomial distributed lag regression model with Data Set 4 
(discontinuous lags) 
 
 Summary 4.5.
Licensing data is different from data in other areas, such as economics or biology, where 
long-term and continuous time-lag effects are assumed. Therefore, the well-known 
econometrics time-series procedures are not well suited to licensing data. The present 
study suggests a process to identify time-lag effects in licensing data. 
 
This study compared the current approach to estimating time-period and time-lag 
coefficients with the new procedure, using an unstructured regression model (OLS) on 
simulated data sets that reflect time-lag behavior in licensing. The results show that the 
time-lag coefficients of actual lag effects result in positive correlations and present the 
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Lag 0 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5
Non-Structured Model (or pre-defined lag structure) PDL Model (n=5, d=2)
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correct continuous or discontinuous periods, whereas AIC and BIC always pick the 
maximum lag length in the simulated data sets.  
 
The OLS estimates exactly the same coefficients as those that are predefined, whereas the 
PDL regression model produces approximations. In the case of a discontinuous lag 
structure, the PDL method cannot identify the discontinuing effect of the licensing due to 
its inherent polynomial structure. The PDL method would be effective when a relatively 
long-lasting time-lag effect, without discontinuousness, is assumed. 
 
The simulated test of four time-lag cases supports and validates the suggested time-lag 
identifying process. The process is robust and successfully detects the correct time-lag 
coefficients in the unique licensing data. 
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5 Chapter 5. Time Lags in U.S. Academic Research Institution Licensing Activities 
 
 
 Forty-Six U.S. Academic Research Institutions and Their Licensing Data 5.1.
The time-lag analysis employed data from the Association of University Technology 
Managers licensing survey of U.S. academic research institutions from 1991 to 2007. 
Raw data on about 198 institutions was reviewed and refined before being used for the 
analysis, for several reasons. First, although AUTM licensing surveys employed certain 
common questionnaires during the period, they also had new questionnaires on specific 
topics only for certain periods. Another difficulty in using the raw data was due to 
inconsistency in the names of the variables. In some cases, there also were data missing 
for certain years, and institutions are excluded from the present study if they didn’t have a 
complete data set for the variables used in the examination of time-lag effect. Only 48 
U.S. institutions were identified as having full data for the period under examination. 
 
The seven variables used in the analysis include research expenditure, number of 
disclosures, number of U.S. patent applications, number of U.S. patents issued, number 
of licenses and options executed, number of start-ups, and licensing income. Research 
expenditure and licensing income were inflation-adjusted using the 1990 consumer price 
index. 
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Among the 48 institutions, two outliers were identified. First, Emory University had an 
extraordinarily high licensing income of $585.7 million in 2005. The university licensed 
its discovery of the HIV/AIDS drug Emtriva to Gilead Sciences and Royalty Pharma and 
received from the licensees a lump sum payment of $525 million in 2005. The University 
of California system also had peculiar incomes, in 2000 and 2006. Given the average 
licensing income during the period, these data could distort the normal time-lag effect of 
the licensing and cause a biased result. Therefore, these two universities were defined as 
outliers and were excluded from the time-lag analysis. The remaining 46 institutions used 
in the analysis are listed in Table 36. 
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Table 36: The 46 institutions used for the time-lag analysis 
Ranking 
(Income, 
2007) 
University 
Ranking 
(Income, 
2007) 
University 
1 City of Hope National Medic 24 Univ. of Oregon 
2 Northwestern Univ. 25 Indiana Univ. (ARTI) 
3 Wake Forest Univ. 26 Ohio Univ. 
4 Univ. of Minnesota 27 Fred Hutchinson Cancer Res. 
5 Massachusetts Inst. of Tech 28 Clemson Univ. 
6 Mayo Foundation 29 Univ. of Southern California 
7 Univ. of Utah 30 Dartmouth College 
8 Univ. of Iowa Research Fdn. 31 St. Jude Children's Res. 
9 Univ. of Michigan 32 Brigham Young Univ. 
10 Harvard Univ. 33 Colorado State Univ. 
11 Washington Univ. 34 Oregon State Univ. 
12 Case Western Reserve Univ. 35 Georgia Inst. of Technology 
13 Baylor College of Medicine 36 Penn State Univ. 
14 Johns Hopkins Univ. 37 Florida State Univ. 
15 California Institute of Tech. 38 Ohio State Univ. 
16 Vanderbilt Univ. 39 Univ. of Arizona 
17 
Brigham & Women's Hospital, 
Inc. 
40 Univ. of Maryland, College 
18 Rutgers, The State Univ. 41 Univ. of Connecticut 
19 Univ. of Texas Southwestern 42 Univ. of Cincinnati 
20 Tulane Univ. 43 Univ. of Delaware 
21 Univ. of Akron 44 New Jersey Institute of Tech. 
22 Michigan State Univ. 45 National Jewish Center 
23 Univ. of Virginia Patent Fdn. 46 Univ. of Dayton 
 
 
Data on the 46 institutions is summarized in Table 37. The average research expenditure 
of the institutions from 1991 to 2007 was $170 million, and licensing income was $4.6 
million. The variances among the institutions in expenditure and number of disclosures 
are two times higher than the variances in time, whereas institutional variances in the 
number of start-ups and licensing income are similar to the variances in time. The 
number of patent applications, patents issued, and licenses and options executed have 
little variance, other than time. 
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Table 37: Summary of the seven variables of the 46 institutions 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Observatio
ns 
EXP 
($10 
million 
in 1990 
dollars) 
Overall 16.91 15.81 0.72 113.93 N = 782 
Between   14.96 1.36 84.52 n = 46 
Within   5.54 -11.04 46.32 T = 17 
DIS 
Overall 94.52 96.02 0.00 661.00 N = 782 
Between   85.76 13.24 390.12 n = 46 
Within   44.90 -150.77 367.23 T = 17 
PTF 
Overall 46.12 66.46 0.00 562.00 N = 782 
Between   49.50 6.76 209.76 n = 46 
Within   44.91 -133.64 398.36 T = 17 
PTI 
Overall 20.19 26.67 0.00 172.00 N = 782 
Between   21.62 3.76 116.35 n = 46 
Within   15.91 -96.16 108.01 T = 17 
LOE 
Overall 25.86 26.02 0.00 163.00 N = 782 
Between   21.74 2.18 95.35 n = 46 
Within   14.63 -20.14 121.33 T = 17 
STU 
Overall 2.93 5.35 0.00 64.00 N = 782 
Between   3.34 0.00 20.18 n = 46 
Within   4.20 -17.24 51.81 T = 17 
LCI 
($0.1 
million 
in 1990 
dollars) 
Overall 46.23 85.91 0.00 743.81 N = 782 
Between   61.07 0.59 313.48 n = 46 
Within   61.05 -125.82 532.36 T = 17 
 
Note: Between = institution variance,   ; Within = time variance,    −     +   .̿ DIS = number of 
disclosures, EXP = research expenditure, LCI = licensing income, LOE = number of licenses and options 
executed, PTF = number of U.S. patent applications, PTI = number of U.S. patents issued, STU = number 
of start-ups. 
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 Time-Lag Coefficients (Steps 2-1 to 2-5) 5.2.
 Step 2-1: Stabilize the Time-Series Panel Data  5.2.1.
A unit root test of the licensing data was conducted using the LLC test, which is a 
stationary test method for time series panel data. The study used the “xtunitrrot” function 
of the Stata package for the test. The two raw data sets, Diff(0) =           , and first-
order difference, Diff(1) =           −            , were tested. The result shows that 
all variables except for the patents issued and license and options executed have a unit 
root and are not stationary (Table 38). If the first-order difference (delta) is taken for the 
variables, they become stationary. Therefore, the delta data for each variable is used for 
the time-lag analysis. 
 
Table 38: Results of the unit root test of licensing data, using the Levin-Lin-Chu test 
Variable 
P-Value From Levin-Lin-Chu Test 
Raw data,  
Diff (0) 
First-order difference, 
Diff (1) 
Expenditure 0.27 
(Not stationary) 
0.00 
(Stationary) 
Disclosure 0.99 
(Not stationary) 
0.00 
(Stationary) 
Patent Filed 0.25 
(Not stationary) 
0.00 
(Stationary) 
Patent Issued 0.00 
(Stationary) 
0.00 
(Stationary) 
License and Option 
Executed 
0.00 
(Stationary) 
0.00 
(Stationary) 
Start-up 0.99 
(Not stationary) 
0.00 
(Stationary) 
Licensing Income 1.00 
(Not stationary) 
0.00 
(Stationary) 
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 Step 2-2: Construct a Model 5.2.2.
The time flow of each licensing activity is assumed based on the licensing process, which 
is identified through the literature (Figure 32). For each activity it is assumed that a 
licensing activity results or influences the other activities on its right, and that there is no 
reverse effect. For example, the number of disclosures cannot be a result of patents issued 
or licensing income. 
 
 
Figure 32: Licensing process 
 
The time-lag effect is defined as the influence of a prior licensing activity on other, 
posterior activities. Therefore, the time-lag effects of each pair of licensing variables 
were explored. 
 
The time-lag distributed lag model, using an unstructured lag coefficient, is defined as 
follows: 
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  , =     , + 	    ,   +     ,   + ⋯+      ,   +   ,       ....................................  (55) 
where, 
  = output licensing variables (delta) of disclosure, patent applications, patent issued, 
licenses and options executed, start-up, and licensing income; 
   = input licensing variables (delta) of research expenditure, disclosure, patent 
applications, patents issued, licenses and options executed, and start-up; 
i = ith institution;   = 1, 2,… 46; 
  = year t; 
  ,  ,…,    = time-lag coefficients; and 
  ,  = error term. 
 
 Step 2-3: Identify Potential Lag Period 5.2.3.
Correlations among each pair of input and output licensing variables, with maximum lag 
periods of 8, are summarized at Table 39. The time lags that have a negative correlation 
to a dependent variable are excluded. For example, the identified potential time lags from 
research expenditure to disclosure are 0, 1, 3, 5, and 7 years. 
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Table 39: Correlation result of the licensing variables 
Variables Time lags of independent variables Selected 
Potential 
Lags 
Depen
dent 
Indepe
ndent 
Lag 0 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6 Lag 7 Lag 8 
DIS EXP 0.145 0.105 -0.056 0.050 -0.001 0.090 -0.073 0.098 -0.025 0, 1, 3, 5, 7 
PTF EXP 0.116 -0.098 -0.008 -0.053 0.147 0.120 0.034 -0.044 0.062 0, 4, 5, 6, 8 
PTI EXP 0.094 0.112 -0.073 -0.013 -0.099 0.176 -0.281 0.076 -0.038 0,1, 5, 7 
LOE 
EXP 
0.024 -0.011 -0.048 -0.084 0.005 0.036 0.009 -0.072 0.145 0, 4, 5, 6, 8 
STU EXP 0.044 -0.150 0.097 -0.021 0.150 -0.009 -0.088 -0.144 0.110 0, 2, 4, 8 
LCI EXP -0.001 -0.108 0.044 0.060 0.014 0.203 -0.221 0.015 0.025 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 
PTF DIS 0.272 0.054 0.051 0.066 0.241 -0.144 -0.095 0.006 -0.050 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 7 
PTI DIS 0.065 -0.069 0.066 0.043 -0.114 0.100 -0.208 -0.001 0.015 0, 2, 3, 5, 8 
LOE DIS -0.012 0.059 -0.047 0.017 0.000 -0.027 -0.008 -0.029 -0.029 1, 3 
STU DIS 0.047 -0.054 0.012 -0.061 0.132 -0.097 -0.067 0.003 0.110 0, 2, 4, 7, 8 
LCI DIS 0.023 -0.074 0.031 -0.056 0.001 0.104 -0.118 0.023 0.056 0, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8 
PTI PTF -0.004 0.036 -0.070 0.147 -0.119 0.032 -0.030 -0.051 -0.077 1, 3, 5 
LOE PTF 0.056 -0.012 0.077 -0.004 -0.032 -0.020 -0.033 -0.018 -0.071 0, 2 
STU PTF 0.204 -0.161 -0.065 0.092 0.049 -0.097 -0.082 0.063 0.044 0, 3, 4, 7, 8 
LCI PTF -0.016 -0.069 -0.052 0.119 0.042 -0.048 -0.031 0.018 -0.018 3, 4, 7 
LOE PTI 0.093 -0.004 -0.096 0.057 0.012 0.064 -0.090 0.082 -0.050 0, 3, 4, 5, 7 
STU PTI -0.049 0.163 -0.135 0.075 -0.037 -0.046 0.000 0.233 -0.082 1, 3, 7 
LCI PTI 0.149 -0.031 0.017 -0.046 0.014 -0.036 0.066 0.024 0.112 0, 2, 4, 6, 7, 8 
STU LOE 0.217 -0.061 -0.078 0.069 0.029 -0.010 -0.024 -0.008 -0.032 0, 3, 4 
LCI LOE 0.066 -0.038 -0.056 0.085 -0.031 -0.007 -0.023 0.046 -0.063 0, 3, 7 
LCI STU 0.141 0.051 -0.054 -0.005 0.025 -0.121 -0.085 0.043 0.176 0, 1, 4, 7, 8 
 
Note: DIS = number of disclosures, EXP = research expenditure, LCI = licensing income, LOE = number 
of licenses and options executed, PTF = number of U.S. patent applications, PTI = number of U.S. patents 
issued, STU = number of start-ups. 
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 Step 2-4: Determine the Lag Period 5.2.4.
The total 21 distributed lag models, using the selected potential lags of each model, were 
tested to identify significant lag periods. For example, the distributed lag regression 
model of disclosure and expenditure with 0, 1, 3, 5, and 7 lags is calculated as 
 
∆  , 
    =   ∆  , 
    +   ∆  ,   
    +   ∆  ,   
    +   ∆  ,   
    +   ∆  ,   
    +         ............  (56) 
 
The regression result obtained using the Stata package is presented in Table 40. The lag 
periods 0, 1, and 5 are significant (p-value < 0.1). Therefore, these three lag periods are 
defined as time lags between disclosure and expenditure. 
 
Table 40: regression result of disclosure and expenditure with potential lag periods 
 
 
The significant time-lag periods from the 21 regression models are summarized in Table 
41. As shown in the first column, the significant time lags from expenditure to disclosure 
are 0, 1, and 5 years; to patent filed, they are 0, 4 and 5 years; to patent issue, they are 1 
                                                                              
         L7.     .9550496   .6247714     1.53   0.127    -.2731142    2.183213
         L5.     1.394634   .5765469     2.42   0.016     .2612686    2.527998
         L3.     .4915564   .5785939     0.85   0.396    -.6458325    1.628945
         L1.     2.109773   .6970823     3.03   0.003     .7394619    3.480084
         --.     1.642528   .5004857     3.28   0.001     .6586823    2.626373
   Delta_EXP  
                                                                              
   Delta_DIS        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total        416513   414  1006.07005           Root MSE      =   30.44
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0790
    Residual    378967.279   409  926.570365           R-squared     =  0.0901
       Model    37545.7207     5  7509.14415           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  5,   409) =    8.10
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     414
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and 5 years; to licenses and options executed, it is 8 years; to start-up, they are 4 and 8 
years; to licensing income, it is 5 years. However, caution is required in interpreting the 
results. For example, time lags of 0, 1, and 5 years from expenditure to disclosure don’t 
necessarily mean it would not be possible for an institution to have disclosure after 2 or 3 
years following their research, which is other than the identified lag periods. Instead, the 
lag periods shown in the table represent the most plausible time period reflecting the data. 
 
Table 41: Significant lag periods among the licensing variables 
Dependent 
Variables 
Significant Lag Periods of the Independent Variables 
Expenditure Disclosure Patent filed 
Patent 
Issued 
Licenses and 
Options 
Executed 
Start-up 
Disclosures Lag0
**
, 1
**
, 5
*
 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Patent Filed 
Lag0
**
, 4
**
, 
5
**
 
Lag0
**
,1
*
, 2
*
, 
3
*
, 4
**
 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Patents 
Issued Lag1
*
, 5
**
 Lag5
*
  Lag1
*
, 3
**
 N/A N/A N/A 
Licenses 
and Options 
Executed 
Lag8
**
 Lag1
**
 Lag0
**
, 2
**
 Lag0
**
, 7
*
 N/A N/A 
Start-up Lag4
**
, 8
*
 Lag4
**
, 8
**
 Lag0
**
 Lag1
**
, 7
**
 Lag0
**
 N/A 
Licensing 
Income Lag5
**
 Lag5
**
 Lag3
**
 Lag6
*
, 8
**
 Lag3
*
 
Lag0
**
, 7
**
, 
8
**
 
 
Note: *p-value < 0.1, **p-value < 0.05 
 
In order to define unobserved time lags, a known lag function or curve should be defined. 
There is no current study defining the curves or lag behavior of continuous lag effects 
representing real licensing cases. Therefore, the present study doesn’t define or estimate 
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time lags if they are not significant in the models, and it assumes discontinuous lag 
effects. 
 Step 2-5: Estimate Time-Lag Coefficients 5.2.5.
The time-lag effects of the identified lag periods among the licensing variables were 
explored. The 21 regression models were specified by including the significant lags only. 
For instance, the lag coefficients of expenditure to disclosure are estimated using the 
model with lag 0, 1, and 5. 
 
∆  , 
    =   ∆  , 
    +   ∆  ,   
    +   ∆  ,   
    +         ..................................................  (57) 
 
The result of the model is presented in Table 42. All of the coefficients are significant 
and have a value of 1.78 for lag 0, 1.67 for lag 1, and 1.49 for lag 5. If these coefficient 
values are normalized, the percentage of expenditure at a certain year relative to the 
disclosure at year t can be found. In this case, the 36% of expenditure at year t, 34% at t – 
1, and 30% at t - 5 are associated with the number of disclosures at t. 
 
Table 42: Time-lag coefficients of expenditure to disclosure 
                                                                               
         L5.     1.490026    .515771     2.89   0.004     .4766956    2.503357
         L1.     1.665441    .513275     3.24   0.001     .6570136    2.673868
         --.     1.782722   .4412415     4.04   0.000     .9158181    2.649625
   Delta_EXP  
                                                                              
   Delta_DIS        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total        444626   506   878.70751           Root MSE      =   28.64
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0665
    Residual    412597.135   503  820.272635           R-squared     =  0.0720
       Model    32028.8648     3  10676.2883           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  3,   503) =   13.02
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     506
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The unstandardized lag coefficients of 21 regression models are presented in Table 43. 
 
Table 43: Unstandardized time-lag coefficients of the licensing variables 
Variables Time-lag Coefficients of Independent Variables 
Depen
dent 
Indepe
ndent 
Lag 0 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6 Lag 7 Lag 8 
DIS EXP 1.783 1.665       1.490       
PTF EXP 1.320       2.101 1.987       
PTI EXP   0.438       0.524       
LOE EXP                 0.899 
STU EXP         0.143       0.112 
LCI EXP           4.252       
PTF DIS 0.246 0.162 0.139 0.095 0.213         
PTI DIS           0.044       
LOE DIS   0.043               
STU DIS         0.014       0.016 
LCI DIS           0.260       
PTI PTF   0.031   0.059           
LOE PTF 0.047   0.047             
STU PTF 0.021                 
LCI PTF       0.281           
LOE PTI 0.140             0.137   
STU PTI   0.026           0.051   
LCI PTI             0.546   0.790 
STU LOE 0.003                 
LCI LOE       0.320           
LCI STU 3.095             0.922 1.732 
 
Note: DIS = number of disclosures, EXP = research expenditure, LCI = licensing income, LOE = number 
of licenses and options executed, PTF = number of U.S. patent applications, PTI = number of U.S. patents 
issued, STU = number of start-ups. 
 
Finally, the time-lag effects of the licensing variables are defined by normalizing the lag 
coefficients, as shown in Table 44. 
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Table 44: Standardized time-lag effects of the licensing variables 
Variables Time-Lag Coefficients of Independent Variables 
Depen
dent 
Indepe
ndent 
Lag 0 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6 Lag 7 Lag 8 
DIS EXP 0.361 0.337       0.302       
PTF EXP 0.244       0.388 0.367       
PTI EXP   0.455       0.545       
LOE EXP                 1.000 
STU EXP         0.560       0.440 
LCI EXP           1.000       
PTF DIS 0.287 0.190 0.163 0.111 0.249         
PTI DIS           1.000       
LOE DIS   1.000               
STU DIS         0.463       0.537 
LCI DIS           1.000       
PTI PTF   0.343   0.657           
LOE PTF 0.498   0.502             
STU PTF 1.000                 
LCI PTF       1.000           
LOE PTI 0.506             0.494   
STU PTI   0.342           0.658   
LCI PTI             0.409   0.591 
STU LOE 1.000                 
LCI LOE       1.000           
LCI STU 0.538             0.160 0.301 
 
Note: DIS = number of disclosures, EXP = research expenditure, LCI = licensing income, LOE = number 
of licenses and options executed, PTF = number of U.S. patent applications, PTI = number of U.S. patents 
issued, STU = number of start-ups. 
 
 Aggregated Time-Lag Effects from Licensing Activities to Licensing Income 5.3.
The aggregated total time-lag effect from each licensing variable to licensing income is 
developed by incorporating the identified time-lag coefficients between each pair of 
licensing variables. 
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 The Paths to Licensing Income 5.3.1.
A total of 32 paths are involved in the licensing process, as illustrated in Figure 33. The 
paths from expenditure on the first node to licensing incomes are associated with all paths 
from 1 to 32. The paths of all other licensing variables begin from the second node. The 
paths from disclosure, which is located at the second node after expenditure, to licensing 
income are defined from paths 1 to 16; the patent application paths are defined from 
paths 17 to 24; the patent issue paths are defined from paths 25 to 28; the license and 
option paths are defined from paths 29 to 30; and finally, the start-up path to licensing 
income is associated with path 31. See Appendix B. for individual groups of paths for 
each licensing variable. 
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Figure 33: All identified paths from licensing variables to licensing income 
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 The Time-Lag Functions and Aggregated Total Time-Lag Effects 5.3.2.
The aggregated total time-lag effects of the six variables incorporating the paths 
identified (research expenditure, number of disclosures, number of U.S. patent 
applications, number of U.S. patents issued, number of licenses and options executed, 
and number of start-ups) are defined by the time-lag functions of each pair of variables 
and their transformation, as defined in Chapter 3. 
 
For illustration, an example of the time-lag functions and transformation of the patents 
issued variable is provided. The paths from patents issued to licensing income are 
presented in Figure 34. 
 
 
Figure 34: Paths from patent issued to licensing income 
 
First, the time-lag functions among the variables from Figure 34 are defined with the lag 
coefficients. For instance, the time-lag function from patents issued to licenses and 
options executed,     ,    , is defined as lag 0 and lag 7 of patents issued, with the 
coefficients of the lags, 0.51 and 0.49, and is expressed as     ,    = 0.51       +
0.49      . The functions of each path are defined in this way (Table 45). 
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Table 45: Time-lag functions of patents issued on the patents issued paths 
Path Time Lag Time-Lag Functions Using the Lag Coefficients 
PTI Path 1 
(6rd degree) 
PTI to LOE     ,    = 0.51       + 0.49        
LOE to STU     ,     =       
STU to LCI     ,     = 0.54     + 0.16       + 0.30        
PTI Path 2 
(2nd degree) 
PTI to LOE     ,    = 0.51       + 0.49        
LOE to LCI     ,     =         
PTI Path 3 
(2nd degree) 
PTI to STU     ,    = 0.34       + 0.66        
STU to LCI     ,     = 0.54     + 0.16       + 0.30        
PTI Direct 
Path 
PTI to LCI     ,     = 0.41       + 0.59        
 
Note: LCI = licensing income, LOE = number of licenses and options executed, PTI = number of U.S. 
patents issued, STU = number of start-ups. 
 
The next step is to combine all the functions on each path, using the transform function, 
⨂ . The time-lag effect of patent issue,     ,    , on the first path is defined as two 
transformations of the three time-lag functions, as follows: 
 
    ,    = (    ,   ⨂     ,    ) ⨂     ,     =     ,    ⨂     ,         ........................  (58) 
    ,    =     ,   ⨂     ,     =      ,      =      ....................................................  (59) 
(0.51        + 0.49        )    =   
0.51          + 0.49          = 0.51      + 0.49          
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    ,    
           =     ,    ⨂     ,     =      ...........................................................  (60) 
0.54      ,      + 0.16      ,        + 0.30      ,        =  
0.54 (0.51     + 0.49      )  + 0.16 (0.51     + 0.49      )    +
0.30 (0.51     + 0.49      )    =  
0.54 ∗ 0.51       + 0.54 ∗ 0.49         + 0.16 ∗ 0.51     (  ) + 0.16 ∗
0.49       (  ) + 0.30 ∗ 0.51     (  ) + 0.30 ∗ 0.49       (  ) =   
0.27     + 0.35       + 0.15       + 0.08        + 0.15          
 
In the same way,     ,    
            and     ,    
            are transformed, whereas 
    ,    
                 is defined by lag coefficients without transformation. Table 46 
summarizes the aggregated time-lag effects of patent issue. 
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Table 46: Time-lag aggregator of patent issue 
Paths 
Transformed 
Direct Paths 
Transformed Direct Time-Lag Functions 
PTI Path 1 
(3rd degree) 
PTI to LCI 
(    ,    
          ) 
    ,    = (    ,   ⨂    ,    )⨂    ,     =
    ,   ⨂    ,       
    ,   ⨂     ,     = 0.51     + 0.49        
    ,    
           =     ,   ⨂    ,     =  
 .        +  .          +  .          +
 .           +  .            
PTI Path 2 
(2nd 
degree) 
PTI to LCI 
(    ,    
          ) 
    ,    
           =     ,   ⨂    ,     =
 .          +  .            
PTI Path 3 
(2nd 
degree) 
PTI to LCI 
(    ,    
          ) 
    ,    
           =     ,   ⨂    ,     =
 .          +  .          +  .          +
 .          +  .           +  .            
PTI Direct 
Path 
PTI to LCI 
(    ,    
           ) 
    ,     =  .         +  .           
 
Note: LCI = licensing income, PTI = number of U.S. patents issued. 
 
The multiple time-lag effects under each path are then summed. The aggregated and 
normalized total time-lag effects of patent issue are summarized in Table 47. 
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Table 47: Integration of multiple time-lag aggregators of patents issued on the different 
paths 
Step Result 
Sum all direct and 
transformed direct time-lag 
functions 
    ,    
           +     ,    
          + 
    ,    
           +    ,    
             
= 0.27     + 0.35       + 0.15       + 0.08        +
0.15        
+0.51       + 0.49         
+0.18       + 0.35       + 0.05       + 0.10       +
0.11        + 0.20         
+0.41       + 0.59        
Total Time-Lag Aggregator 
of PTI to LCI 
(Standardized) 
     ,    = 0.07     + 0.05       + 0.13       +
0.10       + 0.18       + 0.20       + 0.03       +
0.12        + 0.05        + 0.09         
 
Note: LCI = licensing income, PTF = number of U.S. patent applications, PTI = number of U.S. patents 
issued. 
 
The aggregated and normalized total time-lag effects of the other five variables are 
calculated and summarized in Table 48. 
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Table 48: Aggregated total time-lag effects of the six licensing variables 
Variable Item Aggregated Total Time-Lag Effect 
EXP 
Summed Effect 
0.28     + 0.48       + 0.50       + 0.73       + 1.83       +
2.97       + 1.42       + 1.61       + 3.21       + 2.17       +
1.54        + 2.76        + 2.04        + 2.34        +
1.36        + 1.71        + 1.60        + 0.73        +
0.64        + 0.39        + 0.76        + 0.33        +
0.22        + 0.14        + 0.08        + 0.13        +
0.02        + 0.02         
Total Time-Lag 
Effect 
(     ,   ) 
0.01     + 0.02       + 0.02       + 0.02       + 0.06       +
0.09       + 0.04       + 0.05       + 0.10       + 0.07       +
0.05        + 0.09        + 0.06        + 0.07        +
0.04        + 0.05        + 0.05        + 0.02        +
0.02        + 0.01        + 0.02        + 0.01        +
0.01        + 0.004        + 0.003        + 0.004        +
0.001        + 0.001         
DIS 
Summed Effect 
0.23     + 0.72       + 0.24       + 0.65       + 1.92       +
1.81       + 0.69       + 0.70       + 1.41       + 0.84       +
0.54        + 1.08        + 1.34        + 1.24        +
0.41        + 0.83        + 0.26        + 0.15        +
0.11        + 0.28        + 0.43        + 0.06        + 0.06         
Total Time-Lag 
Effect (     ,   ) 
0.01     + 0.04       + 0.02       + 0.04       + 0.12       +
0.11       + 0.04       + 0.04       + 0.09       + 0.05       +
0.03        + 0.07        + 0.08        + 0.08        +
0.03        + 0.05        + 0.02        + 0.01        +
0.01        + 0.02        + 0.03        + 0.003        +
0.004         
PTF 
Summed Effect 
0.81     + 0.09       + 0.33       + 1.68       + 0.29       +
0.50       + 0.33       + 0.38       + 0.69       + 0.62       +
0.65        + 0.69        + 0.07        + 0.32        +
0.06        + 0.12        + 0.12        + 0.23        
Total Time-Lag 
Effect (     ,   ) 
 0.10     + 0.01       + 0.04       + 0.21       + 0.04       +
0.06       + 0.04       + 0.05       + 0.09       + 0.08       +
0.08        + 0.09        + 0.01        + 0.04        +
0.01        + 0.01        + 0.02        + 0.03        
PTI 
Summed Effect 
0.27     + 0.18       + 0.51       + 0.41       + 0.70       +
0.80       + 0.10       + 0.49        + 0.18        + 0.35         
Total Time-Lag 
Effect (     ,   ) 
0.07     + 0.05       + 0.13       + 0.10       + 0.18       +
0.20       + 0.03       + 0.12        + 0.05        + 0.09         
LOE 
Summed Effect 0.54     + 1.00       + 0.16       + 0.30        
Total Time-Lag 
Effect (     ,   ) 
0.27     + 0.50       + 0.08       + 0.15        
STU 
Summed Effect 0.54     + 0.16       +0.30       
Total Time-Lag 
Effect (     ,   ) 
0.54     + 0.16       +0.30       
 
Note: DIS = number of disclosures, EXP = research expenditure, LCI = licensing income, LOE = number 
of licenses and options executed, PTF = number of U.S. patent applications, PTI = number of U.S. patents 
issued, STU = number of start-ups. 
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 Summary 5.4.
The time-lag identifying process, using a distributed lag model with an unstructured 
coefficient structure, was applied to the data from 46 U.S. academic research institutions. 
A total of 21 regression models were applied to each step, and they successfully 
identified the time-lag effect between each pair of the seven licensing variables, including 
research expenditure, disclosure, patent application, patents issued, licenses and options 
executed, start-up, and licensing income. The AUTM licensing survey data of the 46 
institutions from 1991 to 2007 was used for the analysis. 
 
The standardized time-lag coefficients, along with the licensing process, are illustrated in 
Figure 35. The shortest time lag in the licensing process, if the durations are added up, is 
2 years, and the longest one is 27 years. The time-lag model between disclosure and 
patent filed has the greatest explanatory power (R2 = 0.1) among the 21 regression 
models, though all of the models have very low R2 values. However, because the purpose 
of the regression models is to identify significant time-lag coefficients rather than to 
explain a dependent variable by independent variables, the R2 values of the regression 
models are not seriously considered. 
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Figure 35: Licensing process with the time-lag coefficients 
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The minimum duration from expenditures to licensing is 2 years and the maximum is 27 
years. The time lags for which R2 values are higher than others are 
 from research expenditure to disclosure, patent application, start-up, and licensing 
income; 
 from disclosure to patent application and start-up; 
 from patent issued to start-up; and 
 from start-up to licensing income. 
 
Although the model identified the continuous time-lag effect of 4 years from disclosure 
to patent filed, it detected discontinuous lag periods ranging from 1 year to 3 years. This 
reflects the institutions’ licensing practices. After inventions are disclosed through the 
licensing offices, most of them are filed, thus producing significant distribution across the 
periods up to 4 years. On the other hand, the lag relationships between a posterior (output) 
and prior (input) licensing variable depend on the quality and attractiveness of the prior 
variable in licensing. Therefore, more uncertainty and greater variations of time-lag 
effects exist in those variables. 
 
The distributions of the total time-lag effects are illustrated in Figure 36. The time-lag 
effect distributions of expenditure and disclosure show relatively smooth shapes. Over all, 
the time-lag effects have a higher effect as they get closer to the current year, t - 0. 
Unique peak effect values at certain lag periods are observed: t - 8 for expenditure, t - 4 
for disclosure, t - 3 for patent application, t - 8 for patent issue, t - 3 for licenses and 
options executed, and t - 0 for start-up. 
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 (a) Expenditure (EXP)                                                  (b) Disclosure (DIS) 
    
(C) Patent Filed (PTF)                                                   (d) Patent Issued (PTI) 
    
       (e) License & Option Executed (LOE)                          (f) Start-up (STU) 
----- Polynomial trend line of the effect values 
Figure 36: Graph of the aggregated total time-lag effects to licensing income of six licensing 
variables 
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6 Chapter 6. Licensing Performance of 46 U.S. Academic Research Institutions 
 
 Input and Output Structure of the Data Envelopment Analysis Model 6.1.
The input and output structure of the DEA model, exploring efficiencies and changes in 
U.S. academic research institutions’ technology commercialization, is presented in Figure 
37. The ARITC process is defined in 3 (see Figure 10). It includes seven variables: 
research expenditure, number of disclosures, number of U.S. patent applications, number 
of U.S. patents issued, number of licenses and option executed, number of start-ups, and 
licensing income. Research expenditure is defined as an input variable for the DEA 
model. The other six variables can be considered a result of research expenditures on the 
path of the licensing process. 
 
However, when the performance of the licensing or commercialization effort is discussed, 
quality of outputs should be considered as well as quantity. In this study, the quality of 
each invention or license is not measured directly. Instead, the study considers 
performance quality by excluding output variables that reflect high variance in quality. 
For this reason, disclosure, patent applications, and licenses and options executed are 
excluded from the DEA model output. They are intermediating variables that generate 
final products, patents issued, start-ups, and licensing income. The quantity of the latter 
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variables depends on the quality of the intermediating variables. The input and output 
variables of the DEA model measuring ARITC performance are presented in Figure 37. 
 
 
Figure 37: Input and output structure in the data envelopment analysis model 
 
 Time-Lag Effect Neutralized Input and Output Data 6.2.
 Approach to Incorporating Time-Lag Effect Into the Data 6.2.1.
This study evaluates the efficiencies of the licensing performance of 46 U.S. academic 
research institutions from 1991 to 2007. The time-lag effects of each variable that leads 
to licensing income are developed in 5. However, the standard time-lag correlation 
coefficients among the input and output variables are used to define time lag–effect 
aggregated data for the DEA analysis. 
 
There are two reasons for using the lag coefficients rather than time-lag effects, including 
all potential paths to licensing. First, the ranges of the identified time-lag effects are 
longer than the time period covered in the AUTM data. The time-lag effect from research 
expenditure to licensing, for example, begins 27 years from the year when licensing 
income occurs. This would require data from 1980 to 2007. Second, the time-lag effects 
Research 
Expenditure 
ARITC Process 
- Disclosure 
- Patent filed 
- License & option 
executed 
Input Output 
Patent Issued 
 
Start-Up 
 
Licensing Income 
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are developed to understand overall time-lag effects from the variables to licensing 
income by cumulating all possible paths through other variables. Although the finding 
provides insight into the total distributed effect of the lags over long periods, it doesn’t 
necessarily mean that the actual cases in the data follow the hypothetical paths used in the 
time-lag effect. Therefore, the time-lag coefficient values derived from the data could 
reflect more practical lag effects, for the purpose of data transformation. 
 
 Data Transformation 6.2.2.
The time-lag coefficients of the input and output variables identified in 5 are presented in 
Table 49. 
 
Table 49: Time-lag coefficients from input to output variables 
Dependent variable 
(PTI, STU, and LCI) 
Independent Variable: Research Expenditure 
Lag to PTI Lag to STU Lag to LCI 
Lag 1 Lag 5 Lag 4 Lag 8 Lag 5 
Coefficient values of the 
lag 
0.455 0.545 0.560 0.440 1 
 
Note: LCI = licensing income, PTI = number of U.S. patents issued, STU = number of start-ups. 
 
The time-lag coefficients in the distributed lag model are defined as the time duration of 
expenditure for each output variable at year t. This relationship is illustrated in Figure 38. 
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Figure 38: Time-lag relationships between input and output variables 
  
The data is transformed in such a way that the input variable is fixed at year t and the 
three output variables are forwarded to the same duration as the variables. For this 
purpose, the time lags defined by lagged years from expenditure to output variables are 
transformed to the future years of output variables, from the expenditure at year t, using 
the following formulations: 
 
PTI to EXP at t =      ..................................................................................................  (61) 
     =
 
 .   
×        +
 
 .   
×        =  
2.17       + 1.85       ≡ 0.54       + 0.46        
 
STU to EXP at t =      .................................................................................................  (62) 
     =
 
 .   
       +
 
 .   
       = 1.79       + 2.27           
≡ 0.44       + 0.56        
 
LCI to EXP at t =      ..................................................................................................  (63) 
     =          
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The resulting time lag relationships among the transformed data, using the equations 
above and the data structure for DEA and the Malmquist Index, are presented in  
Figure 39.  
 
Figure 39: Time-lag relationship of transformed data and data envelopment analysis model 
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The amount of expenditure at year t is associated with 54% of patents issued at t + 1 and 
46% at t + 5; with 44% of start-ups at t + 4 and 56% at t + 8; and with 100% of licensing 
income at year t + 5. The maximum time period for each year of input is 8 years. 
Therefore, the total input period used in the DEA model ranges from 1991 to 1999 and 
output variables are from 1992 to 2007. Malmquist Indexes measuring the efficiency 
changes using multiyear DEA scores are defined from 1992 (change from 1991 to 1992) 
to 2000 (change from 1999 to 2000), including output variables from 1992 to 2007. 
 
 Verification of the Data Envelopment Analysis Model and Coding 6.3.
The three super-efficiency models by Cook, et al. [33], Lee, et al. [66], and Lovell and 
Rouse [70] were applied to the transformed licensing data of the 46 institutions in order 
to verify the program coding of Xpress-Mosel and to compare those models. For this 
purpose, expenditure in 1999 and other output variables that incorporate time-lag effect 
from 2000 to 2007 was used. The results are summarized in Table 50. 
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Table 50: Super-efficiency scores of three models 
Institutions 
Output-Oriented 
Super Efficiency 
(1/phi) 
Institutions 
Output-Oriented 
Super Efficiency 
(1/phi) 
Lovell 
and 
Rouse 
(2003) 
Cook, 
et al. 
(2009) 
Lee, et 
al.  
(2011) 
Lovell 
and 
Rouse 
(2003) 
Cook, 
et al.  
(2009) 
Lee, et 
al.  
(2011) 
Baylor College of Medicine 0.23 0.23 0.23 Oregon State Univ. 0.17 0.17 0.17 
Brigham & Women's Hospital, 
Inc. 
0.37 0.37 0.37 Penn State Univ. 0.32 0.32 0.32 
Brigham Young Univ. 1.88 1.88 1.88 Rutgers, The State Univ. 0.29 0.29 0.29 
California Institute of Tech. 3.15 3.15 3.15 St. Jude Children's Researc 0.10 0.10 0.10 
Case Western Reserve Univ. 0.37 0.37 0.37 Tulane Univ. 0.19 0.19 0.19 
City of Hope National Medic 1.68 1.68 1.68 Univ. of Akron 865.18 3.75 3.75 
Clemson Univ. 0.23 0.23 0.23 Univ. of Arizona 0.19 0.19 0.19 
Colorado State Univ. 0.38 0.38 0.38 Univ. of Cincinnati 0.12 0.12 0.12 
Dartmouth College 0.19 0.19 0.19 Univ. of Connecticut 0.27 0.27 0.27 
Florida State Univ. 0.39 0.39 0.39 Univ. of Dayton 0.21 0.21 0.21 
Fred Hutchinson Cancer Res. 0.08 0.08 0.08 Univ. of Delaware 0.27 0.27 0.27 
Georgia Inst. of Technology 0.86 0.86 0.86 Univ. of Iowa Research Fdn. 0.35 0.35 0.35 
Harvard Univ. 0.59 0.59 0.59 Univ. of Maryland, College 0.61 0.61 0.61 
Indiana Univ. (ARTI) 0.43 0.43 0.43 Univ. of Michigan 0.53 0.53 0.53 
Johns Hopkins Univ. 0.63 0.63 0.63 Univ. of Minnesota 1.08 1.08 1.08 
Massachusetts Inst. of Tech 2.04 2.04 2.04 Univ. of Oregon 0.35 0.35 0.35 
Mayo Foundation 0.57 0.57 0.57 Univ. of Southern California 0.31 0.31 0.31 
Michigan State Univ. 0.92 0.92 0.92 Univ. of Texas Southwestern 0.42 0.42 0.42 
National Jewish Center 0.28 0.28 0.28 Univ. of Utah 1.19 1.19 1.19 
New Jersey Institute of Tech. 0.22 0.22 0.22 Univ. of Virginia Patent Fdn. 0.27 0.27 0.27 
Northwestern Univ. 0.53 0.53 0.53 Vanderbilt Univ. 0.26 0.26 0.26 
Ohio State Univ. 0.29 0.29 0.29 Wake Forest Univ. 1.01 1.01 1.01 
Ohio Univ. 0.45 0.45 0.45 Washington Univ. 0.53 0.53 0.53 
 
The results confirm that the models have the same super-efficiency scores when decision-
making units are feasible. The models identify eight institutions as efficient. There is one 
 204 
 
infeasible DMU, the University of Akron. The super-efficiency scores obtained using 
Cook, et al.’s (2009) and Lee, et al.’s (2011) models are exactly the same because only 
one input variable is used in the model. On the other hand, Lovell and Rouse’s (2003) 
model generated an unrealistic score: efficiency of 865%. These results verify the coding 
and theoretical comparisons outlined in 3. 
 
 Super-Efficiency Scores and Malmquist Indexes 6.4.
The suggested output-oriented super-efficiency model is applied to the transformed data 
using Xpress-Mosel. The coding of both DEA and the Malmquist Index is provided in 
Appendix C. The results of the steps suggested for the super-efficiency scores (see 3) are 
presented in this section. 
 
 Step 1: Input Saving and Infeasible Decision-Making Units 6.4.1.
First, Lovell and Rouse’s (2003) model was applied to the data of expenditure from 1991 
to 1999 to identify super-efficient (efficient and feasible) or extremely super-efficient 
(efficient but infeasible) institutions. Eleven institutions were found to be efficient for at 
least 1 year. Three institutions were observed to be infeasible DMUs for at least 1 year: 
Brigham Young University in 1993, Ohio University in 1991 and 1992, and the 
University of Akron from 1994 to 1999 (Table 51). 
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Table 51: Super-efficient and extremely super-efficient institutions 
Institution 
Year of Expenditure 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Brigham Young Univ. SE SE ESE SE SE SE SE SE SE 
California Institute of Tech. 
 
SE SE SE SE SE SE SE SE 
City of Hope National 
Medic 
SE SE SE 
  
SE SE SE SE 
Dartmouth College 
    
SE 
    
Florida State Univ. 
  
SE SE SE SE SE 
  
Massachusetts Inst. of Tech SE SE SE SE SE SE SE SE SE 
Ohio Univ. ESE ESE 
       
Univ. of Akron SE 
 
SE ESE ESE ESE ESE ESE ESE 
Univ. of Minnesota 
        
SE 
Univ. of Utah 
       
SE SE 
Wake Forest Univ. 
        
SE 
 
Note: ESE = extremely super-efficient, SE = super-efficient 
 
Table 52 and Table 53 summarize the infeasible institutions and the input slacks of all 
DMUs, along with the frontier years of Malmquist Indexes, using Lee, et al.’s (2011) 
model. Dt(t) stands for super-efficiency scores of an institution in year t when compared 
with the frontier institutions in year t. For example, Ohio University is infeasible when its 
data for 1991 is compared to other frontier institutions in 1991 and it has input slack of 
0.34. The university is also infeasible when its data for 1992 is compared to the frontier 
of 1991. Its slack value is 0.01. 
 
The infeasible institutions listed in the tables are consistent with the extremely super-
efficient institutions identified by the Lovell and Rouse (2003) model. 
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Table 52: Input slacks of infeasible institutions in the frontier year t from 1991 to 1994 
Institutions 
Input Slack Table of Infeasible Decision-Making Units 
Frontier t = 1991 1992 1993 1994 
D
t(
t)
 
D
t(
t+
1)
 
D
t+
1(
t)
 
D
t+
1(
t+
1)
 
D
t(
t)
 
D
t(
t+
1)
 
D
t+
1(
t)
 
D
t+
1(
t+
1)
 
D
t(
t)
 
D
t(
t+
1)
 
D
t+
1(
t)
 
D
t+
1(
t+
1)
 
D
t(
t)
 
D
t(
t+
1)
 
D
t+
1(
t)
 
D
t+
1(
t+
1)
 
 Ohio U. 0.34 
 
0.01 0.31 0.31 
 
0.02 
         
 Brigham Young U. 
       
0.35 0.35 
       
 U. of Akron  
         
0.26 
 
0.28 0.28 0.03 
 
0.27 
 
Note: Dt(t+1)=DEA efficiency of an institution at time t compared to the frontier at year t+1. 
  
Table 53: Input slacks of infeasible institutions in the frontier year t from 1995 to 1998 
Institutions 
Input Slack Table of Infeasible Decision-Making Units 
Frontier t = 1995 1996 1997 1998 
D
t(
t)
 
D
t(
t+
1)
 
D
t+
1(
t)
 
D
t+
1(
t+
1)
 
D
t(
t)
 
D
t(
t+
1)
 
D
t+
1(
t)
 
D
t+
1(
t+
1)
 
D
t(
t)
 
D
t(
t+
1)
 
D
t+
1(
t)
 
D
t+
1(
t+
1)
 
D
t(
t)
 
D
t(
t+
1)
 
D
t+
1(
t)
 
D
t+
1(
t+
1)
 
 Ohio U. 
                
 Brigham Young U. 
                
 U. of Akron  0.27 
 
0.03 0.38 0.38 
 
0.14 0.07 0.07 0.07 
 
0.21 0.21 0.02 
 
0.49 
 
Note: Dt(t+1)=DEA efficiency of an institution at time t compared to the frontier at year t+1. 
 
 Step 2: Identify Zero-Data Issues 6.4.2.
Institutions identified as zero efficiency are listed in Table 54. An institution of which 
efficiency score bounded to zero is associated with the Type 2 zero issue. Zero output of 
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the referred DMUs (DMUs on the left hand side of the output constraints in the DEA 
model) causes the zero efficiency problem.  
 
Table 54: Institutions with zero-efficiency scores 
Evaluated Institutions (    ) Year t 
     
Dt(t) Dt(t+1) Dt+1(t) Dt+1(t+1) 
Ohio U. 1991 0.00 0.31 0.00 0.26 
U. of Akron 1995 0.26 1.41 0.71 0.00 
U. of Akron 1996 0.00 0.58 1.01 0.30 
 
Note: Dt(t+1)=DEA efficiency of an institution at time t compared to the frontier at year t+1. 
 
Institutions with zero-data in output variables are presented in Table 55. Ohio University 
in 1991 in the reference set of the evaluated St. Jude Children’s Research Center in 1991 
has zero start-up (output). Ohio University in 1992 also referred itself in 1991, which also 
has zero value for start-up. Finally, the zero start-up of Ohio University in 1996 caused 
the zero efficiency of Ohio University in 1996. 
 
Table 55: Referred institutions causing type 2 zero issue 
Referred Institutions (    ) 
(   >  ) 
Year of 
      
Data of Referred Institutions 
EXP PTI STU LCI 
    : Ohio U. D1991(1991) 
    :  St. Jude Children's Res. Ctr. 
1991 9.21 1.84 0.00 2.68 
    : Ohio U. D1992(1991) 
    : Ohio U. 
1991 0.99 7.86 0.00 0.61 
    :U. of Akron D1996(1996) 
    : Ohio U.  
1996 1.13 3.46 0.00 0.59 
 
Note: DMU = decision-making unit, EXP = research expenditure, LCI = licensing income, PTI = number 
of U.S. patents issued, STU = number of start-ups. 
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 Step 3: Modify   ∗ Using the Nonradial Super-Efficiency Model 6.4.3.
The nonradial super-efficiency model outlined in 3 was applied to the efficiency scores: 
D1991(1991) and D1992(1991) of Ohio University, and D1996(1996) of the University 
of Akron. The result is presented in Table 56. 
 
Table 56: Nonradial output super-efficiency scores of institutions with type 2 zero issue 
Evaluated Institutions 
(    ) 
Year 
t 
Nonradial Efficiency Modified Beta 
∅   
  ∅   
  ∅   
  
   
=
∑ ∅∗   ∈ 
| |
 
Ohio U. Dt(t) 1991 0.80 0.00 0.37 0.59 
Ohio U. Dt+1(t) 1991 3.42 0.00 0.08 1.75 
U. of Akron Dt(t) 1996 0.37 0.00 0.29 0.33 
 
Note: DMU = decision-making unit, LCI = licensing income, PTI = number of U.S. patents issued, STU = 
number of start-ups. 
 
The nonradial super-efficiency scores of the two institutions that have the Type 2 zero 
issue show zero efficiency for the output variable (start-up), which caused the zero issue. 
However, the efficiencies of other output variables (number of U.S. patents issued and 
licensing income) present non-zero. Therefore, the super-efficiency scores (  ∗) of these 
institutions are replaced by the average of the other two nonradial output super-
efficiencies, as presented in the last column of Table 56. 
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 Step 4: Modified Super-Efficiency Scores Resolving the Zero Data Issue 6.4.4.
Finally, the modified super-efficiency scores of the 46 institutions were defined using 
Lee, et al.’s (2011) equation. (Modified super-efficiency scores are provided in Appendix 
D.) The super-efficiency scores of the 11 super-efficient or extremely super-efficient best 
practicing institutions during the period are summarized in Table 57. 
 
Table 57: Modified super-efficiency scores of 11 institutions (1991–1999) 
Institutions 
Modified Super-Efficience Scores; Dt(t) 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Brigham Young Univ. 2.09 1.16 17.66 3.25 1.25 1.93 2.22 2.05 1.88 
California Institute of 
Tech.  
1.52 1.57 1.13 1.25 1.67 2.36 2.73 3.15 
City of Hope National 
Medic 
5.17 2.47 1.74 
  
1.06 1.75 3.16 1.68 
Dartmouth College 
    
1.59 
    
Florida State Univ. 
  
1.41 2.43 1.02 1.94 1.33 
  
Massachusetts Inst. of 
Tech 
3.33 2.79 2.34 2.35 2.21 2.59 1.86 2.03 2.04 
Ohio Univ. 3.01* 5.11 
       
Univ. of Akron 2.11 
 
1.47 3.04 4.78 4.07* 4.26 2.95 4.76 
Univ. of Minnesota 
        
1.08 
Univ. of Utah 
       
1.07 1.19 
Wake Forest Univ. 
        
1.01 
 
Note: * = average of nonradial output super-efficiency scores are applied. 
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 Malmquist Indexes during the Evaluation Periods 6.4.5.
Modified super-efficiency scores for the years evaluated (t and t + 1) over each frontier 
year (t and t + 1) are used to calculate Malmquist Indexes. (Efficiency change, technical 
change, and Malmquist Index scores for the 46 institutions are provided in Appendix E.) 
 
 Summary 6.5.
The licensing or commercialization performance of 46 U.S. research institutions was 
explored using modified super-efficiency models and the Malmquist Index. The time-lag 
effect neutralized  data for the input of research expenditure from 1991 to 1999 and the 
outputs of patent applications, start-ups, and licensing income from 1992 to 2007 were 
used for the analysis. 
 
Brigham Young University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology are identified 
as super-efficient universities for all the years. The California Institute of Technology and 
the University of Akron were super-efficient for most of the years studied, whereas 
Dartmouth College was efficient only in 1995. Ohio University was efficient in 1991 and 
1992, and inefficient since then. On the other hand, three universities became efficient in 
1998 or 1999. 
 
Table 58 presents the averages of universities’ scores during the periods studied. All of 
the institutions show improved performance (MI > 1) during the period. All of the 
institutions also experienced frontier expansion (TC > 1) during the period, which means 
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that all other best practicing institutions improved their performance. Also, all but 8 
institutions improved efficiency (EC > 1) over the same time period. The efficiency 
change of an evaluated DMU tends to decline if the frontier of the DMU is expanding 
(TC > 1) in the following year compared to an identical frontier, because the distance 
between the DMU and frontier becomes larger, as illustrated in 3. Given this, the 
improved efficiency is significant. This also indicates that performance improvements 
existed throughout all institutions. 
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Table 58: Average efficiency change, technical change, and Malmquist Index scores of the 
46 institutions 
Institutions 
Average over the 
periods 
Institutions 
Average over the 
periods 
EC TC MI EC TC MI 
Baylor College of Medicine 1.26 1.06 1.41 Oregon State Univ. 1.21 1.20 1.40 
Brigham & Women's 
Hospital, Inc. 
0.98 1.22 1.16 Penn State Univ. 1.08 1.08 1.13 
Brigham Young Univ. 2.61 1.59 6.12 Rutgers, The State Univ. 0.97 1.19 1.11 
California Institute of Tech. 1.21 1.04 1.30 
St. Jude Children's 
Research 
1.18 1.18 1.31 
Case Western Reserve Univ. 1.07 1.22 1.19 Tulane Univ. 0.92 1.15 1.02 
City of Hope National Medic 1.01 1.15 1.05 Univ. of Akron 1.23 1.23 1.41 
Clemson Univ. 1.02 1.11 1.02 Univ. of Arizona 1.06 1.08 1.14 
Colorado State Univ. 1.23 1.15 1.22 Univ. of Cincinnati 0.89 1.17 1.01 
Dartmouth College 1.50 1.20 1.77 Univ. of Connecticut 1.02 1.19 1.17 
Florida State Univ. 1.30 1.08 1.32 Univ. of Dayton 0.93 1.22 1.10 
Fred Hutchinson Cancer Res. 0.99 1.18 1.18 Univ. of Delaware 1.07 1.21 1.25 
Georgia Inst. of Technology 1.16 1.12 1.21 
Univ. of Iowa Research 
Fdn. 
1.08 1.15 1.19 
Harvard Univ. 1.07 1.10 1.19 
Univ. of Maryland, 
College 
1.44 1.16 1.47 
Indiana Univ. (ARTI) 1.19 1.17 1.29 Univ. of Michigan 1.17 1.14 1.41 
Johns Hopkins Univ. 1.11 1.14 1.25 Univ. of Minnesota 1.12 1.06 1.19 
Massachusetts Inst. of Tech 0.95 1.11 1.05 Univ. of Oregon 1.06 1.17 1.13 
Mayo Foundation 1.08 1.13 1.15 
Univ. of Southern 
California 
1.02 1.06 1.07 
Michigan State Univ. 1.05 1.10 1.11 
Univ. of Texas 
Southwestern 
1.03 1.20 1.19 
National Jewish Center 1.05 1.23 1.31 Univ. of Utah 1.16 1.13 1.20 
New Jersey Institute of Tech. 1.33 1.26 1.75 
Univ. of Virginia Patent 
Fdn. 
0.95 1.10 1.02 
Northwestern Univ. 1.16 1.16 1.29 Vanderbilt Univ. 1.11 1.14 1.22 
Ohio State Univ. 1.03 1.12 1.17 Wake Forest Univ. 1.33 1.16 1.39 
Ohio Univ. 1.00 1.20 1.08 Washington Univ. 1.06 1.12 1.15 
 
Note: EC = efficiency change, MI = Malmquist Index, TC = technical change. 
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Brigham Young University received the highest Malmquist Index score among the 46 
institutions. The university improved its performance 600%. This is not comparable to 
other institutions, considering that the next highest score is 1.77 for Dartmouth College. 
This bias came from Brigham Young’s extremely high super-efficiency score, 17.66, in 
1993. Excluding Brigham Young University, the average MI of other institutions is 1.23, 
which means that the institutions improved their performance by 23% every year. 
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7 Chapter 7. Characteristics of the Efficiency Change Patterns in U.S. Universities’ 
Technology Commercialization 
This chapter explores the licensing performance characteristics of 46 U.S. academic 
research institutions. For this purpose, time-lag effect neutralized  licensing data 
(expenditure, disclosure, patent applications, patents issued, licenses and options 
executed, number of start-ups, and licensing income) are analyzed, along with 
institutional types and other licensing-related characteristics identified in 3. Regression 
analysis and ANOVA tests were used to investigate their relationship of this data with 
licensing performance. Four types of licensing performance are explored in detail: (a) the 
cumulative licensing outputs of disclosure, patent applications, patents issued, licenses 
and options executed, number of start-up, and licensing income; (b) licensing outputs 
relative to expenditure; (c) super-efficiency scores; and (d) efficiency changes 
(Malmquist Indexes). 
 
 Licensing Data and Organizational Characteristics  7.1.
 Time-lag Effect Neutralized Licensing Data 7.1.1.
The licensing data were transformed using time-lag coefficients. As shown in 6, time-lag 
effects of patent applications, number of start-ups, and licensing income were neutralized 
on the basis of expenditure at year t. The same approach was applied to other licensing 
variables. Figure 40 illustrates the time-lag effect neutralized data of the seven licensing 
variables. 
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Figure 40: Data transform of the licensing data incorporating time-lag coefficients 
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 Types of the 46 Academic Research Institutions 7.1.2.
The 46 academic research institutions are classified by institution type (using definitions 
from the National Center for Education Statistics), private or public status, and whether 
the institution includes a medical school (Table 59). The majority (37) of the institutions 
are 4-year research universities with master’s and doctoral degree programs. Twenty-one 
of the 46 universities are private schools. About 56% of both the private and public 
universities include medical schools. The sample includes 9 non-university research 
institutions, comprising 3 medical research centers, 4 research and teaching institutions 
specialized in medicine, and 2 teaching and research hospitals. 
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Table 59: Types of the 46 academic research institutions 
Institution 
Types 
Private (21) Public (25) 
With medical 
school (12) 
Without medical 
school (9) 
With medical 
school (14) 
Without medical 
school (11) 
Universities (37) 
Research 
Universities (4 
years, including 
master’s and 
doctoral degree 
programs) (37) 
• Case Western 
Reserve Univ.                 
• Dartmouth College                               
• Harvard Univ.                              
• Johns Hopkins Univ.                        
• Northwestern Univ.                         
• Tulane Univ.                               
• Univ. of Southern 
California                
• Vanderbilt Univ.                           
• Wake Forest Univ.                          
• Washington Univ. in 
St. Louis  
(10) 
• Brigham Young 
Univ.                         
• California Institute of 
Tech.           
• Massachusetts 
Institute of Tech.           
• Univ. of Dayton  
(4) 
• Indiana Univ. at 
Indianapolis    
• Michigan State Univ.                       
• Ohio State Univ.                           
• Ohio Univ.                                 
• Univ. of Arizona                           
• Univ. of Cincinnati                        
• Univ. of Connecticut     
• Univ. of Iowa                              
• Univ. of Michigan - 
Ann Arbor               
• Univ. of Minnesota - 
Twin Cities            
• Univ. of Utah                              
• Univ. of Virginia  
(12) 
• Clemson Univ.                        
• Colorado State 
Univ.                  
• Florida State Univ.                        
• Georgia Institute of 
Tech.               
• New Jersey Institute 
of Tech.               
• Oregon State Univ.                         
• Rutgers Univ.                
• Univ. of Akron                             
• Univ. of Delaware                          
• Univ. of Maryland, 
College Park             
• Univ. of Oregon  
(11) 
Non-Universities (Hospitals and Research Institutions) (9) 
Medical Research 
Centers (3) 
n/a • City of Hope 
National Med. Ctr.            
• Fred Hutchinson 
Cancer Res. Ctr.          
• National Jewish Med. 
and Res. Ctr.  
(3) 
n/a n/a 
Special-Focus 
Institutions – 
Medical (4) 
• Baylor College of 
Medicine      
• Mayo Foundation for 
Med. Edu. and Res.  
• (2) 
n/a • Penn State Milton S. 
Hershey Med. Ctr.      
• Univ. of Texas 
Southwestern Med. 
Ctr. 
• (2) 
n/a 
Teaching and 
Research Hospitals 
(2) 
n/a • Brigham and 
Women's Hosp.                    
• St. Jude Children's 
Res. Hosp.  
(2) 
n/a n/a 
 
 Characteristic Variables and Data Gathering 7.1.3.
Institutional characteristics include size, type, research intensity, prestige, and licensing 
experience and effort of a licensing office. The experience and degree of effort on the 
part of technology licensing offices is measured by age (2007 - year established), 
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licensing, and other full-time equivalents (FTEs). The variables and data sources are 
summarized in Table 60. 
 
Table 60: Institutional variables and data sources 
Types Variables Definitions Source 
Institution 
Characteristics 
Institution Type Institution types 
AUTM, 
NCES 
Private/Public Private or public status 
NCES, US 
News, 
Wikipedia 
Medical School The existence of medical school AUTM 
Academic 
Prestige and 
Research 
Faculty’s 
flexible time 
Number of students per faculty NCES 
Research 
Activity 
Total number of journal articles published from 
1991 to 2007 in Compendex and GEOBASE 
DB 
Engineering 
Village DB 
Academic 
Prestige 
Average ranking of “TOP Medical Schools” , 
“Best Research Ranking of Medical Schools” , 
“Best Patient Care Ranking of Medical 
Schools”, “Best Graduate Science School 
Ranking” , “Best Graduate Engineering School 
Ranking”    
US News 
Ranking, 
2011 
Efforts of 
Licensing 
Office 
Experience TTO age (2007- instituted year) 
AUTM 
Licensing effort Licensing FTEs in TLO 
Licensing 
support 
Other FTEs in TLO 
 
 
 Characteristics of the 46 Academic Research Institutions and Licensing Data 7.2.
 Selecting an ANOVA Test Method 7.2.1.
The ANOVA test is used to explore organizational differences. If the dependent variables 
follow normality, a one-way ANOVA is used; otherwise, the Kruskal-Wallis test is used. 
(The result of the normality test is presented in Appendix F.) If the p-value of the 
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Shapiro-Wilk statistics is greater than 0.05, the data satisfies normality. The results 
showed that medical research centers and institutions with a special focus on medicine 
satisfy normality. However, universities didn’t satisfy the normality condition, and 
teaching and research hospitals were not available for the test because of the small 
number of cases. Therefore, Kruskal-Wallis, a nonparametric ANOVA test, was used for 
comparisons of the groups. 
 
 Comparison of Licensing Data from Four Types of Institution 7.2.2.
The cumulative time-lag effect neutralized licensing data of four institutional types is 
summarized in Table 61. The special-focus medical institutions had the highest 
expenditure during the period, followed by universities and teaching and research 
hospitals. However, medical research centers showed higher licensing income than 
medical institutions. Universities and medical institutions recorded similar licensing 
income, but medical institutions showed higher values for all outcome variables, 
excluding licensing income. 
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Table 61: Case summaries by four institution types and cumulative time-lag effect 
neutralized licensing data (1991–1999) 
Institution 
Types 
Statistics 
EXP 
from 
1991 to 
1999 
DIS 
from 
1991 to 
1999 
PTF 
from 
1991 to 
1999 
PTI 
from 
1992 to 
2004 
LOE 
from 
1991 to 
1999 
STU 
from 
1995 to 
2007 
LCI from 
1996 to 
2004 
Universities Mean 128 777 352 199 291 30 443 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
122 725 373 214 249 34 606 
Medical 
Research 
Centers 
Mean 45 179 88 60 97 4 843 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
32 68 29 19 56 3 1,345 
Teaching 
and 
Research 
Hospitals 
Mean 67 431 203 125 237 10 212 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
52 249 198 119 36 14 240 
Special 
Focus 
Institution - 
Medical 
Mean 153 1,036 481 206 410 21 442 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
70 376 384 64 231 10 230 
Total Mean 122 746 339 188 287 27 459 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
114 682 359 197 239 32 626 
 
Note: DIS = number of disclosures, EXP = research expenditure, LCI = licensing income, LOE = number 
of licenses and options executed, PTF = number of U.S. patent applications, PTI = number of U.S. patents 
issued, STU = number of start-ups. 
 
The result of the ANOVA test is presented in Table 62. Disclosure is the only statistically 
significant difference among the institution types. Universities and special focus medical 
institutions had a higher number of disclosures than the other two groups of institutions.  
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Table 62: Kruskal-Wallis test of cumulative licensing data over four institution types 
 Cumulative 
Time 
Aggregated 
Expenditure 
From 1991 
to 1999 
Cumulative 
Time 
Aggregated 
Disclosure 
From 1991 
to 1999 
Cumulative 
Time 
Aggregated 
Patent 
Applications 
From 1991 
to 1999 
Cumulative 
Time 
Aggregated 
Patents 
Issued From 
1992 to 
2004 
Cumulative 
Time 
Aggregated 
Licenses 
and Options 
Executed 
From 1991 
to 1999 
Cumulative 
Time 
Aggregated 
Start-Ups 
From 1995 to 
2007 
Cumulative 
Time 
Aggregated 
Licensing 
Income 
From 1996 
to 2004 
Chi-
square 
5.704 7.807 5.905 5.429 4.902 7.385 1.479 
Degrees of 
freedom 
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Asymp. 
Sig. 
.127 .050 .116 .143 .179 .061 .687 
 
Note: Grouping variable is institution type. 
 
The output variables per expenditure are summarized in Table 63. Medical research 
centers yielded higher licensing incomes than the total average. Hospitals had a smaller 
number of start-ups than other groups. The number of start-ups was greater than the total 
average. However, the ANOVA test (Table 64) showed that the differences among the 
variables relative to expenditure are not statistically significant for the four institution 
types. 
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Table 63: Four institution types and six cumulative time-lag effect neutralized licensing 
output variables per expenditure 
Institution 
Types 
Statistics 
Cumulative Time aggregated Licensing Variables per Expenditure 
DIS PTF PTI LOE STU LCI 
Universities Mean 8.16 3.35 1.91 2.85 .32 4.72 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
8.42 3.05 1.74 3.11 .42 7.28 
Medical 
Research 
Centers 
Mean 4.76 2.65 1.78 2.82 .12 23.62 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
1.70 1.44 .92 2.33 .09 38.51 
Teaching and 
Research 
Hospitals 
Mean 7.13 2.70 1.68 4.75 .09 2.53 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
1.84 .85 .47 3.16 .13 1.61 
Special-Focus 
Institution—
Medical 
Mean 7.16 2.91 1.46 3.22 .14 3.67 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
2.51 1.10 .48 2.35 .03 2.29 
Total Mean 7.81 3.24 1.85 2.96 .28 5.77 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
7.62 2.77 1.58 2.96 .38 11.48 
 
Note: DIS = number of disclosures, LCI = licensing income, LOE = number of licenses and options 
executed, PTF = number of U.S. patent applications, PTI = number of U.S. patents issued, STU = number 
of start-ups. 
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Table 64: Kruskal-Wallis test of cumulative licensing data per expenditure by four 
institution types 
 Cumulative 
Disclosures per 
Expenditure 
Cumulative 
Patent 
Applications 
per 
Expenditure 
Cumulative 
Patents Issued 
per 
Expenditure 
Cumulative 
Licenses and 
Options 
Executed per 
Expenditure 
Cumulative 
Start-Ups per 
Expenditure 
Cumulative 
Licensing 
Income per 
Expenditure 
Chi-Square 2.114 .239 .687 2.244 6.178 .632 
Degrees of 
freedom 
3 3 3 3 3 3 
Asymp. Sig. .549 .971 .876 .523 .103 .889 
 
Note: Grouping variable is institution type. 
 
 Comparison of Licensing Data From Two Types of Institution 7.2.3.
The institutions were regrouped by universities and non-universities, including medical 
research centers, teaching and research hospitals, and special focus medical institutions, 
as summarized in Table 65. The Kruskal-Wallis test indicated no difference between the 
two groups (Table 66). (See normality test in Appendix G.) 
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Table 65: Two institution types and cumulative time-lag effect neutralized licensing data 
(1991–1999) 
Institution 
Types 
Statistics 
EXP from 
1991 to 
1999 
DIS 
from 
1991 to 
1999 
PTF 
from 
1991 to 
1999 
PTI from 
1992 to 
2004 
LOE 
from 
1991 to 
1999 
STU 
from 
1995 to 
2007 
LCI 
from 
1996 to 
2004 
Non-
University 
Mean 98 616 288 140 267 13 525 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
73 480 309 89 206 11 739 
University Mean 128 777 352 199 291 30 443 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
122 725 373 214 249 34 606 
Total Mean 122 746 339 188 287 27 459 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
114 682 359 197 239 32 626 
 
Note: DIS = number of disclosures, EXP = research expenditure, LCI = licensing income, LOE = number 
of licenses and options executed, PTF = number of U.S. patent applications, PTI = number of U.S. patents 
issued, STU = number of start-ups. 
 
 
Table 66: Kruskal-Wallis test of cumulative licensing data from two types of institution 
 Cumulative 
Time 
Aggregated 
Expenditure 
from 1991 
to 1999 
Cumulative 
Time 
Aggregated 
Disclosure 
from 1991 to 
1999 
Cumulative 
Time 
Aggregated 
Patent 
Applications 
from 1991 
to 1999 
Cumulative 
Time 
Aggregated 
Patents 
Issued from 
1992 to 
2004 
Cumulative 
Time 
Aggregated 
Licenses 
and Options 
Executed 
from 1991 
to 1999 
Cumulative 
Time 
Aggregated 
Start-Ups 
from 1995 to 
2007 
Cumulative 
Time 
Aggregated 
Licensing 
Income 
from 1996 
to 2004 
Chi-
Square 
.354 .184 .538 .262 .000 3.043 .161 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Asymp. 
Sig. 
.552 .668 .463 .608 .989 .081 .688 
 
Note: Grouping variable is institution type. 
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However, if cumulative variables per expenditure are considered (Table 67), universities 
had more start-ups than the other institutions (Table 68). Licensing income per 
expenditure of non-universities was higher than that of universities, but this was not 
statistically significant. 
 
Table 67: Two institution types and cumulative time-lag effect neutralized licensing data 
per expenditure 
Institution 
types 
Statistics 
Cumulative 
Disclosures 
per 
Expenditure 
Cumulative 
Patent 
Applications 
per 
Expenditure 
Cumulative 
Patents 
Issued per 
Expenditure 
Cumulative 
Licenses 
and Options 
Executed 
per 
Expenditure 
Cumulative 
Start-Ups 
per 
Expenditure 
Cumulative 
Licensing 
Income per 
Expenditure 
Non-
University 
Mean 6.35 2.78 1.61 3.43 .12 10.07 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
2.22 1.04 .59 2.29 .07 21.83 
University Mean 8.16 3.35 1.91 2.85 .32 4.72 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
8.42 3.05 1.74 3.11 .42 7.28 
Total Mean 7.81 3.24 1.85 2.96 .28 5.77 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
7.62 2.77 1.58 2.96 .38 11.48 
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Table 68: Kruskal-Wallis test of cumulative licensing data per expenditure by two types of 
institution 
  
Cumulative 
Disclosures 
per 
Expenditure 
Cumulative 
Patent 
Applications 
per 
Expenditure 
Cumulative 
Patents 
Issued per 
Expenditure 
Cumulative 
Licenses and 
Options 
Executed per 
Expenditure 
Cumulative 
Start-Ups per 
Expenditure 
Cumulative 
Licensing 
Income per 
Expenditure 
Chi-
Square 
.209 .069 .161 1.021 6.142 .538 
Degrees 
of 
Freedom 
1 1 1 1 1 1 
Asymp. 
Sig. 
.648 .793 .688 .312 .013 .463 
 
Note: Grouping variable is institution type—universities or non-universities (hospital research institutions) 
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 Characteristics of Licensing Performance 7.3.
 Characteristic Variables by Institutional Type 7.3.1.
The total number of journal articles from 1991 to 2007, and three technology licensing 
office–related variables, were sorted by institution type (Table 69). Universities had a 
much higher number of papers published in journals, and this is statistically significant 
(Table 70). No other significant difference was found. Each variable per expenditure 
shows the same result (Table 71 and Table 72). 
 
Table 69: Journal articles and technology licensing office–related variables by institution 
type 
Institution Type Statistics 
Total Number of 
Journal Articles from 
1991 to 2007 
(Compendex and 
GEOBASE) 
Age of 
Technology 
Licensing 
Office (2007 - 
Year 
Instituted) 
Licensing 
Full-Time 
Equivalents 
in 
Technology 
Licensing 
Offices 
Other Full-
Time 
Equivalents 
in 
Technology 
Licensing 
Offices 
Universities 
Mean 7,764 24 6 6 
Standard 
Deviation 
4,521 11 5 6 
Medical Research 
Centers 
Mean 301 18 3 2 
Standard 
Deviation 
133 4 1 1 
Teaching and 
Research Hospitals 
  
Mean 894 17 6 6 
Standard 
Deviation 
986 6 4 5 
Special-Focus 
Institution—
Medical 
Mean 1,071 20 8 9 
Standard 
Deviation 
638 3 3 5 
Total 
Mean 6,396 23 6 6 
Standard 
Deviation 
4,928 10 4 6 
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Table 70: Kruskal-Wallis test of journal papers and technology licensing office variables in 
four types of institution 
  
Total Number of 
Journal Articles 
from 1991 to 2007 
in Compendex 
and GEOBASE  
Age of 
Technology 
Licensing Office 
(2007 - Year 
Instituted) 
Licensing Full-
Time 
Equivalents in 
Technology 
Licensing Office 
Other Full-
Time 
Equivalents in 
Technology 
Licensing 
Office 
Chi-Square 19.354 2.678 3.511 4.895 
Degrees of 
freedom 
3 3 3 3 
Asymp. Sig. .000 .444 .319 .180 
 
Note: Grouping variable is institution type 
 
Table 71: Journal articles and technology licensing offices per expenditure by type of 
institution 
Institution Types Statistics 
Journal 
Articles per 
Expenditure 
Age of 
Technology 
Licensing 
Office per 
Expenditure 
Technology 
Licensing 
Office 
Licensing Full-
Time 
Equivalents per 
Expenditure 
Technology 
Licensing 
Office Other 
Full-Time 
Equivalents per 
Expenditure 
Universities 
  
Mean 118.15 0.37 0.07 0.06 
Standard 
Deviation 
201.93 0.41 0.07 0.06 
Medical Research 
Centers 
  
Mean 7.94 0.51 0.09 0.04 
Standard 
Deviation 
3.05 0.25 0.06 0.02 
Teaching and Research 
Hospitals 
  
Mean 10.88 0.30 0.09 0.08 
Standard 
Deviation 
6.22 0.14 0.01 0.02 
Special-Focus 
Institution—Medical 
  
Mean 9.06 0.15 0.06 0.08 
Standard 
Deviation 
6.05 0.05 0.04 0.06 
Total 
 
Mean 96.82 0.36 .07 0.06 
Standard 
Deviation 
185.84 0.38 0.06 0.05 
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Table 72: Kruskal-Wallis test of journal papers and technology licensing office variables 
per expenditure by four types of institution 
  
Total Number of 
Journal Articles 
per Expenditure 
from 1991 to 2007  
Age of 
Technology 
Licensing Office 
(2007 – Year 
Instituted) per 
Expenditure 
Licensing Full-
Time 
Equivalents in 
Technology 
Licensing 
Offices per 
Expenditure 
Other Full-
Time 
Equivalents in 
Technology 
Licensing 
Offices per 
Expenditure 
Chi-Square 19.354 2.678 3.511 4.895 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
3 3 3 3 
Asymp. Sig. .000 .444 .319 .180 
 
Note: Grouping variable is institution type 
 
 Correlation among Cumulative Licensing and Characteristic Variables 7.3.2.
Table 73 summarizes the correlation between cumulative time aggregated variables and 
institutional characteristic variables. Private institutions showed a positive correlation 
with all licensing variables, but these correlations were not statistically significant. 
Universities with medical schools were positively correlated with expenditure. All 
licensing variables, except for licensing income, had positive relationships with three 
TLO variables. The average ranking of the institutions was positively related to all 
licensing variables, except for expenditure and licensing income. In the case of journal 
articles, all licensing variables showed a positive correlation, except for licenses and 
options executed and licensing income. 
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Table 73: Correlation matrix of cumulative licensing data and institutional variables 
Cumulative 
Time 
aggregated 
Licensing 
Variables 
Institution 
Type 
Private 
or Public 
Status 
Medical 
School 
Age of 
Technolo
gy 
Licensing 
Office  
Licensing 
Full-Time 
Equivalents in 
Technology 
Licensing 
Office 
Other Full-
Time 
Equivalents in 
Technology 
Licensing 
Offices 
Average 
Ranking 
Journal 
Articles 
(a) (b) 
EXP -0.02 0.11 0.10 0.33* 0.54** 0.51** 0.69** 0.18 0.30* 
DIS 0.02 0.09 0.11 0.13 0.68** 0.62** 0.63** 0.36** 0.38** 
PTF 0.03 0.07 0.15 0.12 0.59** 0.49** 0.61** 0.33* 0.31* 
PTI -0.05 0.12 0.16 0.09 0.69** 0.60** 0.63** 0.48** 0.32* 
LOE 0.07 0.04 0.20 0.28 0.68** 0.71** 0.75** 0.29* 0.27 
STU -0.16 0.22 0.08 -0.02 0.75** 0.58** 0.50** 0.51** 0.40** 
LCI 0.00 -0.05 0.15 -0.04 0.28 0.27 0.24 0.18 0.00 
 
Note: *p-value < 0.1, **p-value < 0.05 
(a) = Universities, medical research centers, teaching and research hospitals, or special focus institution–
medical 
(b) = Universities or non-universities 
 DIS = number of disclosures, EXP = research expenditure, LCI = licensing income, LOE = number of 
licenses and options executed, PTF = number of U.S. patent applications, PTI = number of U.S. patents 
issued, STU = number of start-ups. 
 
Table 74 summarizes the correlations among the variables related to research 
performance, institutions’ size or human research capacity, licensing offices, and 
licensing performance. 
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Table 74: Correlation among licensing characteristics and universities 
Other Characteristics 
Technology Licensing Office 
(TLO) 
Licensing Performance 
Category Characteristics TLO Age 
Licensing 
Full-Time 
Equivalen
ts in TLO 
Other 
Full-Time 
Equivalent
s in TLO 
Average 
Efficiency 
Average 
Malmquist 
Index 
Research 
Performance 
Science and technology 
journal articles 
0.29* 0.22 0.28 0.02 -0.16 
Best graduate engineering 
school ranking (higher is 
better) 
0.65** 0.45** 0.29 0.35* -0.09 
Best graduate science school 
ranking (higher is better) 
0.67** 0.44** 0.37* 0.38* -0.08 
Institutions’ 
size and 
research 
capacity 
(universities) 
Number of students per 
faculty 
-0.18 -0.13 -0.35* 0.16 0.24 
Total enrolled students in 
fall 2009 
0.07 0.20 0.10 0.05 0.09 
Total enrolled graduate 
students in fall 2009 
0.35* 0.43** 0.43** -0.15 -0.16 
 
Note: *p-value < 0.1, **p-value < 0.05 
 
The age of a technology licensing office was positively related to research performance 
and total number graduate students. Similarly, institutions with better performance in 
research had larger TLO staffs. Average licensing efficiency was positively related to the 
two research performance variables. On the other hand, significant relationships among 
licensing performance changes, the Malmquist Index, and other research- and size-related 
variables were not observed. 
 
 Regression of Six Licensing Outcome Variables to the Characteristics 7.3.3.
Variables 
The six licensing outcome variables were regressed to expenditure and characteristics 
variables, including journal articles, average rankings (higher is better), private status, 
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and presence of a medical school. The second model includes TLO variables such as 
TLO age, licensing FTEs in TLOs, and other FTEs in TLOs (Table 75). Private or public 
status and existence of a medical school were not significant, throughout all models. The 
journal articles were positively related to disclosure and start-up. The average ranking of 
an institution was related only to number of patents issued. More licensing FTEs were 
related to more licenses and options executed. On the other hand, older TLOs were 
related to more start-ups. 
 233 
 
Table 75: Regression of licensing outcomes to characteristic variables (four institution types 
excluded) 
Variables 
Cumulative Licensing Outcomes 
Disclosure 
Patent 
Applications 
Patents Issued 
Licenses and 
Options 
Executed 
Start-Ups 
Licensing 
Income 
Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Model 
1&2 
Expenditure 0.65** 0.40** 0.82** 0.71** 0.66** 0.41** 0.71** 0.38** 0.46** 0.19 - 
Journal 
Articles 
0.26* 0.22 0.13 0.10 0.21 0.15 0.13 0.10 0.36** 0.26* - 
Average 
Ranking 
0.13 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.24* 0.16 0.10 0.00 0.31* 0.20 - 
Private 
Status 
0.11 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.15 0.17 0.07 0.03 - 
Medical 
School 
-0.08 -0.16 -0.15 -0.17 -0.08 -0.14 0.06 -0.06 -0.12 -0.17 - 
Technology 
Licensing 
Office Age  
 0.18  0.14  0.23  0.08  0.43** - 
Licensing 
Full-Time 
Equivalents 
in 
Technology 
Licensing 
Office 
 0.23  0.02  0.14  0.32**  0.14 - 
Other Full-
Time 
Equivalents 
in 
Technology 
Licensing 
Offices 
 0.12  0.05  0.14  0.26  0.05 - 
Adjuste
d R2 
0.56** 0.72** 0.69** 0.74** 0.60** 0.68** 0.62** 0.79** 0.48** 0.67** - 
 
Note: *p-value < 0.1, **p-value < 0.05 
 
The four institution types were added to the regression models above, as summarized in 
Table 76. Most results were similar to those of the previous regression models, except for 
the effect of existence of a medical school and average ranking. The existence of a 
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medical school was negatively related to disclosure and patent applications. An additional 
significant effect of average ranking to patents issued was observed when institution 
types were considered. The presence of a special-focus medical institution showed a 
positive effect on disclosure, whereas effects of other types were not significant. Other 
licensing FTE was also positively related to licenses and options executed. No significant 
relationship with licensing income was observed. 
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Table 76: Regression of licensing outcomes to characteristic variables (four institution types) 
Variables 
Cumulative Licensing Outcomes 
Disclosure 
Patent 
Applications 
Patents Issued 
Licenses and 
Options 
Executed 
Start-Ups 
Licensing 
Income 
Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Model 
1 & 2 
Expenditure 0.55** 0.37** 0.75** 0.69** 0.57** 0.37** 0.63** 0.36** 0.35** 0.14 - 
Journal 
Articles 
0.32* 0.30* 0.18 0.16 0.18 0.14 0.18 0.14 0.28* 0.25* - 
Average 
Ranking 
0.32* 0.17 0.17 0.11 0.16** 0.34** 0.24 0.09 0.60** 0.12** - 
Private Status 0.18 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.15 0.14 0.19 0.21* 0.14 0.09 - 
Medical School -0.17 -0.23* -0.21* -0..22* -0.12 -0.18 0.01 -0.10 -0.18 -0.23* - 
Universities 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.08 0.17 0.17 0.00 0.09 0.32 0.24 - 
Medical 
Research 
Centers 
-0.21 -0.11 -0.12 -0.10 -0.27 -0.18 -0.23 -0.08 -0.31 -0.21 - 
Special-Focus 
Institutions 
(Medical) 
0.34* 0.34* 0.26 0.24 0.20 0.19 0.17 0.19 0.29 0.25 - 
Technology 
Licensing 
Office Age  
 
0.17 
 
0.14 
 
0.16 
 
0.06 
 
0.35* 
 
Licensing Full-
Time 
Equivalents in 
Technology 
Licensing 
Office 
 
0.21 
 
0.01 
 
0.13 
 
0.31** 
 
0.13 
 
Other Full-
Time 
Equivalents in 
Technology 
Licensing 
Office 
 
0.08 
 
0.02 
 
0.15 
 
0.24* 
 
0.05 
 
Adjusted R2 0.64** 0.74** 0.72** 0.71** 0.66** 0.71** 0.65** 0.80** 0.60** 0.73** - 
 
Note: *p-value < 0.1, **p-value < 0.05 
Values are standard coefficients. 
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  Regression of Efficiency and Efficiency Changes to Characteristic 7.3.4.
Variables 
The average efficiency and Malmquist Index scores were regressed to the characteristic 
variables (Table 77). The existence of a medical school had a negative effect on average 
efficiency. TLO licensing-related FTE per expenditure was positively related to both 
efficiency and efficiency change. Other FTE per expenditure was related to higher 
efficiency. Private institutions showed positive effects on average efficiency change. 
 
Table 77: Regression of efficiency and efficiency changes to characteristic variables (four 
institution types) 
Independent Variables 
Dependent Variable 
Average Efficiency Average Malmquist Index 
Total Number of Journal Articles From 
1991 to 2007 
0.13 0.04 
Average of Hospital, Medical, Science, 
and Engineering Ranking 
-0.12 -0.11 
Private or Public Status 0.21 0.27* 
Existence of a Medical School -0.34** -0.18 
Universities 0.42 0.36 
Medical Research Centers 0.30 0.07 
Special-Focus Institutions (Medical) 0.28 0.25 
Technology Licensing Office Age (2007 
– year instituted) 
0.21 -0.02 
Technology Licensing Office Licensing 
Full-Time Equivalents per Expenditure 
0.34* 0.61** 
Technology Licensing Office Other 
Full-Time Equivalents per Expenditure 
0.41** 0.16 
Adjusted R2 0.55** 0.54** 
 
Note: *p-value < 0.1, **p-value < 0.05 
Values are standard coefficients. 
 
 237 
 
 Summary 7.4.
The significant correlations among the characteristics and licensing data are summarized 
in Table 78. All licensing data, except for licensing income, was positively related to 
TLO and research performance. 
 
Table 78: Summary of correlations 
Cumulative Time 
Effect Neutralized 
Licensing Variables 
by Aggregated 
Time-Lag 
Medical 
School 
Technolog
y Licensing 
Office Age 
Licensing Full-
Time Equivalents 
in Technology 
Licensing Office 
Other Full-Time 
Equivalents in 
Technology 
Licensing Offices 
Average 
Ranking 
Journal 
Articles 
EXP Positive Positive Positive Positive 
 
Positive 
DIS  Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive 
PTF  Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive 
PTI  Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive 
LOE  Positive Positive Positive Positive 
 
STU  Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive 
LCI   
 
   
 
Note: DIS = number of disclosures, EXP = research expenditure, LCI = licensing income, LOE = number 
of licenses and options executed, PTF = number of U.S. patent applications, PTI = number of U.S. patents 
issued, STU = number of start-ups. 
 
Results of regression of licensing data on research expenditure and other characteristics 
are summarized in Table 79. 
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Table 79: Summary of the results of regression of licensing data 
Cumulative 
Time Effect 
Neutralized 
Licensing 
Variables by 
Aggregated 
Time-Lag 
(Dependent) 
EXP 
Private 
Status 
Medical 
School 
Technology 
Licensing 
Office Age 
Licensing Full-
Time 
Equivalents in 
Technology 
Licensing 
Office 
Other Full-
Time 
Equivalents 
in 
Technology 
Licensing 
Offices 
Average 
Ranking 
Journal 
Articles 
DIS Positive  Negative    Positive Positive 
PTF Positive  Negative      
PTI Positive      Positive  
LOE Positive    Positive Positive   
STU Positive  Negative Positive   Positive Positive 
LCI     
 
   
 
Note: DIS = number of disclosures, EXP = research expenditure, LCI = licensing income, LOE = number 
of licenses and options executed, PTF = number of U.S. patent applications, PTI = number of U.S. patents 
issued, STU = number of start-ups. 
 
Regression results of efficiency scores on characteristics are summarized in Table 80. 
 
Table 80: Summary of the results of regression of efficiency and efficiency change 
Cumulative Time 
Effect Neutralized 
Licensing 
Variables by 
Aggregated Time-
Lag (Dependent) 
Private 
Status 
Medical 
School 
Technology 
Licensing 
Office Age 
Licensing Full-
Time 
Equivalents per 
Expenditure 
Other Full-
Time 
Equivalents 
per 
Expenditure 
Average 
Ranking 
Journal 
Articles 
Average 
Efficiency 
 Negative  Positive Positive Positive Positive 
Average 
Malmquist Index 
Positive   Positive    
 
  
 239 
 
 
8Chapter 8. Conclusion 
 Discussion and Implications 8.1.
The implications of this study are discussed in this section. 
 
 Licensing Time Lags and Licensing Strategy 8.1.1.
The individual time-lag relationships between two licensing variables are extended to 
multipath lag effects on licensing income as a final result of licensing activities. A 
summary of the time-lag effects is presented in Table 81. 
 
Table 81: Time-lag effects for licensing 
 
Expenditure Disclosure 
Patent 
Application 
Patent 
Issued 
Licenses and 
Options 
Executed 
Start-Up 
Weighted average lag 
duration 
(Aggregated time lag 
effect X time lag) 
10.3 years 8.8 6.7 7.3 3.3 3.5 
Lag durations with 
high aggregated 
coefficient value 
5 (0.09),  
8 (0.10) 
4 (0.12),  
5 (0.11) 
3 (0.21), 
11 (0.09) 
7 (0.18), 
8 (0.20) 
3 (0.50),  
8 (0.15) 
0 (0.54), 
8 (0.30) 
 
The average lag from expenditure to licensing income throughout all possible paths is 
10.3 years, and the most plausible lags, which have higher standard lag coefficient values, 
are 5 (9%) and 8 (10%) years. The overall lags range from 0 to 27 years. Time lags 
between disclosure and licensing income range from zero to 22 years, with an average of 
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8.8 years. The time lag periods which have the highest effect from the disclosure to 
licensing income are 4 (12%) and 5 (11%) years. 
 
Patent applications and patents issued have similar average lags—6.7 and 7.3 years, 
respectively. Licenses and options executed and start-up also have similar average lag 
periods—3.3 and 3.5 years, respectively. The average lags of the two licensing activities 
are smaller than any other lags. This is a reasonable result because these two variables 
represent actual licensing practice, which has a high correlation to licensing income. 
 
Interesting observations can be made when the two time lags of the highest aggregated 
coefficients are selected for each licensing variable, as shown in Table 81. Although 
disclosure and patents issued have consecutive lags, two time lags of all others are far 
from each other. This might reflect different licensing paths among them. 
 
The first path is a very attractive invention or technology for which a licensing 
opportunity is identified at an early stage of the licensing process. The three short lag 
periods of 5-year lags from expenditure, 3 years from patent, and 3 years from licenses 
and options exercised could be related to this pattern. The second pattern is a delayed or 
shelved invention [60]. There could be many reasons for delay. For example, a 
technology or disclosure may need further breakthrough, market needs may not be clear 
enough, faculty inventors may not be actively involved in licensing, or an academic 
institution may be conservative in licensing and negotiation [36, 51, 111]. 
 241 
 
 
The longer lags, such as 8 years from expenditure, 11 years from patent application, and 
8 years from licenses and options exercised, could be associated with the second pattern. 
Start-up at t - 0 has the highest effect on licensing. This is consistent with findings from 
other researchers [23, 55, 114, 121]. Generally, universities prefer a short-term cash 
reward from a spin-off, rather than long-term royalty or equity. 
 
The cumulative total time-lag effects are illustrated in Figure 41. The cumulative lags of 
start-up reflect two distinct license royalty strategies of spin-offs. The first 50% of start –
up is associated with long periods of 7 and 8 years, and the other half is related to zero or 
one year duration until royalties are collected. The longer period results from annual 
royalty or equity, which adds years before a new start-up generates revenues. In 
interviews with university licensing managers, Bray and Lee [23] found that it is not 
uncommon for a spin-off to take 8 years until it starts to generate revenue; it can take 10 
years after licensing is negotiated, if the invention requires clinical trials. The shorter 
time lags represent the lump sum cash payment option, which occurs within a year or two. 
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Figure 41: Cumulative time-lag effects 
 
Three distinctive lag periods for licensing and options executed were observed: long term 
(8 to 7 years), medium term (3 to 4 years), and short term (up to 1 year). These lag 
periods are related to the royalty types that an institution receives from the license, such 
as equity, running royalty, and lump sum by an auction and up-front payment [23, 121]. 
 
In summary, research institution licensing offices should consider the time lags in 
licensing and incorporate these lags into their licensing strategy. Depending on the policy 
and financial goal of the university’s licensing, the licensing office can develop a 
licensing portfolio for an invention so that the desirable cash flow of multiple licensing 
negotiations is achieved. This also suggests that university administrators and 
stakeholders outside of the university must understand that licensing is a time-consuming 
process. Therefore, they should not enforce a certain licensing format or apply a faculty 
reward system with a short time frame. 
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 Relative Licensing Performance of Academic Research Institutions 8.1.2.
The overall licensing performance of the 46 universities examined is presented in Table 
82. The average efficiency of all institutions during the period investigated is 0.65 (SE), 
and they improved 33% (MI) annually over the period. Although most scores show a 
small change every year, MI in 1992 and SE in 1993 show relatively higher scores 
because of the extremely high super-efficiency scores of Brigham Young University in 
1993. 
 
Table 82: Average scores of the 46 institutions by year 
Year of 
Expenditure (t) 
Average Super-
Efficiency at t 
Average 
Efficiency 
Change (From t 
to t + 1) 
Average 
Technical 
Change 
(From t to t + 1) 
Average 
Malmquist Index 
(From t to t + 1) 
1991 0.70 1.02 1.70 1.69 
1992 0.61 1.41 1.23 2.20 
1993 0.86 1.10 0.97 1.01 
1994 0.59 1.19 1.11 1.25 
1995 0.59 1.21 0.98 1.13 
1996 0.64 0.97 1.23 1.18 
1997 0.63 0.99 1.14 1.08 
1998 0.60 1.23 0.92 1.12 
1999 0.66 - - - 
Average 0.65 1.14 1.16 1.33 
 
Note: t = time 
 
Two distinct periods of performance change were observed, as illustrated in Figure 42. 
The average efficiency change scores of the 46 institutions were higher than the technical 
change scores from 1992 to 1995. This is the period dominated by the licensing 
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performance of institutions that were catching up. During this period, inefficient 
institutions improved their performance significantly. On the other hand, the prominent 
performance improvements of the best practicing institutions occurred after this period. 
  
 
 
Figure 42: Catch-up and frontier expansion dominating periods 
 
 
Figure 43 shows the location of the super-efficient (SE ≥	 1) and inefficient (SE < 1) 
institutions along the two dimensions of average super-efficiency scores and Malmquist 
Indexes. There were 7 super-efficient institutions, including (in the order of efficiency 
scores) Brigham Young University, the University of Akron, the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology, City of Hope National Medical Center, California Institute of Technology, 
and Florida State University. The result is consistent with the best practicing universities 
identified by Thursby and Kemp [122], except for City of Hope, which is a research 
hospital.  
 
These institutions have similar performance changes, although Brigham Young 
University improved significantly because the university had an extreme score in 1993. 
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The licensing performances of Brigham Young University, the University of Akron, the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and City of Hope were more than two times 
higher than that of other low-performance (inefficient) institutions. 
 
 
Figure 43: Average super-efficiency and efficiency change (Malmquist Index) of the 46 
institutions 
 
The Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the California Institute of Technology are 
prominent engineering schools that have very intensive research activity because of their 
higher research funding. Other studies [6, 62, 122] also identified these schools as the 
best-performing universities in commercialization. City of Hope is a private teaching and 
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research hospital, ranked number 17 in the area of cancer treatment in a 2010 national 
hospital ranking by US News. The hospital, established in 1913, is famous for its 
contribution to the development of synthetic human insulin in 1978 as well as for its 
dedicated comprehensive cancer center. In 2007, the institution had the highest licensing 
income of the 46 institutions, $118 million. However, its average expenditure during the 
period was relatively low, $77 million, which ranked 38 out of 46. This is a good 
example of the licensing and commercialization effect of the medical and biotechnology 
areas. Florida State University is similar to City of Hope. The average expenditure of the 
university is low, ranked 30th, but its licensing income is high, ranked 4th. 
 
On the other hand, three universities that had both low expenditure and low licensing 
income were identified as best-practicing institutions. The University of Akron, Ohio 
University and Brigham Young University had the lowest average research expenditures, 
ranked 44, 45, and 46, respectively. Their licensing income rankings are 39, 37, and 26, 
respectively. 
 
The 46 institutions are grouped by average super-efficiency scores and Malmquist 
Indexes, as presented in Table 83 and Table 84. 
 
 
 
 247 
 
Table 83: Low-efficiency group (39 institutions) 
Malmquist 
Index 
Super-efficiency score 
< 30% 
Exceptionally 
Low Efficiency 
< 50% 
Very Low 
Efficiency 
< 70% 
Low Efficiency 
< 90% 
Slightly Low 
Efficiency 
 < 110% 
Low 
Improvement 
 Clemson Univ. 
 Tulane Univ. 
(2) 
 Univ. of Cincinnati 
 Univ. of Dayton 
 Univ. of Southern 
California 
 Univ. of Virginia 
Patent Fdn. 
(4) 
  
< 130% 
Medium 
Improvement 
 Case Western 
Reserve Univ. 
 Colorado State 
Univ. 
 Fred Hutchinson 
Cancer Res. 
 Indiana Univ. 
(ARTI) 
 Univ. of Arizona 
 Univ. of 
Connecticut 
Vanderbilt Univ. 
(7) 
 Brigham & 
Women's Hospital, 
Inc. 
 Mayo Foundation 
 Northwestern Univ. 
 Ohio State Univ. 
 Penn State Univ. 
 Rutgers, The State 
Univ. 
 Univ. of Delaware 
 Univ. of Iowa 
Research Fdn. 
 Univ. of Oregon 
 Univ. of Texas 
Southwestern 
 Washington Univ. 
(11) 
 Georgia Inst. of 
Technology 
 Harvard Univ. 
 Johns Hopkins 
Univ. 
 Univ. of Minnesota 
(4) 
 Michigan State 
Univ. 
 Univ. of Utah 
(2) 
< 150% 
High 
Improvement 
 Baylor College of 
Medicine 
 National Jewish 
Center 
 Oregon State Univ. 
 St. Jude Children's 
Researc 
(4) 
 Univ. of Maryland, 
College 
 Univ. of Michigan 
 Wake Forest Univ. 
(3) 
  
< 200% 
Very High 
Improvement 
  Dartmouth College 
 New Jersey 
Institute of Tech. 
(2) 
  
> 200% 
Exceptional 
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Table 84: High-efficiency group (7 institutions) 
Malmquist 
Index 
Super-efficiency score 
< 100% 
Good 
Efficiency 
< 200% 
Super-Efficiency 
< 300% 
Very High 
Super-Efficiency 
> 300% 
Exceptionally 
High Super-
Efficiency 
< 110% 
Low 
Improvement 
 
 Ohio Univ. 
(1) 
 City of Hope 
National Medic 
 Massachusetts Inst. 
of Tech 
(2) 
 
< 130% 
Medium 
Improvement 
 
 California Institute 
of Tech. 
(1) 
  
< 150% 
High 
Improvement 
 
 Florida State Univ. 
(1) 
 
 Univ. of Akron 
(1) 
< 200% 
Very High 
Improvement 
    
> 200% 
Exceptional 
   
 Brigham Young 
Univ. 
(1) 
  
 
A. Top Research Institutions with Low Licensing Performance 
The research intensity and licensing performance of prestigious research universities are 
compared to explore the reasons for the differences in licensing performance. For this 
purpose, research intensity is defined as a ratio of publications per unit of expenditure to 
number of students per faculty. Generally, the ratio of students to faculty is used as an 
indicator of available time and effort that a faculty may use to focus on his or her 
research. Journal publications relative to research expenditure are used as an 
approximation of research performance. The research intensity of the six universities and 
their licensing activity are compared in Table 84. 
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Table 85: Research and licensing activity of top research institutions 
Institutions 
Research Activity Licensing Activity 
Number of 
students per 
faculty (a) 
Journal 
publications 
per unit of 
research 
expenditure 
(b) 
Research 
Intensity 
 (b)/(a) 
Technolog
y licensing 
office age 
(2007 - 
year 
instituted) 
Licensing 
full-time 
equivalents 
per unit of 
expenditur
e 
Licensing 
full-time 
equivalents 
per total 
disclosure* 
Super-Efficient 
and Excellent 
Research 
Performance 
Institutions  
(100% ≤ 
Super-
Efficiency) 
California 
Institute of 
Technology 
3 132.80 44.27 29 0.05 1.80 
Massachuset
ts Institute 
of 
Technology 
8 23.04 2.88 67 0.05 5.60 
Average 5.50 77.92 14.17 48.00 0.05 3.70 
Inefficient but 
Good Research 
Performance 
Institutions 
(50% ≤	Super-
Efficiency < 
70%) 
Georgia 
Inst. of Tech 
18 86.29 4.79 17 0.05 5.70 
Harvard 
Univ. 
7 44.37 6.34 30 0.02 5.90 
Johns 
Hopkins 
Univ. 
11 11.27 1.02 34 0.01 4.10 
Univ. of 
Minnesota 
21 40.12 1.91 50 0.12 16.30 
Average 11.33 56.31 4.97 37.83 0.05 8.00 
 
Note: * = The number of the licensing full-time equivalents per total disclosure = 1,000s 
 
Four institutions have potential to improve their licensing performance: the Georgia 
Institute of Technology, Harvard University, Johns Hopkins University, and the 
University of Minnesota. With high research expenditures (among the top 10 for 
expenditure out of the 46 institutions) and excellent academic reputations, these 
institutions are located in the same group of low efficiency (efficiency scores between 50% 
and 70%) and medium improvement (Malmquist Indexes between 110% and 130%), 
whereas some other research universities, including the California Institute of 
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Technology and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, which also have excellent 
academic reputations, demonstrate super-efficient licensing performance. 
 
The California Institute of Technology has outstanding research intensity and licensing 
performance. The superiority of its licensing performance is a result of its research 
performance in science and engineering, which advances technologies for commercial 
purposes. The other super-efficient licensing university, the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, has a research intensity similar to that of inefficient universities Johns 
Hopkins University and the University of Minnesota. The research expenditure of Johns 
Hopkins is the highest among the 46 institutions. 
 
Although the 2011 medical school rankings place Johns Hopkins University first and 
Harvard University third, their engineering school rankings are 26th (Johns Hopkins) and 
18th (Harvard). The reason for the lagging licensing performance of the two universities 
is their focus on medical and life sciences rather than engineering. This is supported by 
the finding that a university with a medical school has lower licensing performance than a 
university without a medical school. The licensing FTEs per expenditure of Harvard 
University and Johns Hopkins University are relatively smaller than that of the super-
efficient universities but similar to the level of licensing FTEs per disclosure of the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. This implies that the licensing offices of the two 
inefficient universities have the capability to deal with the disclosure for licensing, but 
not enough licensing experts, given their research scale. Therefore, more licensing 
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professionals in the medical and life sciences area would significantly improve their 
licensing performance. 
 
The Georgia Institute of Technology shows no difference from the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology in either research activity or licensing efforts, except for the age 
of the licensing office. The licensing office of Georgia Tech has the shortest history 
among the six universities listed in Table 85, and its age is lower than the average age, 23 
years, among all 46 institutions. Thus, it can be inferred that, for a long period, the 
university did not have a strong policy supporting licensing, even after the U.S. 
government emphasized technology transfer from universities with the Bayh-Dole Act of 
1980. The lower annual efficiency change of 21%, which is less than the average of 33% 
for the 46 institutions, shows that their licensing practice did not improve significantly 
compared with other institutions, even though they had a similar levels of TLO staff. 
Therefore, the inefficient licensing performance is related to their lack of experience and 
past lack of strong policies supporting licensing, rather than to insufficient research 
performance or licensing staff. 
 
On the other hand, the University of Minnesota has a greater number of licensing staff 
but lower licensing performance. The research intensity of the university is similar to that 
of Johns Hopkins University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, but the 
number of students per faculty is very high compared with the others. Lach and 
Schankerman [64] found that university faculty size is positively related to license 
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income. This implies that, although the research performance of the University of 
Minnesota is not low, its faculty is suffering from a lack of time to actively engage in 
licensing activity. Therefore, university support to secure faculty time to collaborate with 
industry and the licensing office, as well as a reward system for faculty contributions to 
commercialization, are recommended [114]. 
 
The licensing gaps between the two groups cannot be reduced without significant 
improvement in the licensing practices universities support, even though the inefficient 
universities have high potential based on excellent research performance. 
 
B. Medium-Level Research Institutions with Low Licensing Performance  
Michigan State University and the University of Utah, which are ranked 17 and 22 in 
research expenditure, respectively, are located in the same position of slightly low 
efficiency scores and medium licensing improvement. Dartmouth College and the New 
Jersey Institute of Technology, which have very low research expenditure as numbers 35 
and 42 out of the 46 institutions, improved licensing performance significantly while still 
having very low efficiency. Their best engineering school rankings in 2011 are between 
50 and 100. Although according to their rankings they are similar in terms of academic 
prestige, their licensing performances are quite different (Table 86). 
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Table 86: Research and licensing activity of research institutions with low school rankings 
(50 to 100) 
Institutions (Engineering 
School Rankings in 2011) 
Research Activity Licensing Activity 
Number of 
students per 
faculty (a) 
Journal 
publications 
relative to 
research 
expenditure 
(b) 
Research 
intensity 
 (b)/(a) 
Technology 
licensing 
office age 
(2007 - 
instituted 
year) 
Licensing 
full-time 
equivalents 
relative to 
expenditure 
Licensing 
full-time 
equivalents 
per total 
disclosures* 
Super-Efficient  
(100% ≤ 
Super-
Efficiency) 
Florida State 
Univ. (92) 
25.00 98.60 3.94 11.00 0.05 0.02 
Slightly Low 
Efficiency 
(70 ≤ Full-
Time 
Equivalents < 
90 %) 
Michigan 
State Univ. 
(52) 
17.00 82.28 4.84 15.00 0.04 0.01 
Univ. of 
Utah (60) 
15.00 73.85 4.92 39.00 0.09 0.01 
Average 16.00 78.07 4.88 27.00 0.06 0.01 
Very Low 
Efficiency but 
Highly 
Improving 
(50 ≤	Full-
Time 
Equivalents < 
70%) 
Dartmouth 
College (50) 
8.00 48.67 6.08 22.00 0.04 0.01 
New Jersey 
Inst. of 
Tech. (92) 
15.00 103.50 6.90 17.00 0.14 0.01 
Average 11.50 76.09 6.49 19.50 0.09 0.01 
 
Note: * = The number of the licensing full-time equivalents per total disclosure = 1,000s 
 
The differences between the slightly low-efficient and very low-efficient groups in 
research and licensing activity are not clear. However, if the annual changes in licensing 
FTEs are considered, the difference becomes obvious (Figure 44). The slightly low-
efficient universities have increased their licensing staffs significantly so that they are 
similar to or greater than the average of the 46 institutions. On the other hand, the 
licensing FTEs of the very low-efficient universities have stayed at a similar level over 
the years. This implies that the University of Utah and Michigan State University have 
continuous support for licensing and have emphasized licensing activity. 
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Figure 44: Technology licensing offices’ full-time equivalents for slightly efficient and low-
efficiency universities 
 
The Malmquist Index shows that the very low-efficiency group, Dartmouth College and 
the New Jersey Institute of Technology, have greatly improved their licensing 
performance. However, their effort was not superior to the other two universities with a 
similar level of academic prestige. Considering the shorter history of licensing offices at 
the very low-efficiency universities, the significant improvement reflects their late 
engagement in licensing. Therefore, even though the efficiency changes of the two 
universities demonstrate their improvement, more significant catch-up to the other, 
superior universities would not be possible without further investment through their 
licensing offices. 
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C. Low-Level Research Institutions with Very Low Licensing Performance 
This study also found that a less prestigious university with small research expenditure 
can achieve significant licensing outcomes. The engineering schools of Ohio University, 
the University of Akron, and Brigham Young University are ranked 138, 125, and 107, 
respectively, but they are identified as a super-efficient licensing group. This suggests 
that a university with a prestigious reputation or low research expenditure can improve its 
licensing performance. 
 
 Licensing Practices and Related Characteristics of Academic Research 8.1.3.
Institutions 
A. Institution Types and Licensing  
Only certain differences in licensing data are observed among the institution types. 
Universities and special-focus medical institutions have more disclosures than others. 
When universities and non-universities are compared, universities have more start-ups 
than non-universities. This might be due to universities’ greater human resources in the 
form of students and faculty. Universities, in particular, encourage student entrepreneurs 
to create spin-offs and involve faculty in new start-ups. 
 
However, caution is needed when these results are associated with institution types, 
because only a small number of cases (9 out of 46) are involved with non-university 
institutions. 
 
 256 
 
B. Research Performance, Academic Prestige, and Licensing Performance 
Siegel, et al. [113] suggested that a trade-off exists between university technology 
commercialization and research performance. On the other hand, some other studies 
found that higher-quality faculty members, who may bring better-quality research, tend to 
be reluctant to spend their time in the commercialization of their findings [60]. If 
faculties get involved in commercialization activity, they may spend less effort or time on 
their primary duties of teaching and research [96]. 
 
The present study found that licensing variables have a positive correlation with TLO 
variables, ranking, and journal articles. Journal articles and average ranking indirectly 
reflect research intensity and its quality. The results show that an institution with high 
research performance has more disclosures and start-ups. Moreover, a better-than-
average ranking is significantly related to more patents issued. This shows that patents 
issued (though not patent applications) reflect the quality of inventions. The effect of the 
existence of a medical school on disclosure, patent applications, and start-up is negative. 
This shows that, although a medical school spends more research funds, the quantity of 
new inventions is relatively small, resulting in fewer start-ups. 
 
One surprising result is that academic prestige, as measured by academic ranking, is 
negatively related to both licensing efficiency and efficiency change. However, the study 
also found that not only highly prestigious instructions such as the California Institute of 
Technology and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology but also less prestigious ones 
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with lower research expenditure presented high licensing performance. Considering that 
most of the super-efficient institutions are prestigious ones, the result does not strongly 
prove that less-prestigious institutions have better licensing performance. Instead, it can 
be understood that not all prestigious institutions emphasize licensing, and therefore they 
could improve their performance significantly. Another possible interpretation is that the 
negative relationships reflect the dominant catch-up efforts of less-efficient institutions, 
which was observed in 6. Baldini, et al.’s [11] study found that institution size relative to 
total budget does not have a statistically significant relationship with patents. Therefore, 
an effective licensing process and organizational support are very important to achieving 
better licensing performance. 
 
C. Effort, Age, and Licensing Performance of Technology Licensing Offices 
The results of the present study support the findings of other studies [111] [96] [121] [76] 
[64] [47]. Although the effect of a TLO’s age on efficiency and efficiency change is not 
statistically significant, TLO licensing FTEs and other FTEs relative to expenditure 
contribute to better licensing performance. The study also confirms that TLO age is 
associated with the number of start-ups. TLO age represents the history of a TLO and 
therefore its experience. A more experienced TLO with a long history presents good 
support for start-ups. However, more human resources (licensing and other FTEs), rather 
than experience (TLO age), are related to more licenses and options executed. This 
supports the idea that TLO size is important to an institution’s successful licensing 
negotiation. 
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D. Institutions’ Private or Public Status and Licensing Performance 
The results also show that private institutions are more active than public institutions in 
licensing and that their performance is therefore significantly higher. 
 
E. Existence of Medical School and Licensing Performance 
The results of the existing empirical studies of U.S. institutions on the effect of the 
presence of a medical school conflict with each other. Powers [96] and Thursby, et al. 
[121] found a positive but statistically insignificant relationship when licensing income 
was regressed. Anderson, et al. [6] and Thursby and Kemp [122] found that the existence 
of a medical school exerted a negative effect on licensing efficiency, whereas Siegel, et 
al.’s [111] study found the opposite effect on efficiency. 
 
However, if these results and methods are compared carefully, as summarized in Table 
87, it appears that the differences come from the methods employed. Powers [96] and 
Thursby, et al.’s [121] results are consistent in that the effect of a medical school on the 
quantity of licensing income is positive. However, the two other studies [6, 122], using 
the same DEA method, both present a negative effect. These results show that a 
university with a medical school benefits from a greater amount of research funding and 
licensing income. Universities with medical schools also demonstrated the greatest range 
in profitability [28, 127]. On the other hand, their relative licensing performances were 
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not better than that of universities without a medical school. Regarding the insignificant 
effect of a medical school, Powers [96] mentioned, “While this result may seem 
counterintuitive, it is also true that many of the advances in the life sciences do not 
emerge from medical schools but rather from within arts and sciences units” (p. 40). 
 
Table 87: Effect of the existence of a medical school in a university 
Literature 
Effect on Licensing Income Effect on Licensing Efficiency 
Result Method Result Method 
Anderson, et al. [6]   
Negative 
(insignificant) 
Data 
envelopment 
analysis 
Siegel, et al. [111]   
Positive 
(insignificant) 
Stochastic 
frontier 
efficiency 
Powers [96] 
Positive 
(insignificant) 
Regression   
Thursby, et al. [121] 
Positive 
(insignificant) 
Regression   
Thursby and Kemp 
[122] 
  
Negative 
(significant) 
Data 
envelopment 
analysis 
 
The results show that an institution with a medical school obtains more research funding, 
which has a statistically significant and negative effect on efficiency scores. Also, an 
institution with a medical school showed less improvement in efficiency scores during 
the period examined, but this result was not statistically significant. 
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 Recommendations 8.1.4.
This section summarizes the finding and implications, presenting recommendations for 
licensing managers, university administrators, and governments as well as researchers 
interested in measuring the licensing performance of research institutions. 
 
A. A university with a medical school 
Many studies, including the present study, identified that a university with a medical 
school has lower licensing performance because it has relatively fewer licensing 
outcomes relative to its significant amount of research funding in the medical area. The 
lower licensing productivity of a medical school arises from several facts [97]: 
1) Research in bioscience is difficult to license in the market, due to high 
manufacturing costs and production complexity. 
2) Bioscience technologies require huge research and development investment and 
commercialization expenditures. 
3) The technologies require government regulatory approval, which takes long a 
time and many resources, with no guarantee of approval. 
4) Physicians and medical researchers are not motivated to engage in the 
commercialization process. 
 
Therefore, a licensing office must develop a specific screening and marketing process for 
a bioscience technology. A well-structured assessment and screening process in the early 
stage of commercialization will reduce the risk inherent in the study of bioscience 
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technology and will promote funding opportunities for the further investment required for 
commercialization. A licensing staff specialized in the medical area is essential to the 
success of the process. 
 
Although it is necessary for a licensing office to improve its process of commercializing 
bioscience technologies, the nature of R & D in a medical school should be considered 
when its licensing performance is evaluated. Considering the uniqueness of the licensing 
practice in a medical school, the licensing performance of a medical school should be 
separated from that of other science and engineering departments when a benchmarking 
study is done for multiple universities. 
 
B. Public and private status of an institution and its licensing practice 
The study indicates that a private university has better licensing than a public one. As 
Powers [96] described in detail, a private university has more flexibility in terms of 
organization structure and operations in its budget, which enables the university to adapt 
itself to a new policy and environment. Although a private university is financially more 
independent from state government, it relies more on student tuitions and other revenue 
to secure its budget. As a result, technology licensing and commercialization have been 
considered important financial resources since the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 allowed 
universities to obtain benefit from licensing.  The changes of private institutions’ 
licensing efficiency observed in this this study justify their motivation and effort. 
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On the other hand, public schools are limited in the ways they may secure and manage 
their budget for their own purposes while also getting support from a state government. 
The allocation and management of their revenue are controlled heavily by the 
government. This financial dependency, an insufficient reward system, and a rigid 
organizational structure make it difficult to motivate faculties to actively engage in 
licensing practice. Without significant changes in policies and budget operations on the 
part of both universities and government, licensing practice will to some extent be limited. 
 
C. Organizational environment encouraging faculty engagement 
This study reveals that, given the same level of research and licensing activity, some 
institutions had higher licensing productivity than others. One characteristic is faculty 
time for research, observed by looking at the number of students per faculty member. 
Although this study is limited in identifying detailed organizational and personal aspects 
relative to licensing practice, other studies have provided evidence and insight on these 
topics. Based on the findings from this and other research [114], the following 
organizational and personal policies to promote licensing activity are recommended: 
1) An appropriate reward system should be applied to motivate and compensate an 
inventor for his or her engagement. 
2) Depending on an institution’s goals and commercialization preferences, an 
inventor should be allowed to devote his or her time to licensing activity. 
3) An institution should not be too aggressive in exercising intellectual property 
rights. However, there is a trade-off between aggressive and flexible exercise of 
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rights. Aggressive practice reduces the number of licensing agreements but 
increases revenue from the agreements [111]. Therefore, the potential value of the 
technology should be considered along with institutional direction for the use of 
intellectual property. 
4) Institutions’ perception of licensing should be changed. A licensing exercise 
should not be considered a trade-off between teaching and research. Also, there 
still exists a common misunderstanding that capitalizing on technology that was 
funded by the public limits the public good. 
 
D. Appropriate licensing office skills and resources 
Results indicate that licensing offices’ history and staff are related to better licensing 
performance. Given the same research performance and inventor involvement, the 
success of commercialization relies on the staff’s available time, expertise in the 
technology area, and marketing and negotiation skills. 
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 Contributions 8.2.
The present study outlines an approach for assessing the licensing performance of 
academic research institutions over time and explores these performances with regard to 
related institutional characteristics. For this purpose, the study developed two new 
methods: a time-lag identifying process using a distributed lag model and an unstructured 
regression coefficient structure, and a three-stage modified super-efficiency DEA model 
resolving computational infeasibility and zero-data issues. The results provide 
stakeholders in government agencies, companies, research organizations, and other 
universities with a better understanding of licensing practices, filling in the gaps 
identified by the literature review. 
 
 Time-Lag Effect (Gap 1) 8.2.1.
Time duration exists in licensing activity and outcomes because of the inherent 
processing time of the activities. Although most researchers acknowledge the time lag of 
variables in studies identifying the relationships between characteristics and outcomes 
(performance) of licensing, they don’t apply time lags among the variables in their 
analysis. Some studies ignore the effect of the time lag and others use the average of the 
variables during the investigated period to mitigate the effect. However, if time lags are 
not incorporated into a model, caution is needed when interpreting the results [55]. With 
regard to their study measuring commercialization efficiencies of 112 U.S. universities, 
for example, Thursby and Kemp [122] commented, “We are mixing inputs and outputs 
from different points in time. To the extent that there are lags involved, our result must be 
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considered with caution” (p. 114). To understand the practices and performance of 
academic research institution technology commercialization, time lags should be 
considered in the analysis. 
 
The time-lag identifying process developed this study provides a better approach to 
measuring the possible time lags in licensing or commercialization. The time lags 
identified by the approach also could enable researchers to build a more elaborate and 
realistic model for evaluating academic research institution technology licensing. 
 
 Measurement of Academic Research Institution Technology 8.2.2.
Commercialization Performance and Influencing Characteristics (Gaps 2, 3, 
and 4) 
ARITC involves various ambiguous aspects. The perceptions, goals, policies, and 
regulations of an institution concerning technology commercialization could vary, along 
with the organizational specification. Indeed, different stakeholders, such as university 
administrators, faculty, and TLO managers, have different perceptions of the importance 
of commercialization outcomes. The heterogeneous characteristics surrounding ARITCs 
make it difficult to measure performance. Therefore, benchmarking studies are a 
widespread method in this area and can provide insights into the relative performance of 
ARITC practices. 
 
Although the efficiency of a benchmarking study identifies best practitioners and 
inefficient institutions, there exists a limitation in implementing the results in the real 
 266 
 
world and in understanding the rational reasons for low or high efficiency. Therefore, 
additional analysis, such as regression, has been performed to explain the characteristics 
influencing efficiency. However, because the efficiency score created by stochastic 
frontier estimation or data envelopment analysis puts all unknown specifications of an 
institution into a single number, the identified relationships between the efficiency score 
and organizational characteristics also includes aspects that are ambiguous for 
interpretation and application in the real world. 
 
The approach outlined in this study could overcome those limitations by exploring 
organizational characteristics and various aspects of efficiency (average efficiency, 
efficiency changes, technical changes, and Malmquist Index) over time. The approach 
provides insight into organizational practice and related polices and characteristics by 
examining their relationships with the efficiency and patterns of ARITC. 
 
For this purpose, this study developed a three-stage super-efficiency VRS model, which 
overcomes the current limitations in DEA theory. First, the study resolves computational 
infeasibility caused by an extreme data point when variable returns to scale is applied. 
For this purpose, the strengths and limitations of the three current approaches [33, 66, 70] 
have been discussed and the models have been tested using published data. Second, a 
nonradial model has been applied to deal with zero-data issues. 
  
 267 
 
 Assumptions 8.3.
Two types of assumptions have been made in this research: an assumption about the 
expert and an assumption about measurements and the models. 
 
First, it is assumed that the expert is capable of identifying and understanding all 
technology licensing mechanisms and related licensing contracts and laws, and that one 
expert’s perceptions and knowledge of the assigned area can represent the related 
activities of other institutions. 
 
The second group of assumptions is made when developing the model and selecting 
variables. Such assumptions include the following: 
1. The relative performance of technology licensing reflects different levels of 
practice and policy. 
2. The selected outputs and inputs for the DEA models are broad enough to include 
all possible outcomes and resources. 
3. Licensing efficiency could be different, and different performances can be 
understood in the context of efficiency changes and selected institutional variables. 
4. The time-lag coefficients identified in this study represent lag effects common to 
all institutions. 
 
 268 
 
 Limitations 8.4.
Although this research sheds light on the efficiency and importance of ARITC, there also 
are inherent limitations, such as the following: 
 
1. Institutions’ policies for technology commercialization are not observed and 
measured, yet such policies and other related characteristics are expected to 
influence licensing efficiencies. Therefore, it is worth examining the overall 
relationship between efficiency and effectiveness, and identifying the 
organizational characteristics that influence them. 
2. The time lags identified in this study are general and common differences 
observed from the data for the time period. The approach of the study is 
reasonable enough to observe general trends in commercialization and the 
performance of ARITC. However, some unique technology commercialization 
time lags cannot be explained. 
3. The quality of the disclosures is related to faculty quality [60]. After the 
inventions are disclosed, faculty quality also will positively influence patents, 
licensing, and licensing income [47, 96]. However, productive faculties inventing 
valuable technology, which has high potential in the market, are not always 
positively related to the more or better disclosure [60]. For instance, prominent 
faculty members may be reluctant to be involved in technology commercialization 
activity through disclosure and patenting of their inventions because they prefer 
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conducting research and publishing their findings in journals [60, 96]. The present 
study does not consider those characteristics. 
 
 Future Work 8.5.
The following areas are suggested for future work. 
 
1. Case studies of academic research institutions’ technology commercialization 
practices could help increase model reliability and improve understanding of 
certain unique institutional situations that could not be observed in this study. 
2. The licensing time lags identified in the study need to be explored further by 
using case studies of several academic research institutions. 
3. This study explores a limited number of institutional characteristics that influence 
licensing performance. A dedicated survey could help to identify other 
characteristics that explain time lags and licensing performance. 
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10Appendix A. STATA Procedure for the PDL Regression Analysis 
* Document: http://www.statajournal.com/sjpdf.html?articlenum=st0065 
* generate the pdl(12,4) data  pdl(p=lag,q=degree) 
 
* sim_arma x, ar(.9) spin(10000) nobs(300) 
 
* data should x _t y 
* lag = 3 degree = 2 
 
 
* tsset year 
 
/* Program Start */ 
 
program pdlconstraints 
version 8.2 
args p q matname 
local r = `p' - `q' 
local m = `q' + 1 
matrix `matname' = J(`r',`p'+3,0) 
forvalues i = 1/`r' { 
local x = `i' + `q'+ 1 
local k = -1 
local d = 1 
forvalues j = `x'(-1)`i' { 
local k = `k' + 1 
matrix `matname'[`i',`j'] = `d'*comb(`m',`k') 
local d = -1*`d' 
} 
} 
end 
 
 
program vandermonde 
version 8.2 
syntax name, Numlist(numlist) 
local p: word count `numlist' 
tokenize `numlist' 
matrix `namelist' = J(`p',`p',0) 
forvalues c = 1/`p' { 
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forvalues r = 1/`p' { 
matrix `namelist'[`r',`c'] = (``c'')^(`r' - 1) 
} 
} 
end 
 
 
program zvars 
version 8.2 
syntax varname, Matrix(name) 
local n = colsof(`matrix') 
local k = rowsof(`matrix') 
forvalues i = 1/`n' { 
local z`i' `matrix'[1,`i']*`varlist' 
} 
forvalues j = 2/`k' { 
forvalues i = 1/`n' { 
local m = `j' - 1 
local z`i' `z`i'' + `matrix'[`j',`i']*L`m'.`varlist' 
} 
} 
forvalues i = 1/`n' { 
generate double z`i' = `z`i'' 
} 
end 
 
 
program recover, eclass 
version 8.2 
syntax name, Matrix(name) 
tempname alpha v w B V 
matrix `alpha' = e(b) 
matrix `v' = e(V) 
local r = rowsof(`matrix') 
matrix `w' = J(`r',1,0) 
matrix `matrix' = `matrix',`w' 
local c = colsof(`matrix') 
matrix `w' = J(1,`c',0) 
matrix `w'[1,`c'] = 1 
matrix `matrix' = `matrix'\(`w') 
matrix `B' = (`matrix'*(`alpha')')' 
matrix `V' = `matrix'*`v'*(`matrix')' 
matrix rownames `B' = y 
local r = `r'-1 
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local names `namelist' 
forvalues i = 1/`r' { 
local names `names' L`i'.`namelist' 
} 
local names `names' _cons 
matrix colnames `B' = `names' 
matrix rownames `V' = `names' 
matrix colnames `V' = `names' 
ereturn post `B' `V' 
ereturn local cmd recover 
ereturn display 
end 
 
 
 
use "D:\STATA\Dissertation\12. Final_Simulation_Test  (Paper 
Work)\Stata_Simulation_Data.dta", clear 
 
tsset year 
 
******Data set 3 (x3 and y3) 
/* ***** INPUT 1 ******  */ 
 
/* PDL commend with parameters; p (lag) q (degree) mathname */ 
 
*Input lag = 5 degree = 2 matrix_name 
* pdlconstraints lag degree 
pdlconstraints 5 2 A 
*Input (0/lag) 
cnsreg y3 L(0/5).x3, constraints(A) 
*xtgls y3 L(0/8).x3, noconstant panels(hetero) 
 
/*PDL(lag = 8, degree = 4) */ 
*Input n(0/lag) 
vandermonde V, n(0/5) 
 
*Input 1... degree+1 , 1...lag+1 
matrix V = V[1..3,1..6] 
 
matrix W = V' 
 
 
zvars x3, matrix(W) 
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/*regress */ 
regress y3 z* 
* regress y z*, noconstant 
 
recover x3, matrix(W) 
 
est store DEG4 
 
* drop variables generated from the previous PDL model 
drop z1 z2 z3 
 
 
/* ***** INPUT 2 ******  */ 
 
/* PDL commend with parameters; p (lag) q (degree) mathname */ 
 
*Input lag = 5 degree = 3 matrix_name 
* pdlconstraints lag degree 
pdlconstraints 5 3 A 
*Input (0/lag) 
cnsreg y3 L(0/5).x3, constraints(A) 
 
*Input n(0/lag) 
vandermonde V, n(0/5) 
 
*Input 1... degree+1 , 1...lag+1 
matrix V = V[1..4,1..6] 
 
matrix W = V' 
 
 
zvars x3, matrix(W) 
 
/*regress */ 
regress y3 z* 
* regress y z*, noconstant 
 
recover x3, matrix(W) 
 
est store DEG4 
 
* drop variables generated from the previous PDL model 
drop z1 z2 z3 z4 
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/* ***** INPUT 3 ******  */ 
 
/* PDL commend with parameters; p (lag) q (degree) mathname */ 
 
*Input lag = 4 degree = 3 matrix_name 
* pdlconstraints lag degree 
pdlconstraints 4 3 A 
*Input (0/lag) 
cnsreg y3 L(0/4).x3, constraints(A) 
 
*Input n(0/lag) 
vandermonde V, n(0/4) 
 
*Input 1... degree+1 , 1...lag+1 
matrix V = V[1..4,1..5] 
 
matrix W = V' 
 
 
zvars x3, matrix(W) 
 
/*regress */ 
regress y3 z* 
* regress y z*, noconstant 
 
recover x3, matrix(W) 
 
est store DEG4 
 
* drop variables generated from the previous PDL model 
drop z1 z2 z3 z4 
 
 
 
/* ***** INPUT 4 ******  */ 
 
/* PDL commend with parameters; p (lag) q (degree) mathname */ 
 
*Input lag = 4 degree = 2 matrix_name 
* pdlconstraints lag degree 
pdlconstraints 4 2 A 
*Input (0/lag) 
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cnsreg y3 L(0/4).x3, constraints(A) 
 
*Input n(0/lag) 
vandermonde V, n(0/4) 
 
*Input 1... degree+1 , 1...lag+1 
matrix V = V[1..3,1..5] 
 
matrix W = V' 
 
 
zvars x3, matrix(W) 
 
/*regress */ 
regress y3 z* 
* regress y z*, noconstant 
 
recover x3, matrix(W) 
 
est store DEG4 
 
* drop variables generated from the previous PDL model 
drop z1 z2 z3 
 
 
 
******Data set 4 (x4 and y4) 
/* ***** INPUT 1 ******  */ 
 
/* PDL commend with parameters; p (lag) q (degree) mathname */ 
 
*Input lag = 5 degree = 2 matrix_name 
* pdlconstraints lag degree 
pdlconstraints 5 2 A 
*Input (0/lag) 
cnsreg y4 L(0/5).x4, constraints(A) 
*xtgls y4 L(0/8).x4, noconstant panels(hetero) 
 
/*PDL(lag = 8, degree = 4) */ 
*Input n(0/lag) 
vandermonde V, n(0/5) 
 
*Input 1... degree+1 , 1...lag+1 
matrix V = V[1..3,1..6] 
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matrix W = V' 
 
 
zvars x4, matrix(W) 
 
/*regress */ 
regress y4 z* 
* regress y z*, noconstant 
 
recover x4, matrix(W) 
 
est store DEG4 
 
* drop variables generated from the previous PDL model 
drop z1 z2 z3 
 
 
/* ***** INPUT 2 ******  */ 
 
/* PDL commend with parameters; p (lag) q (degree) mathname */ 
 
*Input lag = 5 degree = 3 matrix_name 
* pdlconstraints lag degree 
pdlconstraints 5 3 A 
*Input (0/lag) 
cnsreg y4 L(0/5).x4, constraints(A) 
 
*Input n(0/lag) 
vandermonde V, n(0/5) 
 
*Input 1... degree+1 , 1...lag+1 
matrix V = V[1..4,1..6] 
 
matrix W = V' 
 
 
zvars x4, matrix(W) 
 
/*regress */ 
regress y4 z* 
* regress y z*, noconstant 
 
recover x4, matrix(W) 
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est store DEG4 
 
* drop variables generated from the previous PDL model 
drop z1 z2 z3 z4 
 
 
 
/* ***** INPUT 3 ******  */ 
 
/* PDL commend with parameters; p (lag) q (degree) mathname */ 
 
*Input lag = 4 degree = 3 matrix_name 
* pdlconstraints lag degree 
pdlconstraints 4 3 A 
*Input (0/lag) 
cnsreg y4 L(0/4).x4, constraints(A) 
 
*Input n(0/lag) 
vandermonde V, n(0/4) 
 
*Input 1... degree+1 , 1...lag+1 
matrix V = V[1..4,1..5] 
 
matrix W = V' 
 
 
zvars x4, matrix(W) 
 
/*regress */ 
regress y4 z* 
* regress y z*, noconstant 
 
recover x4, matrix(W) 
 
est store DEG4 
 
* drop variables generated from the previous PDL model 
drop z1 z2 z3 z4 
 
 
 
/* ***** INPUT 4 ******  */ 
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/* PDL commend with parameters; p (lag) q (degree) mathname */ 
 
*Input lag = 4 degree = 2 matrix_name 
* pdlconstraints lag degree 
pdlconstraints 4 2 A 
*Input (0/lag) 
cnsreg y4 L(0/4).x4, constraints(A) 
 
*Input n(0/lag) 
vandermonde V, n(0/4) 
 
*Input 1... degree+1 , 1...lag+1 
matrix V = V[1..3,1..5] 
 
matrix W = V' 
 
 
zvars x4, matrix(W) 
 
/*regress */ 
regress y4 z* 
* regress y z*, noconstant 
 
recover x4, matrix(W) 
 
est store DEG4 
 
* drop variables generated from the previous PDL model 
drop z1 z2 z3 
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11Appendix B. Licensing Paths of Each Variable to the Licensing Income 
 
Figure B1: Licensing paths to the licensing income from the expenditure 
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Figure B2: Licensing paths to the licensing income from the disclosure 
 
 
Figure B3: Licensing paths to the licensing income from the patent filed 
 
 
Figure B4: Licensing paths to the licensing income from the patent issued 
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Figure B5: Licensing paths to the licensing income from the license and option executed 
 
 
 
Figure B6: Licensing paths to the licensing income from the start-up 
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12Appendix C. Xpress Mosel Coding of Modified Super-Efficiency Model 
1. Radial VRS SE Malmquist Model 
 
model "Malmquist" 
uses "mmxprs"; !gain access to the Xpress-Optimizer solver 
 
! Dynamic Data 2-2: 46 U.S. research institutions licensing data! 
! Dynamic Data 2-3: Coefficients has been recalculated by adding lag0, 46 Inst., excluding ID47 
 
! Time-Lag Neutralized Data using 1st distance lags (coefficients from regression without transform 
functions) 
! Factored Data: EXP from  1991 to 2002,PTI , STU, LCI from 1992 to 2007 
! Data set from 1991 to 1999 
! one input and three outputs model 
 
parameters 
 DATAFILE = "DYNAMIC_DATA3.txt" 
  
 end-parameters 
 
writeln ("DATAFILE = ",DATAFILE)  
 
 
declarations 
   ALLYEAR = 1991..1999 ! DATA FROM Year 1991-1999 
   DMU = 1..46 ! Set of Decision Making Units, hard coded 
   ID: array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of integer   ! Set of DMU ID 
   YEAR: array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of integer ! load Year 
   NAMES: array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of string   ! Set of DMU Names 
   EXP, PTI, STU, LCI:  array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of real   ! Set of input and output variables 
    
   START_YEAR = 1991    ! First Year of Malmquist Index (CHANGE FROM 
MFRONTYEAR-1 TO MFRONYEAR) 
   END_YEAR = 1998    ! Last Year of Malmquist Index (CHNAGE FROM MTOYEAR - 1 
TO MTOYEAR) 
    
           
 EC: array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of real 
 TC: array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of real  
 MI: array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of real  
 
! Definition of decision variables       
   Dtt_Exp_Saving: array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of mpvar 
   Dtt1_Exp_Saving: array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of mpvar 
   Dt1t_Exp_Saving: array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of mpvar 
   Dt1t1_Exp_Saving: array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of mpvar 
    
   !Dtt: Dt(t)     
   Dtt_Radial_Beta:  array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of mpvar 
   !Dtt1: Dt(t+1) 
   Dtt1_Radial_Beta:  array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of mpvar 
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   !Dt1t: Dt+1(t) 
   Dt1t_Radial_Beta:  array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of mpvar 
   !Dt1t1: Dt+1(t+1)    
   Dt1t1_Radial_Beta:  array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of mpvar 
   
  ! Variables to count number of input saving from the stage 1 
 DTT_Num_Saving: array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of real 
 DTT1_Num_Saving: array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of real 
 DT1T_Num_Saving: array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of real 
 DT1T1_Num_Saving: array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of real 
 
  ! Stage 1 Lambda variables 
   Stage1_Dtt_Lambda:  array (ALLYEAR, DMU,DMU)  of mpvar ! Array of lambda 
   Stage1_Dtt1_Lambda:  array (ALLYEAR, DMU,DMU)  of mpvar ! Array of lambda 
   Stage1_Dt1t_Lambda:  array (ALLYEAR, DMU,DMU)  of mpvar ! Array of lambda 
   Stage1_Dt1t1_Lambda:  array (ALLYEAR, DMU,DMU)  of mpvar ! Array of lambda 
 
 
   Stage2_Dtt_Lambda:  array (ALLYEAR, DMU,DMU)  of mpvar ! Array of lambda    
   Stage2_Dtt1_Lambda:  array (ALLYEAR, DMU,DMU)  of mpvar ! Array of lambda    
   Stage2_Dt1t_Lambda:  array (ALLYEAR, DMU,DMU)  of mpvar ! Array of lambda    
   Stage2_Dt1t1_Lambda:  array (ALLYEAR, DMU,DMU)  of mpvar ! Array of lambda    
 
! Variables to store input saving from the stage 1 
   DTT_EXP_STAGE1_SAVING: array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of real 
   DTT1_EXP_STAGE1_SAVING: array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of real 
   DT1T_EXP_STAGE1_SAVING: array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of real 
   DT1T1_EXP_STAGE1_SAVING: array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of real 
 
! Variables to store beta from the stage 2 
   !Dtt: Dt(t) 
   DTT_RADIAL_BETA_VALUE: array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of real 
   !Dtt1: Dt(t+1) 
   DTT1_RADIAL_BETA_VALUE: array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of real 
   !Dt1t: Dt+1(t) 
   DT1T_RADIAL_BETA_VALUE: array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of real 
   !Dt1t1: Dt+1(t+1) 
   DT1T1_RADIAL_BETA_VALUE: array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of real 
    
! Final super efficiency phi 
   !Dtt: Dt(t) 
   DTT_SE_phi: array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of real 
   !Dtt1: Dt(t+1) 
   DTT1_SE_phi: array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of real 
   !Dt1t: Dt+1(t) 
   DT1T_SE_phi: array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of real 
   !Dt1t1: Dt+1(t+1) 
   DT1T1_SE_phi: array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of real 
   
! Final super efficiency SE (>1; efficinecy) = SAME WITH _SE_Phi 
   !Dtt: Dt(t) 
   DTT_SE: array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of real 
   !Dtt1: Dt(t+1) 
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   DTT1_SE: array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of real 
   !Dt1t: Dt+1(t) 
   DT1T_SE: array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of real 
   !Dt1t1: Dt+1(t+1) 
   DT1T1_SE: array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of real 
 
end-declarations 
 
 
initializations from DATAFILE 
  ID NAMES YEAR EXP PTI STU LCI   ! Reads the data from the above file 
end-initializations 
 
! ### Stage 1: Calculate input saving. If it is not zero, the DMU is an infeasible case. ###  
 
forall (dmu_year in ALLYEAR | START_YEAR <= dmu_year AND dmu_year <= END_YEAR) do 
 
 forall(k in DMU) do 
  !Dtt: Dt(t) 
  sum (j in DMU | j<>k) Stage1_Dtt_Lambda(dmu_year,j,k)=1   ! Variable returns to Scale 
  Stage1_Dtt_Lambda(dmu_year,k,k)=0 
  sum (j in DMU | j<>k) Stage1_Dtt_Lambda(dmu_year,j,k)*EXP(dmu_year, j) - Dtt_Exp_Saving 
(dmu_year, k)<= EXP(dmu_year,k) !input, EXP, constraint 
   
  !Dtt1: Dt(t+1) 
  sum (j in DMU) Stage1_Dtt1_Lambda(dmu_year,j,k)=1   ! Variable returns to Scale 
  sum (j in DMU) Stage1_Dtt1_Lambda(dmu_year,j,k)*EXP(dmu_year, j) - Dtt1_Exp_Saving 
(dmu_year, k)<= EXP(dmu_year+1,k) !input, EXP, constraint 
   
  !Dt1t: Dt+1(t) 
  sum (j in DMU) Stage1_Dt1t_Lambda(dmu_year,j,k)=1   ! Variable returns to Scale 
  sum (j in DMU) Stage1_Dt1t_Lambda(dmu_year,j,k)*EXP(dmu_year+1, j) - Dt1t_Exp_Saving 
(dmu_year, k)<= EXP(dmu_year,k) !input, EXP, constraint 
   
  !Dt1t1: Dt+1(t+1) 
  sum (j in DMU | j<>k) Stage1_Dt1t1_Lambda(dmu_year,j,k)=1   ! Variable returns to Scale 
  Stage1_Dt1t1_Lambda(dmu_year,k,k)=0 
  sum (j in DMU | j<>k) Stage1_Dt1t1_Lambda(dmu_year,j,k)*EXP(dmu_year+1, j) - 
Dt1t1_Exp_Saving (dmu_year, k)<= EXP(dmu_year+1,k) !input, EXP, constraint 
 
 end-do ! evalute all DMUs  
  
end-do ! Stage1 DEA loop, evaluate all years (from start year to end year) 
 
minimize (sum (k in DMU, dmu_year in ALLYEAR | START_YEAR <= dmu_year AND dmu_year 
<= END_YEAR)  
(Dtt_Exp_Saving (dmu_year, k)+ Dtt1_Exp_Saving (dmu_year, k)+ Dt1t_Exp_Saving (dmu_year, k)+ 
Dt1t1_Exp_Saving (dmu_year, k))) !object function: minimize input saving 
 
! count number of saving 
forall (dmu_year in ALLYEAR | START_YEAR <= dmu_year AND dmu_year <= END_YEAR) do 
 
 forall(k in DMU) do 
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  !Dtt: Dt(t) 
  if getsol(Dtt_Exp_Saving (dmu_year, k)) >0 then DTT_Num_Saving(dmu_year,k) := 1 
  end-if 
  !Dtt1: Dt(t) 
  if getsol(Dtt1_Exp_Saving (dmu_year, k)) >0 then DTT1_Num_Saving(dmu_year,k) := 1 
  end-if 
  !Dt1t: Dt(t) 
  if getsol(Dt1t_Exp_Saving (dmu_year, k)) >0 then DT1T_Num_Saving(dmu_year,k) := 1 
  end-if 
  !Dt1t1: Dt(t) 
  if getsol(Dt1t1_Exp_Saving (dmu_year, k)) >0 then DT1T1_Num_Saving(dmu_year,k) := 1 
  end-if 
  
 end-do 
  
end-do 
 
! Print input saving table 
writeln("") 
writeln("Input Saving Table") 
writeln("=====================") 
writeln("ID", " ","INST NAME","        ", "YEAR"," ", "INPUT SAVING") 
writeln("                                              Dtt   Dtt1   Dt1t   Dt1t1") 
 writeln("-------------------------------------------------------") 
 forall (dmu_year in ALLYEAR | START_YEAR <= dmu_year AND dmu_year <= END_YEAR) 
do 
  forall(k in DMU) do  
   writeln(ID(dmu_year,k), "\t",NAMES(dmu_year,k),"\t", 
dmu_year,"\t",getsol(Dtt_Exp_Saving (dmu_year, k)),"\t",getsol(Dtt1_Exp_Saving (dmu_year, 
k)),"\t",getsol(Dt1t_Exp_Saving (dmu_year, k)),"\t",getsol(Dt1t1_Exp_Saving (dmu_year, k)) )   
  end-do 
 end-do 
writeln("-------------------------------------------------------") 
 
! Store input savings to the variables for the stage2 
forall (dmu_year in ALLYEAR | START_YEAR <= dmu_year AND dmu_year <= END_YEAR) do 
 forall(k in DMU) do  
  DTT_EXP_STAGE1_SAVING(dmu_year, k) := getsol(Dtt_Exp_Saving (dmu_year, k)) 
  DTT1_EXP_STAGE1_SAVING(dmu_year, k) := getsol(Dtt1_Exp_Saving (dmu_year, k)) 
  DT1T_EXP_STAGE1_SAVING(dmu_year, k) := getsol(Dt1t_Exp_Saving (dmu_year, k)) 
  DT1T1_EXP_STAGE1_SAVING(dmu_year, k) := getsol(Dt1t1_Exp_Saving (dmu_year, k)) 
 end-do 
end-do 
 
! #### End of Stage 1 #### 
 
! ### Stage 2: Using the input savings from the stage 1 evalute super efficiency of the DMUs for all 
years ### 
 
forall (dmu_year in ALLYEAR | START_YEAR <= dmu_year AND dmu_year <= END_YEAR) do 
 
 forall(k in DMU) do 
  
 296 
 
 !! Input constraints 
  !Dtt: Dt(t) 
  sum (j in DMU | j<>k) Stage2_Dtt_Lambda(dmu_year,j,k)=1   ! Variable returns to Scale 
  Stage2_Dtt_Lambda(dmu_year,k,k)=0 
  sum (j in DMU | j<>k) Stage2_Dtt_Lambda(dmu_year,j,k)*EXP(dmu_year, j) - 
DTT_EXP_STAGE1_SAVING (dmu_year, k)<= EXP(dmu_year,k) !input, EXP, constraint 
   
  !Dtt1: Dt(t+1) 
  sum (j in DMU) Stage2_Dtt1_Lambda(dmu_year,j,k)=1   ! Variable returns to Scale 
  sum (j in DMU) Stage2_Dtt1_Lambda(dmu_year,j,k)*EXP(dmu_year, j) - 
DTT1_EXP_STAGE1_SAVING (dmu_year, k)<= EXP(dmu_year+1,k) !input, EXP, constraint 
   
  !Dt1t: Dt+1(t) 
  sum (j in DMU) Stage2_Dt1t_Lambda(dmu_year,j,k)=1   ! Variable returns to Scale 
  sum (j in DMU) Stage2_Dt1t_Lambda(dmu_year,j,k)*EXP(dmu_year+1, j) - 
DT1T_EXP_STAGE1_SAVING (dmu_year, k)<= EXP(dmu_year,k) !input, EXP, constraint 
   
  !Dt1t1: Dt+1(t+1) 
  sum (j in DMU | j<>k) Stage2_Dt1t1_Lambda(dmu_year,j,k)=1   ! Variable returns to Scale 
  Stage2_Dt1t1_Lambda(dmu_year,k,k)=0 
  sum (j in DMU | j<>k) Stage2_Dt1t1_Lambda(dmu_year,j,k)*EXP(dmu_year+1, j) - 
DT1T1_EXP_STAGE1_SAVING (dmu_year, k)<= EXP(dmu_year+1,k) !input, EXP, constraint 
 
 !! Output Constraints 
  !Dtt: Dt(t) 
  sum (j in DMU | j<>k) Stage2_Dtt_Lambda(dmu_year,j,k)*PTI(dmu_year, j)>= PTI(dmu_year, 
k)*Dtt_Radial_Beta(dmu_year, k) !output PTI constraint 
  sum (j in DMU | j<>k) Stage2_Dtt_Lambda(dmu_year,j,k)*STU(dmu_year, j)>= 
STU(dmu_year, k)*Dtt_Radial_Beta(dmu_year, k) !output STU constraint 
  sum (j in DMU | j<>k) Stage2_Dtt_Lambda(dmu_year,j,k)*LCI(dmu_year, j)>= LCI(dmu_year, 
k)*Dtt_Radial_Beta(dmu_year, k) !output LCI constraint 
   
  !Dtt1: Dt(t+1) 
  sum (j in DMU) Stage2_Dtt1_Lambda(dmu_year,j,k)*PTI(dmu_year, j)>= PTI(dmu_year+1, 
k)*Dtt1_Radial_Beta(dmu_year, k) !output PTI constraint 
  sum (j in DMU) Stage2_Dtt1_Lambda(dmu_year,j,k)*STU(dmu_year, j)>= STU(dmu_year+1, 
k)*Dtt1_Radial_Beta(dmu_year, k) !output STU constraint 
  sum (j in DMU) Stage2_Dtt1_Lambda(dmu_year,j,k)*LCI(dmu_year, j)>= LCI(dmu_year+1, 
k)*Dtt1_Radial_Beta(dmu_year, k) !output LCI constraint 
   
  !Dt1t: Dt+1(t) 
  sum (j in DMU) Stage2_Dt1t_Lambda(dmu_year,j,k)*PTI(dmu_year+1, j)>= PTI(dmu_year, 
k)*Dt1t_Radial_Beta(dmu_year, k) !output PTI constraint 
  sum (j in DMU) Stage2_Dt1t_Lambda(dmu_year,j,k)*STU(dmu_year+1, j)>= STU(dmu_year, 
k)*Dt1t_Radial_Beta(dmu_year, k) !output STU constraint 
  sum (j in DMU) Stage2_Dt1t_Lambda(dmu_year,j,k)*LCI(dmu_year+1, j)>= LCI(dmu_year, 
k)*Dt1t_Radial_Beta(dmu_year, k) !output LCI constraint 
   
  !Dt1t1: Dt+1(t+1) 
  sum (j in DMU | j<>k) Stage2_Dt1t1_Lambda(dmu_year,j,k)*PTI(dmu_year+1, j)>= 
PTI(dmu_year+1, k)*Dt1t1_Radial_Beta(dmu_year, k) !output PTI constraint 
  sum (j in DMU | j<>k) Stage2_Dt1t1_Lambda(dmu_year,j,k)*STU(dmu_year+1, j)>= 
STU(dmu_year+1, k)*Dt1t1_Radial_Beta(dmu_year, k) !output STU constraint 
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  sum (j in DMU | j<>k) Stage2_Dt1t1_Lambda(dmu_year,j,k)*LCI(dmu_year+1, j)>= 
LCI(dmu_year+1, k)*Dt1t1_Radial_Beta(dmu_year, k) !output LCI constraint 
  
 end-do ! evalute all DMUs  
  
end-do ! Stage 2 DEA loop, evaluate all years (from start year to end year) 
 
forall (dmu_year in ALLYEAR | START_YEAR <= dmu_year AND dmu_year <= END_YEAR) do 
 
 forall(k in DMU) do 
  Dtt_Radial_Beta(dmu_year, k) <= 1000 
   
  Dtt1_Radial_Beta(dmu_year, k) <= 1000 
   
  Dt1t_Radial_Beta(dmu_year, k) <= 1000 
   
  Dt1t1_Radial_Beta(dmu_year, k) <= 1000 
 end-do 
end-do  
 
 
 
maximize (sum (k in DMU, dmu_year in ALLYEAR | START_YEAR <= dmu_year AND dmu_year 
<= END_YEAR) 
(Dtt_Radial_Beta(dmu_year, k)+ Dtt1_Radial_Beta(dmu_year, k)+Dt1t_Radial_Beta(dmu_year, 
k)+Dt1t1_Radial_Beta(dmu_year, k) )) 
 
! Save beta to the static variables for the post evalution 
! if beta = 1000 Type 1 (infinitive case) -> 1 
! if beta = 0 Type 2 (bounded to zero case) -> (1/ the output) of the evaluted DMU 
 
forall (dmu_year in ALLYEAR | START_YEAR <= dmu_year AND dmu_year <= END_YEAR) do 
  forall(k in DMU) do  
   !Dtt: Dt(t) 
   DTT_RADIAL_BETA_VALUE(dmu_year, k):= getsol(Dtt_Radial_Beta(dmu_year,k)) 
   !Dtt1: Dt(t+1) 
   DTT1_RADIAL_BETA_VALUE(dmu_year, k):= getsol(Dtt1_Radial_Beta(dmu_year,k)) 
   !Dt1t: Dt+1(t) 
   DT1T_RADIAL_BETA_VALUE(dmu_year, k):= getsol(Dt1t_Radial_Beta(dmu_year,k)) 
   !Dt1t1: Dt+1(t+1) 
   DT1T1_RADIAL_BETA_VALUE(dmu_year, k):= getsol(Dt1t1_Radial_Beta(dmu_year,k)) 
  end-do 
end-do 
 
!!zero-efficinecy is replaced by the average of the non-radial efficiencies 
! Average of non zero non-radial efficiencies 
!DTT_RADIAL_BETA_VALUE(1991, 23):= 0.59 
!DT1T_RADIAL_BETA_VALUE(1991, 23):= 1.75 
!DTT_RADIAL_BETA_VALUE(1996, 29):= 0.33 
!DT1T1_RADIAL_BETA_VALUE(1995, 29):= 0.33 
 
! Min of non zero non-radial efficiencies 
DTT_RADIAL_BETA_VALUE(1991, 23):= 0.37 
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DT1T_RADIAL_BETA_VALUE(1991, 23):= 0.08 
DTT_RADIAL_BETA_VALUE(1996, 29):= 0.29 
DT1T1_RADIAL_BETA_VALUE(1995, 29):= 0.29 
 
 
! Calculate final super efficiency 
! if there is a saving use Lee, et al.'s calculatoin 
 
forall (dmu_year in ALLYEAR | START_YEAR <= dmu_year AND dmu_year <= END_YEAR) do 
  forall(k in DMU) do  
   !Dtt: Dt(t) 
      if DTT_Num_Saving(dmu_year,k)>0 then  
        DTT_SE_phi(dmu_year,k) := ( EXP(dmu_year,k)+ 
DTT_EXP_STAGE1_SAVING(dmu_year, k)*EXP(dmu_year,k))/DTT_Num_Saving(dmu_year,k) + 
1/DTT_RADIAL_BETA_VALUE(dmu_year,k) 
        else DTT_SE_phi(dmu_year,k) := 1/DTT_RADIAL_BETA_VALUE(dmu_year,k) 
      end-if 
       
      !Dtt1: Dt(t+1) 
      if DTT1_Num_Saving(dmu_year,k)>0 then  
        DTT1_SE_phi(dmu_year,k) := ( EXP(dmu_year+1,k)+ 
DTT1_EXP_STAGE1_SAVING(dmu_year, 
k)*EXP(dmu_year+1,k))/DTT1_Num_Saving(dmu_year,k) + 
1/DTT1_RADIAL_BETA_VALUE(dmu_year,k) 
        else DTT1_SE_phi(dmu_year,k) := 1/DTT1_RADIAL_BETA_VALUE(dmu_year,k) 
      end-if 
      !Dt1t: Dt+1(t) 
      if DT1T_Num_Saving(dmu_year,k)>0 then  
        DT1T_SE_phi(dmu_year,k) := ( EXP(dmu_year,k)+ 
DT1T_EXP_STAGE1_SAVING(dmu_year, k)*EXP(dmu_year,k))/DT1T_Num_Saving(dmu_year,k) 
+ 1/DT1T_RADIAL_BETA_VALUE(dmu_year,k) 
        else DT1T_SE_phi(dmu_year,k) := 1/DT1T_RADIAL_BETA_VALUE(dmu_year,k) 
      end-if 
      !Dt1t1: Dt+1(t+1) 
      if DT1T1_Num_Saving(dmu_year,k)>0 then  
        DT1T1_SE_phi(dmu_year,k) := ( EXP(dmu_year+1,k)+ 
DT1T1_EXP_STAGE1_SAVING(dmu_year, 
k)*EXP(dmu_year+1,k))/DT1T1_Num_Saving(dmu_year,k) + 
1/DT1T1_RADIAL_BETA_VALUE(dmu_year,k) 
        else DT1T1_SE_phi(dmu_year,k) := 
1/DT1T1_RADIAL_BETA_VALUE(dmu_year,k) 
      end-if 
   
  end-do 
end-do 
 
 
!Final Modifed Super Efficiency 
forall (dmu_year in ALLYEAR | START_YEAR <= dmu_year AND dmu_year <= END_YEAR) do 
 forall(k in DMU) do 
  DTT_SE(dmu_year,k) := DTT_SE_phi(dmu_year,k) 
  DTT1_SE(dmu_year,k) := DTT1_SE_phi(dmu_year,k) 
  DT1T_SE(dmu_year,k) := DT1T_SE_phi(dmu_year,k) 
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  DT1T1_SE(dmu_year,k) :=DT1T1_SE_phi(dmu_year,k) 
 end-do 
end-do 
 
! Malmquist Index 
 
forall (dmu_year in ALLYEAR | START_YEAR <= dmu_year AND dmu_year <= END_YEAR) do 
 forall(k in DMU) do 
  EC(dmu_year,k) := DT1T1_SE(dmu_year,k) / DTT_SE(dmu_year,k) 
  TC(dmu_year,k) := sqrt ( (DTT1_SE(dmu_year,k) / DT1T1_SE(dmu_year,k)) * 
(DTT_SE(dmu_year,k) / DT1T_SE(dmu_year,k)) ) 
  MI(dmu_year,k) := EC(dmu_year,k)*TC(dmu_year,k) 
 end-do 
end-do 
 
 
!Print Beta 
writeln("") 
writeln("Beta Table") 
writeln("=====================") 
writeln("ID", " ","INST NAME","            ", "YEAR","    ", "Beta") 
writeln("                                              Dtt_Beta Dtt1_Beta Dt1t_Beta Dt1t1_Beta") 
 writeln("-------------------------------------------------------") 
 forall (dmu_year in ALLYEAR | START_YEAR <= dmu_year AND dmu_year <= END_YEAR) 
do 
  forall(k in DMU) do  
   writeln(ID(dmu_year,k), "\t",NAMES(dmu_year,k),"\t", dmu_year,"\t",  
   getsol(Dtt_Radial_Beta(dmu_year,k)),"\t",getsol(Dtt1_Radial_Beta(dmu_year,k)),"\t", 
   getsol(Dt1t_Radial_Beta(dmu_year,k)),"\t",getsol(Dt1t1_Radial_Beta(dmu_year,k)) )  
  end-do 
 end-do 
writeln("-------------------------------------------------------") 
 
 
!Print Lambda 
writeln("") 
writeln("Lambda Table: DMUk = Ohio U.(23) 1991 Dtt") 
writeln("=========================================") 
writeln("ID", " ","INST NAME","            ", "YEAR","    ", "Lambda") 
 writeln("-------------------------------------------------------") 
 forall (dmu_year in ALLYEAR | 1991 <= dmu_year AND dmu_year <= 1991) do 
  forall(k in DMU| k = 23) do  
   forall (j in DMU) do 
    writeln(ID(dmu_year,j), "\t",NAMES(dmu_year,j),"\t", dmu_year,"\t",  
    getsol(Stage2_Dtt_Lambda(dmu_year,j,k)))  
   end-do 
  end-do 
 end-do 
writeln("-------------------------------------------------------") 
 
writeln("") 
writeln("Lambda Table: DMUk = Ohio U.(23) 1991 Dt1t") 
writeln("=========================================") 
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writeln("ID", " ","INST NAME","            ", "YEAR","    ", "Lambda") 
 writeln("-------------------------------------------------------") 
 forall (dmu_year in ALLYEAR | 1991 <= dmu_year AND dmu_year <= 1991) do 
  forall(k in DMU| k = 23) do  
   forall (j in DMU) do 
    writeln(ID(dmu_year,j), "\t",NAMES(dmu_year,j),"\t", dmu_year,"\t",  
    getsol(Stage2_Dt1t_Lambda(dmu_year,j,k)))  
   end-do 
  end-do 
 end-do 
writeln("-------------------------------------------------------") 
 
writeln("") 
writeln("Lambda Table: DMUk = Univ. of Akron(29) 1996 Dtt") 
writeln("=========================================") 
writeln("ID", " ","INST NAME","            ", "YEAR","    ", "Lambda") 
 writeln("-------------------------------------------------------") 
 forall (dmu_year in ALLYEAR | 1996 <= dmu_year AND dmu_year <= 1996) do 
  forall(k in DMU| k = 29) do  
   forall (j in DMU) do 
    writeln(ID(dmu_year,j), "\t",NAMES(dmu_year,j),"\t", dmu_year,"\t",  
    getsol(Stage2_Dtt_Lambda(dmu_year,j,k)))  
   end-do 
  end-do 
 end-do 
writeln("-------------------------------------------------------") 
 
 
 
!Print Modified SE 
writeln("") 
writeln("Modified SE Table") 
writeln("=====================") 
writeln("ID", " ","INST NAME","            ", "YEAR","    ", "Modified SE") 
writeln("                                              Dtt_SE Dtt1_SE Dt1t_SE Dt1t1_SE") 
 writeln("-------------------------------------------------------") 
 forall (dmu_year in ALLYEAR | START_YEAR <= dmu_year AND dmu_year <= END_YEAR) 
do 
  forall(k in DMU) do  
   writeln(ID(dmu_year,k), "\t",NAMES(dmu_year,k),"\t", dmu_year,"\t",  
  
 DTT_SE(dmu_year,k),"\t",DTT1_SE(dmu_year,k),"\t",DT1T_SE(dmu_year,k),"\t",DT1T1_SE(dm
u_year,k) )  
  end-do 
 end-do 
writeln("-------------------------------------------------------") 
 
 
 
!Print Final MI 
writeln("") 
writeln("MI Table") 
writeln("=====================") 
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writeln("ID", " ","INST NAME","            ", "YEAR","    ", "Malmquist Index") 
writeln("                                              EC   TC   MI") 
 writeln("-------------------------------------------------------") 
 forall (dmu_year in ALLYEAR | START_YEAR <= dmu_year AND dmu_year <= END_YEAR) 
do 
  forall(k in DMU) do  
   writeln(ID(dmu_year,k), "\t",NAMES(dmu_year,k),"\t", dmu_year,"\t",  
   EC(dmu_year,k),"\t",TC(dmu_year,k),"\t",MI(dmu_year,k) )  
  end-do 
 end-do 
writeln("-------------------------------------------------------") 
 
 
end-model 
 
 
2. Non-radial VRS SE Malmquist Model 
model "Malmquist" 
uses "mmxprs"; !gain access to the Xpress-Optimizer solver 
 
! Dynamic Data 2-1: 47 U.S. research institutions licensing data 
! Dynamic Data 2-2: 46 U.S. research institutions licensing data EXCLUDING ID47. Woods Hole 
Oceanographic Inst. 
! Dynamic Data 2-3: Coefficients has been recalculated by adding lag0, 46 Inst., excluding ID47 
! ID47. Woods Hole Oceanographic Inst. has so many zero data point result in unrealistic result in DEA 
and Malmquist 
 
! Time-Lag Factored Data using 1st distance lags (coefficients from regression without transform functions) 
! Factored Data: EXP from  1991 to 2002,PTI , STU, LCI from 1992 to 2007 
! Data set from 1991 to 1999 
! one input and three outputs model 
 
parameters 
 DATAFILE = "DYNAMIC_DATA3.txt" 
  
 end-parameters 
 
writeln ("DATAFILE = ",DATAFILE)  
 
 
declarations 
   ALLYEAR = 1991..1999 ! DATA FROM Year 1991-1999 
   DMU = 1..46 ! Set of Decision Making Units, hard coded 
   ID: array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of integer   ! Set of DMU ID 
   YEAR: array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of integer ! load Year 
   NAMES: array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of string   ! Set of DMU Names 
   EXP, PTI, STU, LCI:  array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of real   ! Set of input and output variables 
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   START_YEAR = 1991    ! First Year of Malmquist Index (CHANGE FROM 
MFRONTYEAR-1 TO MFRONYEAR) 
   END_YEAR = 1998    ! Last Year of Malmquist Index (CHNAGE FROM MTOYEAR - 1 TO 
MTOYEAR) 
    
   M = 20 
           
!   Dtt_TC: array(ALLYEAR, DMU) of real ! Technical Change of Malmquist 
!   Dtt_TC1: array(ALLYEAR, DMU) of real ! Dt(t+1)/Dt+1(t+1) in TC 
!   Dtt_TC2: array(ALLYEAR, DMU) of real ! Dt(t)/Dt+1(t) in TC 
!   Dtt_EC: array(ALLYEAR, DMU) of real ! Efficinecy Change of Malmquist 
!   Dtt_MALMQUIST: array(ALLYEAR, DMU) of real ! Malmquist indices of all 47 DMUs 
 
! Definition of decision variables       
   Dtt_Exp_Saving: array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of mpvar 
   Dtt1_Exp_Saving: array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of mpvar 
   Dt1t_Exp_Saving: array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of mpvar 
   Dt1t1_Exp_Saving: array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of mpvar 
   !Dtt: Dt(t)     
   Dtt_PTI_Beta:  array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of mpvar 
   Dtt_STU_Beta:  array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of mpvar 
   Dtt_LCI_Beta:  array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of mpvar     
   !Dtt1: Dt(t+1) 
   Dtt1_PTI_Beta:  array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of mpvar 
   Dtt1_STU_Beta:  array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of mpvar 
   Dtt1_LCI_Beta:  array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of mpvar     
   !Dt1t: Dt+1(t) 
   Dt1t_PTI_Beta:  array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of mpvar 
   Dt1t_STU_Beta:  array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of mpvar 
   Dt1t_LCI_Beta:  array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of mpvar     
   !Dt1t1: Dt+1(t+1)    
   Dt1t1_PTI_Beta:  array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of mpvar 
   Dt1t1_STU_Beta:  array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of mpvar 
   Dt1t1_LCI_Beta:  array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of mpvar     
 
 
   Stage1_Dtt_Lambda:  array (ALLYEAR, DMU,DMU)  of mpvar ! Array of lambda 
   Stage1_Dtt1_Lambda:  array (ALLYEAR, DMU,DMU)  of mpvar ! Array of lambda 
   Stage1_Dt1t_Lambda:  array (ALLYEAR, DMU,DMU)  of mpvar ! Array of lambda 
   Stage1_Dt1t1_Lambda:  array (ALLYEAR, DMU,DMU)  of mpvar ! Array of lambda 
 
 
   Stage2_Dtt_Lambda:  array (ALLYEAR, DMU,DMU)  of mpvar ! Array of lambda    
   Stage2_Dtt1_Lambda:  array (ALLYEAR, DMU,DMU)  of mpvar ! Array of lambda    
   Stage2_Dt1t_Lambda:  array (ALLYEAR, DMU,DMU)  of mpvar ! Array of lambda    
   Stage2_Dt1t1_Lambda:  array (ALLYEAR, DMU,DMU)  of mpvar ! Array of lambda    
 
! Variables to store input saving from the stage 1 
   DTT_EXP_STAGE1_SAVING: array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of real 
   DTT1_EXP_STAGE1_SAVING: array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of real 
   DT1T_EXP_STAGE1_SAVING: array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of real 
   DT1T1_EXP_STAGE1_SAVING: array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of real 
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! Variables to store beta from the stage 2 
   !Dtt: Dt(t) 
   DTT_PTI_BETA_VALUE: array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of real 
   DTT_STU_BETA_VALUE: array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of real 
   DTT_LCI_BETA_VALUE: array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of real 
   !Dtt1: Dt(t+1) 
   DTT1_PTI_BETA_VALUE: array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of real 
   DTT1_STU_BETA_VALUE: array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of real 
   DTT1_LCI_BETA_VALUE: array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of real 
   !Dt1t: Dt+1(t) 
   DT1T_PTI_BETA_VALUE: array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of real 
   DT1T_STU_BETA_VALUE: array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of real 
   DT1T_LCI_BETA_VALUE: array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of real 
   !Dt1t1: Dt+1(t+1) 
   DT1T1_PTI_BETA_VALUE: array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of real 
   DT1T1_STU_BETA_VALUE: array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of real 
   DT1T1_LCI_BETA_VALUE: array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of real 
 
! Variables to store average beta of each output 
   DTT_BETA_AVERAGE: array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of real 
   DTT1_BETA_AVERAGE: array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of real 
   DT1T_BETA_AVERAGE: array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of real 
   DT1T1_BETA_AVERAGE: array (ALLYEAR, DMU) of real 
  
    
end-declarations 
 
 
initializations from DATAFILE 
  ID NAMES YEAR EXP PTI STU LCI   ! Reads the data from the above file 
end-initializations 
 
! ### Stage 1: Calculate input saving. If it is not zero, the DMU is an infeasible case. ###  
 
forall (dmu_year in ALLYEAR | START_YEAR <= dmu_year AND dmu_year <= END_YEAR) do 
 
 forall(k in DMU) do 
  !Dtt: Dt(t) 
  sum (j in DMU | j<>k) Stage1_Dtt_Lambda(dmu_year,j,k)=1   ! Variable returns to Scale 
  Stage1_Dtt_Lambda(dmu_year,k,k)=0 
  sum (j in DMU | j<>k) Stage1_Dtt_Lambda(dmu_year,j,k)*EXP(dmu_year, j) - Dtt_Exp_Saving 
(dmu_year, k)<= EXP(dmu_year,k) !input, EXP, constraint 
   
  !Dtt1: Dt(t+1) 
  sum (j in DMU) Stage1_Dtt1_Lambda(dmu_year,j,k)=1   ! Variable returns to Scale 
  sum (j in DMU) Stage1_Dtt1_Lambda(dmu_year,j,k)*EXP(dmu_year, j) - Dtt1_Exp_Saving 
(dmu_year, k)<= EXP(dmu_year+1,k) !input, EXP, constraint 
   
  !Dt1t: Dt+1(t) 
  sum (j in DMU) Stage1_Dt1t_Lambda(dmu_year,j,k)=1   ! Variable returns to Scale 
  sum (j in DMU) Stage1_Dt1t_Lambda(dmu_year,j,k)*EXP(dmu_year+1, j) - Dt1t_Exp_Saving 
(dmu_year, k)<= EXP(dmu_year,k) !input, EXP, constraint 
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  !Dt1t1: Dt+1(t+1) 
  sum (j in DMU | j<>k) Stage1_Dt1t1_Lambda(dmu_year,j,k)=1   ! Variable returns to Scale 
  Stage1_Dt1t1_Lambda(dmu_year,k,k)=0 
  sum (j in DMU | j<>k) Stage1_Dt1t1_Lambda(dmu_year,j,k)*EXP(dmu_year+1, j) - 
Dt1t1_Exp_Saving (dmu_year, k)<= EXP(dmu_year+1,k) !input, EXP, constraint 
 
 end-do ! evalute all DMUs  
  
end-do ! Stage1 DEA loop, evaluate all years (from start year to end year) 
 
minimize (sum (k in DMU, dmu_year in ALLYEAR | START_YEAR <= dmu_year AND dmu_year <= 
END_YEAR)  
(Dtt_Exp_Saving (dmu_year, k)+ Dtt1_Exp_Saving (dmu_year, k)+ Dt1t_Exp_Saving (dmu_year, k)+ 
Dt1t1_Exp_Saving (dmu_year, k))) !object function: minimize input saving 
 
 
! Print input saving table 
writeln("") 
writeln("Input Saving Table") 
writeln("=====================") 
writeln("ID", " ","INST NAME","        ", "YEAR"," ", "INPUT SAVING") 
writeln("                                              Dtt   Dtt1   Dt1t   Dt1t1") 
 writeln("-------------------------------------------------------") 
 forall (dmu_year in ALLYEAR | START_YEAR <= dmu_year AND dmu_year <= END_YEAR) do 
  forall(k in DMU) do  
   writeln(ID(dmu_year,k), "\t",NAMES(dmu_year,k),"\t", dmu_year,"\t",getsol(Dtt_Exp_Saving 
(dmu_year, k)),"\t",getsol(Dtt1_Exp_Saving (dmu_year, k)),"\t",getsol(Dt1t_Exp_Saving (dmu_year, 
k)),"\t",getsol(Dt1t1_Exp_Saving (dmu_year, k)) )   
  end-do 
 end-do 
writeln("-------------------------------------------------------") 
 
! Store input savings to the variables for the stage2 
forall (dmu_year in ALLYEAR | START_YEAR <= dmu_year AND dmu_year <= END_YEAR) do 
 forall(k in DMU) do  
  DTT_EXP_STAGE1_SAVING(dmu_year, k) := getsol(Dtt_Exp_Saving (dmu_year, k)) 
  DTT1_EXP_STAGE1_SAVING(dmu_year, k) := getsol(Dtt1_Exp_Saving (dmu_year, k)) 
  DT1T_EXP_STAGE1_SAVING(dmu_year, k) := getsol(Dt1t_Exp_Saving (dmu_year, k)) 
  DT1T1_EXP_STAGE1_SAVING(dmu_year, k) := getsol(Dt1t1_Exp_Saving (dmu_year, k)) 
 end-do 
end-do 
 
! #### End of Stage 1 #### 
 
! ### Stage 2: Using the input savings from the stage 1 evalute super efficiency of the DMUs for all years 
### 
 
forall (dmu_year in ALLYEAR | START_YEAR <= dmu_year AND dmu_year <= END_YEAR) do 
 
 forall(k in DMU) do 
  
 !! Input constraints 
  !Dtt: Dt(t) 
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  sum (j in DMU | j<>k) Stage2_Dtt_Lambda(dmu_year,j,k)=1   ! Variable returns to Scale 
  Stage2_Dtt_Lambda(dmu_year,k,k)=0 
  sum (j in DMU | j<>k) Stage2_Dtt_Lambda(dmu_year,j,k)*EXP(dmu_year, j) - 
DTT_EXP_STAGE1_SAVING (dmu_year, k)<= EXP(dmu_year,k) !input, EXP, constraint 
   
  !Dtt1: Dt(t+1) 
  sum (j in DMU) Stage2_Dtt1_Lambda(dmu_year,j,k)=1   ! Variable returns to Scale 
  sum (j in DMU) Stage2_Dtt1_Lambda(dmu_year,j,k)*EXP(dmu_year, j) - 
DTT1_EXP_STAGE1_SAVING (dmu_year, k)<= EXP(dmu_year+1,k) !input, EXP, constraint 
   
  !Dt1t: Dt+1(t) 
  sum (j in DMU) Stage2_Dt1t_Lambda(dmu_year,j,k)=1   ! Variable returns to Scale 
  sum (j in DMU) Stage2_Dt1t_Lambda(dmu_year,j,k)*EXP(dmu_year+1, j) - 
DT1T_EXP_STAGE1_SAVING (dmu_year, k)<= EXP(dmu_year,k) !input, EXP, constraint 
   
  !Dt1t1: Dt+1(t+1) 
  sum (j in DMU | j<>k) Stage2_Dt1t1_Lambda(dmu_year,j,k)=1   ! Variable returns to Scale 
  Stage2_Dt1t1_Lambda(dmu_year,k,k)=0 
  sum (j in DMU | j<>k) Stage2_Dt1t1_Lambda(dmu_year,j,k)*EXP(dmu_year+1, j) - 
DT1T1_EXP_STAGE1_SAVING (dmu_year, k)<= EXP(dmu_year+1,k) !input, EXP, constraint 
 
 !! Output Constraints 
  !Dtt: Dt(t) 
  sum (j in DMU | j<>k) Stage2_Dtt_Lambda(dmu_year,j,k)*PTI(dmu_year, j)>= PTI(dmu_year, 
k)*Dtt_PTI_Beta(dmu_year, k) !output PTI constraint 
  sum (j in DMU | j<>k) Stage2_Dtt_Lambda(dmu_year,j,k)*STU(dmu_year, j)>= STU(dmu_year, 
k)*Dtt_STU_Beta(dmu_year, k) !output STU constraint 
  sum (j in DMU | j<>k) Stage2_Dtt_Lambda(dmu_year,j,k)*LCI(dmu_year, j)>= LCI(dmu_year, 
k)*Dtt_LCI_Beta(dmu_year, k) !output LCI constraint 
   
  !Dtt1: Dt(t+1) 
  sum (j in DMU) Stage2_Dtt1_Lambda(dmu_year,j,k)*PTI(dmu_year, j)>= PTI(dmu_year+1, 
k)*Dtt1_PTI_Beta(dmu_year, k) !output PTI constraint 
  sum (j in DMU) Stage2_Dtt1_Lambda(dmu_year,j,k)*STU(dmu_year, j)>= STU(dmu_year+1, 
k)*Dtt1_STU_Beta(dmu_year, k) !output STU constraint 
  sum (j in DMU) Stage2_Dtt1_Lambda(dmu_year,j,k)*LCI(dmu_year, j)>= LCI(dmu_year+1, 
k)*Dtt1_LCI_Beta(dmu_year, k) !output LCI constraint 
   
  !Dt1t: Dt+1(t) 
  sum (j in DMU) Stage2_Dt1t_Lambda(dmu_year,j,k)*PTI(dmu_year+1, j)>= PTI(dmu_year, 
k)*Dt1t_PTI_Beta(dmu_year, k) !output PTI constraint 
  sum (j in DMU) Stage2_Dt1t_Lambda(dmu_year,j,k)*STU(dmu_year+1, j)>= STU(dmu_year, 
k)*Dt1t_STU_Beta(dmu_year, k) !output STU constraint 
  sum (j in DMU) Stage2_Dt1t_Lambda(dmu_year,j,k)*LCI(dmu_year+1, j)>= LCI(dmu_year, 
k)*Dt1t_LCI_Beta(dmu_year, k) !output LCI constraint 
   
  !Dt1t1: Dt+1(t+1) 
  sum (j in DMU | j<>k) Stage2_Dt1t1_Lambda(dmu_year,j,k)*PTI(dmu_year+1, j)>= 
PTI(dmu_year+1, k)*Dt1t1_PTI_Beta(dmu_year, k) !output PTI constraint 
  sum (j in DMU | j<>k) Stage2_Dt1t1_Lambda(dmu_year,j,k)*STU(dmu_year+1, j)>= 
STU(dmu_year+1, k)*Dt1t1_STU_Beta(dmu_year, k) !output STU constraint 
  sum (j in DMU | j<>k) Stage2_Dt1t1_Lambda(dmu_year,j,k)*LCI(dmu_year+1, j)>= 
LCI(dmu_year+1, k)*Dt1t1_LCI_Beta(dmu_year, k) !output LCI constraint 
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 end-do ! evalute all DMUs  
  
end-do ! Stage 2 DEA loop, evaluate all years (from start year to end year) 
 
forall (dmu_year in ALLYEAR | START_YEAR <= dmu_year AND dmu_year <= END_YEAR) do 
 
 forall(k in DMU) do 
  Dtt_PTI_Beta(dmu_year, k) <= M 
  Dtt_STU_Beta(dmu_year, k) <= M 
  Dtt_LCI_Beta(dmu_year, k) <= M 
   
  Dtt1_PTI_Beta(dmu_year, k) <= M 
  Dtt1_STU_Beta(dmu_year, k) <= M 
  Dtt1_LCI_Beta(dmu_year, k) <= M 
   
  Dt1t_PTI_Beta(dmu_year, k) <= M 
  Dt1t_STU_Beta(dmu_year, k) <= M 
  Dt1t_LCI_Beta(dmu_year, k) <= M 
   
  Dt1t1_PTI_Beta(dmu_year, k) <= M 
  Dt1t1_STU_Beta(dmu_year, k) <= M 
  Dt1t1_LCI_Beta(dmu_year, k) <= M 
 end-do 
end-do  
 
 
 
maximize (sum (k in DMU, dmu_year in ALLYEAR | START_YEAR <= dmu_year AND dmu_year <= 
END_YEAR)  
(Dtt_PTI_Beta(dmu_year, k)+ Dtt1_PTI_Beta(dmu_year, k)+Dt1t_PTI_Beta(dmu_year, 
k)+Dt1t1_PTI_Beta(dmu_year, k)+ 
Dtt_STU_Beta(dmu_year, k)+ Dtt1_STU_Beta(dmu_year, k)+Dt1t_STU_Beta(dmu_year, 
k)+Dt1t1_STU_Beta(dmu_year, k)+ 
Dtt_LCI_Beta(dmu_year, k)+ Dtt1_LCI_Beta(dmu_year, k)+Dt1t_LCI_Beta(dmu_year, 
k)+Dt1t1_LCI_Beta(dmu_year, k))) 
 
 
! Save beta to the static variables for the post evalution 
forall (dmu_year in ALLYEAR | START_YEAR <= dmu_year AND dmu_year <= END_YEAR) do 
 forall(k in DMU) do 
    !Dtt: Dt(t) 
      if getsol(Dtt_PTI_Beta(dmu_year,k))=1000 or getsol(Dtt_PTI_Beta(dmu_year,k))=0 then 
DTT_PTI_BETA_VALUE(dmu_year,k):= 1  
      else DTT_PTI_BETA_VALUE(dmu_year,k):= getsol(Dtt_PTI_Beta(dmu_year,k))  
      end-if 
       
      if getsol(Dtt_STU_Beta(dmu_year,k))=1000 or getsol(Dtt_STU_Beta(dmu_year,k))= 0 then 
DTT_STU_BETA_VALUE(dmu_year,k):= 1  
      else DTT_STU_BETA_VALUE(dmu_year,k):= getsol(Dtt_STU_Beta(dmu_year,k))  
      end-if 
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      if getsol(Dtt_LCI_Beta(dmu_year,k))=1000 or getsol(Dtt_LCI_Beta(dmu_year,k))= 0 then 
DTT_LCI_BETA_VALUE(dmu_year,k):= 1  
      else DTT_LCI_BETA_VALUE(dmu_year,k):= getsol(Dtt_LCI_Beta(dmu_year,k)) 
      end-if 
      
     !Dtt1: Dt(t+1) 
     if getsol(Dtt1_PTI_Beta(dmu_year,k))=1000 or getsol(Dtt1_PTI_Beta(dmu_year,k))= 0 then 
DTT1_PTI_BETA_VALUE(dmu_year,k):= 1  
     else DTT1_PTI_BETA_VALUE(dmu_year,k):= getsol(Dtt1_PTI_Beta(dmu_year,k))  
     end-if 
      
     if getsol(Dtt1_STU_Beta(dmu_year,k))=1000 or getsol(Dtt1_STU_Beta(dmu_year,k))= 0 then 
DTT1_STU_BETA_VALUE(dmu_year,k):= 1  
     else DTT1_STU_BETA_VALUE(dmu_year,k):= getsol(Dtt1_STU_Beta(dmu_year,k))  
     end-if 
      
     if getsol(Dtt1_LCI_Beta(dmu_year,k))=1000 or getsol(Dtt1_LCI_Beta(dmu_year,k))= 0 then 
DTT1_LCI_BETA_VALUE(dmu_year,k):=  1  
     else DTT1_LCI_BETA_VALUE(dmu_year,k):= getsol(Dtt1_LCI_Beta(dmu_year,k))  
     end-if 
      
     !Dt1t: Dt+1(t) 
     if getsol(Dt1t_PTI_Beta(dmu_year,k))=1000 or getsol(Dt1t_PTI_Beta(dmu_year,k))= 0 then 
DT1T_PTI_BETA_VALUE(dmu_year,k):= 1  
     else DT1T_PTI_BETA_VALUE(dmu_year,k):= getsol(Dt1t_PTI_Beta(dmu_year,k))  
     end-if 
      
     if getsol(Dt1t_STU_Beta(dmu_year,k))=1000 or getsol(Dt1t_STU_Beta(dmu_year,k))= 0 then 
DT1T_STU_BETA_VALUE(dmu_year,k):= 1  
     else DT1T_STU_BETA_VALUE(dmu_year,k):= getsol(Dt1t_STU_Beta(dmu_year,k))  
     end-if 
      
     if getsol(Dt1t_LCI_Beta(dmu_year,k))=1000 or getsol(Dt1t_LCI_Beta(dmu_year,k))= 0 then 
DT1T_LCI_BETA_VALUE(dmu_year,k):= 1  
     else DT1T_LCI_BETA_VALUE(dmu_year,k):=getsol(Dt1t_LCI_Beta(dmu_year,k))  
     end-if 
    
    !Dt1t1: Dt+1(t+1) 
     if getsol(Dt1t1_PTI_Beta(dmu_year,k))=1000 or getsol(Dt1t1_PTI_Beta(dmu_year,k))= 0 then 
DT1T1_PTI_BETA_VALUE(dmu_year,k):= 1  
     else DT1T1_PTI_BETA_VALUE(dmu_year,k):= getsol(Dt1t1_PTI_Beta(dmu_year,k))  
     end-if 
      
     if getsol(Dt1t1_STU_Beta(dmu_year,k))=1000 or getsol(Dt1t1_STU_Beta(dmu_year,k))= 0 then 
DT1T1_STU_BETA_VALUE(dmu_year,k):= 1 
     else DT1T1_STU_BETA_VALUE(dmu_year,k):= getsol(Dt1t1_STU_Beta(dmu_year,k))  
     end-if 
      
     if getsol(Dt1t1_LCI_Beta(dmu_year,k))=1000 or getsol(Dt1t1_LCI_Beta(dmu_year,k))= 0 then 
DT1T1_LCI_BETA_VALUE(dmu_year,k):=  1  
     else DT1T1_LCI_BETA_VALUE(dmu_year,k):= getsol(Dt1t1_LCI_Beta(dmu_year,k))  
     end-if 
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 end-do 
end-do 
 
! Calcualte Average Beta of the Three Ouptut Betas 
forall (dmu_year in ALLYEAR | START_YEAR <= dmu_year AND dmu_year <= END_YEAR) do 
 forall(k in DMU) do 
     DTT_BETA_AVERAGE(dmu_year,k):= 
(DTT_PTI_BETA_VALUE(dmu_year,k)+DTT_STU_BETA_VALUE(dmu_year,k)+DTT_LCI_BETA_V
ALUE(dmu_year,k))/3 
     DTT1_BETA_AVERAGE(dmu_year,k):= 
(DTT1_PTI_BETA_VALUE(dmu_year,k)+DTT1_STU_BETA_VALUE(dmu_year,k)+DTT1_LCI_BET
A_VALUE(dmu_year,k))/3 
     DT1T_BETA_AVERAGE(dmu_year,k):= 
(DT1T_PTI_BETA_VALUE(dmu_year,k)+DT1T_STU_BETA_VALUE(dmu_year,k)+DT1T_LCI_BET
A_VALUE(dmu_year,k))/3 
     DT1T1_BETA_AVERAGE(dmu_year,k):= 
(DT1T1_PTI_BETA_VALUE(dmu_year,k)+DT1T1_STU_BETA_VALUE(dmu_year,k)+DT1T1_LCI_B
ETA_VALUE(dmu_year,k))/3 
 end-do 
end-do 
 
 
 
!Print Beta 
writeln("") 
writeln("Beta Table: Dtt") 
writeln("=====================") 
writeln("ID", " ","INST NAME","            ", "YEAR","    ", "Beta") 
writeln("                                              Dtt_PTI_Beta Dtt_STU_Beta Dtt_LCI_Beta") 
 writeln("-------------------------------------------------------") 
 forall (dmu_year in ALLYEAR | START_YEAR <= dmu_year AND dmu_year <= END_YEAR) do 
  forall(k in DMU) do  
   writeln(ID(dmu_year,k), "\t",NAMES(dmu_year,k),"\t", dmu_year,"\t", 
getsol(Dtt_PTI_Beta(dmu_year,k)),"\t",getsol(Dtt_STU_Beta(dmu_year,k)),"\t",getsol(Dtt_LCI_Beta(dmu
_year,k)))   
  end-do 
 end-do 
writeln("-------------------------------------------------------") 
 
writeln("") 
writeln("Beta Table: Dtt1") 
writeln("=====================") 
writeln("ID", " ","INST NAME","            ", "YEAR","    ", "Beta") 
writeln("                                              Dtt1_PTI_Beta Dtt1_STU_Beta Dtt1_LCI_Beta") 
 writeln("-------------------------------------------------------") 
 forall (dmu_year in ALLYEAR | START_YEAR <= dmu_year AND dmu_year <= END_YEAR) do 
  forall(k in DMU) do  
   writeln(ID(dmu_year,k), "\t",NAMES(dmu_year,k),"\t", dmu_year,"\t", 
getsol(Dtt1_PTI_Beta(dmu_year,k)),"\t",getsol(Dtt1_STU_Beta(dmu_year,k)),"\t",getsol(Dtt1_LCI_Beta(d
mu_year,k)))   
  end-do 
 end-do 
writeln("-------------------------------------------------------") 
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writeln("") 
writeln("Beta Table: Dt1t") 
writeln("=====================") 
writeln("ID", " ","INST NAME","            ", "YEAR","    ", "Beta") 
writeln("                                              Dt1t_PTI_Beta Dt1t_STU_Beta Dt1t_LCI_Beta") 
 writeln("-------------------------------------------------------") 
 forall (dmu_year in ALLYEAR | START_YEAR <= dmu_year AND dmu_year <= END_YEAR) do 
  forall(k in DMU) do  
   writeln(ID(dmu_year,k), "\t",NAMES(dmu_year,k),"\t", dmu_year,"\t", 
getsol(Dt1t_PTI_Beta(dmu_year,k)),"\t",getsol(Dt1t_STU_Beta(dmu_year,k)),"\t",getsol(Dt1t_LCI_Beta(d
mu_year,k)))   
  end-do 
 end-do 
writeln("-------------------------------------------------------") 
 
writeln("") 
writeln("Beta Table: Dt1t1") 
writeln("=====================") 
writeln("ID", " ","INST NAME","            ", "YEAR","    ", "Beta") 
writeln("                                              Dt1t1_PTI_Beta Dt1t1_STU_Beta Dt1t1_LCI_Beta") 
 writeln("-------------------------------------------------------") 
 forall (dmu_year in ALLYEAR | START_YEAR <= dmu_year AND dmu_year <= END_YEAR) do 
  forall(k in DMU) do  
   writeln(ID(dmu_year,k), "\t",NAMES(dmu_year,k),"\t", dmu_year,"\t", 
getsol(Dt1t1_PTI_Beta(dmu_year,k)),"\t",getsol(Dt1t1_STU_Beta(dmu_year,k)),"\t",getsol(Dt1t1_LCI_Be
ta(dmu_year,k)))   
  end-do 
 end-do 
writeln("-------------------------------------------------------") 
 
writeln("") 
writeln("Average Beta Table (after output beta transformed: zero beta ->1, unbounded beta ->1)") 
writeln("=====================") 
writeln("ID", " ","INST NAME","            ", "YEAR","    ", "Beta") 
writeln("                                             Dtt_beta  Dtt1_beta  Dt1t_beta Dt1t1_beta") 
 writeln("-------------------------------------------------------") 
 forall (dmu_year in ALLYEAR | START_YEAR <= dmu_year AND dmu_year <= END_YEAR) do 
  forall(k in DMU) do  
   writeln(ID(dmu_year,k), "\t",NAMES(dmu_year,k),"\t", dmu_year,"\t", 
DTT_BETA_AVERAGE(dmu_year,k),"\t",DTT1_BETA_AVERAGE(dmu_year,k),"\t",DT1T_BETA_A
VERAGE(dmu_year,k),"\t",DT1T1_BETA_AVERAGE(dmu_year,k))   
  end-do 
 end-do 
writeln("-------------------------------------------------------") 
 
 
end-model 
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13Appendix D. Modified Super-Efficiency Score of the 46 Institutions during the period 
Table D1: Modified Super-Efficiency Score of the 46 U.S. Institutions 
 
DMU 
ID 
Institutions Year Dt(t) Dt(t+1) Dt+1(t) Dt+1(t+1) 
1 Baylor College of Medicine 1991 0.10 0.48 0.08 0.27 
2 Brigham & Women's Hospital, Inc. 1991 0.56 1.20 0.32 0.61 
3 Brigham Young Univ. 1991 2.09 1.08 2.50 1.16 
4 California Institute of Tech. 1991 0.87 1.97 0.49 1.52 
5 Case Western Reserve Univ. 1991 0.35 0.31 0.18 0.15 
6 City of Hope National Medic 1991 5.17 1.49 0.99 2.47 
7 Clemson Univ. 1991 0.54 0.74 0.44 0.40 
8 Colorado State Univ. 1991 0.42 0.34 0.22 0.19 
9 Dartmouth College 1991 0.21 0.55 0.12 0.34 
10 Florida State Univ. 1991 0.32 0.99 0.22 0.96 
11 Fred Hutchinson Cancer Res. 1991 0.21 0.22 0.12 0.11 
12 Georgia Inst. of Technology 1991 0.44 0.73 0.24 0.39 
13 Harvard Univ. 1991 0.41 0.89 0.29 0.60 
14 Indiana Univ. (ARTI) 1991 0.18 0.29 0.09 0.14 
15 Johns Hopkins Univ. 1991 0.31 0.74 0.24 0.35 
16 Massachusetts Inst. of Tech 1991 3.33 2.16 0.76 2.79 
17 Mayo Foundation 1991 0.61 0.97 0.35 0.52 
18 Michigan State Univ. 1991 0.77 0.99 0.60 0.64 
19 National Jewish Center 1991 0.37 0.22 0.25 0.15 
20 New Jersey Institute of Tech. 1991 0.14 0.89 0.10 0.55 
21 Northwestern Univ. 1991 0.28 0.53 0.14 0.26 
22 Ohio State Univ. 1991 0.32 0.77 0.16 0.37 
23 Ohio Univ. 1991 3.01 3.27 1.56 5.11 
24 Oregon State Univ. 1991 0.13 0.24 0.07 0.13 
25 Penn State Univ. 1991 0.25 0.28 0.18 0.18 
26 Rutgers, The State Univ. 1991 0.48 0.90 0.28 0.45 
27 St. Jude Children's Researc 1991 0.34 0.10 0.21 0.06 
28 Tulane Univ. 1991 0.45 0.55 0.28 0.33 
29 Univ. of Akron 1991 2.11 1.42 1.11 0.97 
30 Univ. of Arizona 1991 0.16 0.34 0.10 0.16 
31 Univ. of Cincinnati 1991 0.56 0.59 0.34 0.34 
32 Univ. of Connecticut 1991 0.40 0.65 0.22 0.34 
33 Univ. of Dayton 1991 0.49 0.58 0.30 0.33 
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Table D1: Modified Super-Efficiency Score of the 46 U.S. Institutions (continued) 
 
DMU 
ID 
Institutions Year Dt(t) Dt(t+1) Dt+1(t) Dt+1(t+1) 
34 Univ. of Delaware 1991 0.45 0.61 0.32 0.34 
35 Univ. of Iowa Research Fdn. 1991 0.27 0.46 0.14 0.22 
36 Univ. of Maryland, College 1991 0.35 0.53 0.20 0.26 
37 Univ. of Michigan 1991 0.20 0.58 0.10 0.40 
38 Univ. of Minnesota 1991 0.45 1.08 0.32 0.51 
39 Univ. of Oregon 1991 0.70 0.70 0.42 0.39 
40 Univ. of Southern California 1991 0.36 0.57 0.23 0.32 
41 Univ. of Texas Southwestern 1991 0.41 0.84 0.23 0.42 
42 Univ. of Utah 1991 0.86 1.32 0.45 0.74 
43 Univ. of Virginia Patent Fdn. 1991 0.66 1.07 0.37 0.56 
44 Vanderbilt Univ. 1991 0.18 0.21 0.10 0.12 
45 Wake Forest Univ. 1991 0.40 0.59 0.24 0.34 
46 Washington Univ. 1991 0.41 0.53 0.34 0.26 
1 Baylor College of Medicine 1992 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.25 
2 Brigham & Women's Hospital, Inc. 1992 0.61 0.48 0.44 0.37 
3 Brigham Young Univ. 1992 1.16 72.50 0.60 17.66 
4 California Institute of Tech. 1992 1.52 1.44 1.15 1.57 
5 Case Western Reserve Univ. 1992 0.15 0.20 0.11 0.15 
6 City of Hope National Medic 1992 2.47 1.04 1.15 1.74 
7 Clemson Univ. 1992 0.40 0.20 0.32 0.17 
8 Colorado State Univ. 1992 0.19 0.11 0.19 0.12 
9 Dartmouth College 1992 0.34 0.25 0.32 0.17 
10 Florida State Univ. 1992 0.96 1.46 0.79 1.41 
11 Fred Hutchinson Cancer Res. 1992 0.11 0.35 0.08 0.27 
12 Georgia Inst. of Technology 1992 0.39 0.33 0.32 0.32 
13 Harvard Univ. 1992 0.60 0.47 0.50 0.43 
14 Indiana Univ. (ARTI) 1992 0.14 0.24 0.12 0.20 
15 Johns Hopkins Univ. 1992 0.35 0.47 0.34 0.47 
16 Massachusetts Inst. of Tech 1992 2.79 1.19 1.15 2.34 
17 Mayo Foundation 1992 0.52 0.29 0.40 0.26 
18 Michigan State Univ. 1992 0.64 0.85 0.56 0.86 
19 National Jewish Center 1992 0.15 0.51 0.13 0.21 
20 New Jersey Institute of Tech. 1992 0.55 1.65 0.46 0.61 
21 Northwestern Univ. 1992 0.26 0.54 0.20 0.38 
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Table D1: Modified Super-Efficiency Score of the 46 U.S. Institutions (continued) 
 
 
DMU 
ID 
Institutions Year Dt(t) Dt(t+1) Dt+1(t) Dt+1(t+1) 
22 Ohio State Univ. 1992 0.37 0.40 0.32 0.44 
23 Ohio Univ. 1992 5.11 0.85 2.35 0.46 
24 Oregon State Univ. 1992 0.13 0.29 0.10 0.21 
25 Penn State Univ. 1992 0.18 0.32 0.18 0.31 
26 Rutgers, The State Univ. 1992 0.45 0.49 0.38 0.44 
27 St. Jude Children's Researc 1992 0.06 0.27 0.06 0.21 
28 Tulane Univ. 1992 0.33 0.32 0.31 0.28 
29 Univ. of Akron 1992 0.97 1.32 0.77 1.47 
30 Univ. of Arizona 1992 0.16 0.14 0.15 0.15 
31 Univ. of Cincinnati 1992 0.34 0.41 0.27 0.33 
32 Univ. of Connecticut 1992 0.34 0.22 0.24 0.16 
33 Univ. of Dayton 1992 0.33 0.46 0.25 0.34 
34 Univ. of Delaware 1992 0.34 0.42 0.25 0.35 
35 Univ. of Iowa Research Fdn. 1992 0.22 0.25 0.19 0.22 
36 Univ. of Maryland, College 1992 0.26 0.38 0.19 0.30 
37 Univ. of Michigan 1992 0.40 0.47 0.34 0.39 
38 Univ. of Minnesota 1992 0.51 0.48 0.52 0.48 
39 Univ. of Oregon 1992 0.39 0.34 0.29 0.27 
40 Univ. of Southern California 1992 0.32 0.48 0.33 0.52 
41 Univ. of Texas Southwestern 1992 0.42 0.48 0.32 0.37 
42 Univ. of Utah 1992 0.74 0.57 0.76 0.44 
43 Univ. of Virginia Patent Fdn. 1992 0.56 0.47 0.63 0.47 
44 Vanderbilt Univ. 1992 0.12 0.31 0.13 0.22 
45 Wake Forest Univ. 1992 0.34 0.31 0.34 0.24 
46 Washington Univ. 1992 0.26 0.38 0.27 0.37 
1 Baylor College of Medicine 1993 0.25 0.36 0.25 0.36 
2 Brigham & Women's Hospital, Inc. 1993 0.37 0.31 0.46 0.39 
3 Brigham Young Univ. 1993 17.66 2.23 0.87 3.25 
4 California Institute of Tech. 1993 1.57 0.91 1.34 1.13 
5 Case Western Reserve Univ. 1993 0.15 0.18 0.19 0.23 
6 City of Hope National Medic 1993 1.74 0.73 1.51 0.97 
7 Clemson Univ. 1993 0.17 0.19 0.22 0.23 
8 Colorado State Univ. 1993 0.12 0.11 0.14 0.14 
9 Dartmouth College 1993 0.17 0.28 0.21 0.36 
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Table D1: Modified Super-Efficiency Score of the 46 U.S. Institutions (continued) 
 
 
DMU 
ID 
Institutions Year Dt(t) Dt(t+1) Dt+1(t) Dt+1(t+1) 
10 Florida State Univ. 1993 1.41 1.21 1.08 2.43 
11 Fred Hutchinson Cancer Res. 1993 0.27 0.17 0.34 0.22 
12 Georgia Inst. of Technology 1993 0.32 0.58 0.36 0.64 
13 Harvard Univ. 1993 0.43 0.50 0.41 0.48 
14 Indiana Univ. (ARTI) 1993 0.20 0.17 0.23 0.19 
15 Johns Hopkins Univ. 1993 0.47 0.60 0.43 0.57 
16 Massachusetts Inst. of Tech 1993 2.34 1.12 1.12 2.35 
17 Mayo Foundation 1993 0.26 0.31 0.30 0.36 
18 Michigan State Univ. 1993 0.86 0.82 0.92 0.88 
19 National Jewish Center 1993 0.21 0.22 0.21 0.23 
20 New Jersey Institute of Tech. 1993 0.61 0.88 0.37 0.51 
21 Northwestern Univ. 1993 0.38 0.40 0.51 0.49 
22 Ohio State Univ. 1993 0.44 0.30 0.49 0.33 
23 Ohio Univ. 1993 0.46 0.50 0.47 0.50 
24 Oregon State Univ. 1993 0.21 0.11 0.28 0.15 
25 Penn State Univ. 1993 0.31 0.30 0.34 0.28 
26 Rutgers, The State Univ. 1993 0.44 0.39 0.48 0.45 
27 St. Jude Children's Researc 1993 0.21 0.15 0.25 0.18 
28 Tulane Univ. 1993 0.28 0.23 0.36 0.27 
29 Univ. of Akron 1993 1.47 2.36 1.09 3.04 
30 Univ. of Arizona 1993 0.15 0.22 0.15 0.24 
31 Univ. of Cincinnati 1993 0.33 0.21 0.37 0.27 
32 Univ. of Connecticut 1993 0.16 0.12 0.20 0.16 
33 Univ. of Dayton 1993 0.34 0.29 0.42 0.36 
34 Univ. of Delaware 1993 0.35 0.18 0.31 0.22 
35 Univ. of Iowa Research Fdn. 1993 0.22 0.37 0.25 0.44 
36 Univ. of Maryland, College 1993 0.30 0.18 0.34 0.19 
37 Univ. of Michigan 1993 0.39 0.39 0.44 0.36 
38 Univ. of Minnesota 1993 0.48 0.48 0.52 0.49 
39 Univ. of Oregon 1993 0.27 0.22 0.27 0.23 
40 Univ. of Southern California 1993 0.52 0.42 0.57 0.46 
41 Univ. of Texas Southwestern 1993 0.37 0.38 0.47 0.45 
42 Univ. of Utah 1993 0.44 0.51 0.55 0.59 
43 Univ. of Virginia Patent Fdn. 1993 0.47 0.26 0.52 0.30 
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Table D1: Modified Super-Efficiency Score of the 46 U.S. Institutions (continued) 
 
 
DMU 
ID 
Institutions Year Dt(t) Dt(t+1) Dt+1(t) Dt+1(t+1) 
44 Vanderbilt Univ. 1993 0.22 0.20 0.29 0.26 
45 Wake Forest Univ. 1993 0.24 0.15 0.30 0.19 
46 Washington Univ. 1993 0.37 0.41 0.40 0.42 
1 Baylor College of Medicine 1994 0.36 0.24 0.41 0.19 
2 Brigham & Women's Hospital, Inc. 1994 0.39 0.50 0.31 0.37 
3 Brigham Young Univ. 1994 3.25 1.43 2.51 1.25 
4 California Institute of Tech. 1994 1.13 1.41 1.50 1.25 
5 Case Western Reserve Univ. 1994 0.23 0.25 0.18 0.31 
6 City of Hope National Medic 1994 0.97 1.02 0.59 0.62 
7 Clemson Univ. 1994 0.23 0.19 0.16 0.13 
8 Colorado State Univ. 1994 0.14 0.23 0.11 0.34 
9 Dartmouth College 1994 0.36 1.68 0.28 1.59 
10 Florida State Univ. 1994 2.43 1.18 0.95 1.02 
11 Fred Hutchinson Cancer Res. 1994 0.22 0.12 0.19 0.16 
12 Georgia Inst. of Technology 1994 0.64 0.69 0.90 0.99 
13 Harvard Univ. 1994 0.48 0.51 0.38 0.41 
14 Indiana Univ. (ARTI) 1994 0.19 0.23 0.24 0.32 
15 Johns Hopkins Univ. 1994 0.57 0.60 0.51 0.47 
16 Massachusetts Inst. of Tech 1994 2.35 1.27 1.34 2.21 
17 Mayo Foundation 1994 0.36 0.32 0.35 0.24 
18 Michigan State Univ. 1994 0.88 1.02 0.64 0.74 
19 National Jewish Center 1994 0.23 0.63 0.24 0.44 
20 New Jersey Institute of Tech. 1994 0.51 0.35 1.12 0.25 
21 Northwestern Univ. 1994 0.49 0.26 0.45 0.21 
22 Ohio State Univ. 1994 0.33 0.32 0.47 0.28 
23 Ohio Univ. 1994 0.50 0.59 0.32 0.39 
24 Oregon State Univ. 1994 0.15 0.12 0.15 0.09 
25 Penn State Univ. 1994 0.28 0.30 0.31 0.28 
26 Rutgers, The State Univ. 1994 0.45 0.46 0.53 0.35 
27 St. Jude Children's Researc 1994 0.18 0.25 0.12 0.18 
28 Tulane Univ. 1994 0.27 0.28 0.18 0.19 
29 Univ. of Akron 1994 3.04 2.32 0.71 4.78 
30 Univ. of Arizona 1994 0.24 0.16 0.33 0.23 
31 Univ. of Cincinnati 1994 0.27 0.39 0.25 0.42 
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Table D1: Modified Super-Efficiency Score of the 46 U.S. Institutions (continued) 
 
DMU 
ID 
Institutions Year Dt(t) Dt(t+1) Dt+1(t) Dt+1(t+1) 
32 Univ. of Connecticut 1994 0.16 0.35 0.17 0.28 
33 Univ. of Dayton 1994 0.36 0.31 0.27 0.32 
34 Univ. of Delaware 1994 0.22 0.22 0.16 0.28 
35 Univ. of Iowa Research Fdn. 1994 0.44 0.54 0.46 0.41 
36 Univ. of Maryland, College 1994 0.19 0.50 0.27 0.74 
37 Univ. of Michigan 1994 0.36 0.39 0.33 0.37 
38 Univ. of Minnesota 1994 0.49 0.64 0.65 0.52 
39 Univ. of Oregon 1994 0.23 0.61 0.33 0.45 
40 Univ. of Southern California 1994 0.46 0.37 0.64 0.53 
41 Univ. of Texas Southwestern 1994 0.45 0.49 0.34 0.35 
42 Univ. of Utah 1994 0.59 0.51 0.84 0.73 
43 Univ. of Virginia Patent Fdn. 1994 0.30 0.39 0.36 0.59 
44 Vanderbilt Univ. 1994 0.26 0.34 0.29 0.27 
45 Wake Forest Univ. 1994 0.19 0.34 0.13 0.26 
46 Washington Univ. 1994 0.42 0.48 0.34 0.41 
1 Baylor College of Medicine 1995 0.19 0.40 0.23 0.36 
2 Brigham & Women's Hospital, Inc. 1995 0.37 0.47 0.47 0.45 
3 Brigham Young Univ. 1995 1.25 1.53 2.34 1.93 
4 California Institute of Tech. 1995 1.25 1.42 1.32 1.67 
5 Case Western Reserve Univ. 1995 0.31 0.39 0.23 0.28 
6 City of Hope National Medic 1995 0.62 0.67 1.00 1.06 
7 Clemson Univ. 1995 0.13 0.21 0.17 0.28 
8 Colorado State Univ. 1995 0.34 0.29 0.24 0.21 
9 Dartmouth College 1995 1.59 0.25 1.80 0.18 
10 Florida State Univ. 1995 1.02 0.89 1.19 1.94 
11 Fred Hutchinson Cancer Res. 1995 0.16 0.11 0.12 0.13 
12 Georgia Inst. of Technology 1995 0.99 1.24 0.70 0.87 
13 Harvard Univ. 1995 0.41 0.50 0.44 0.48 
14 Indiana Univ. (ARTI) 1995 0.32 0.25 0.23 0.25 
15 Johns Hopkins Univ. 1995 0.47 0.49 0.42 0.43 
16 Massachusetts Inst. of Tech 1995 2.21 1.92 1.27 2.59 
17 Mayo Foundation 1995 0.24 0.38 0.30 0.46 
18 Michigan State Univ. 1995 0.74 0.76 0.95 0.99 
19 National Jewish Center 1995 0.44 0.26 0.58 0.27 
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Table D1: Modified Super-Efficiency Score of the 46 U.S. Institutions (continued) 
 
DMU 
ID 
Institutions Year Dt(t) Dt(t+1) Dt+1(t) Dt+1(t+1) 
20 New Jersey Institute of Tech. 1995 0.25 0.33 0.33 0.42 
21 Northwestern Univ. 1995 0.21 0.35 0.24 0.39 
22 Ohio State Univ. 1995 0.28 0.45 0.29 0.32 
23 Ohio Univ. 1995 0.39 0.23 0.54 0.32 
24 Oregon State Univ. 1995 0.09 0.07 0.11 0.09 
25 Penn State Univ. 1995 0.28 0.33 0.34 0.40 
26 Rutgers, The State Univ. 1995 0.35 0.44 0.43 0.51 
27 St. Jude Children's Researc 1995 0.18 0.20 0.23 0.25 
28 Tulane Univ. 1995 0.19 0.18 0.26 0.24 
29 Univ. of Akron 1995 4.78 0.71 2.15 4.07 
30 Univ. of Arizona 1995 0.23 0.26 0.17 0.21 
31 Univ. of Cincinnati 1995 0.42 0.49 0.39 0.51 
32 Univ. of Connecticut 1995 0.28 0.19 0.34 0.21 
33 Univ. of Dayton 1995 0.32 0.37 0.29 0.30 
34 Univ. of Delaware 1995 0.28 0.65 0.22 0.45 
35 Univ. of Iowa Research Fdn. 1995 0.41 0.34 0.51 0.38 
36 Univ. of Maryland, College 1995 0.74 0.53 0.53 0.38 
37 Univ. of Michigan 1995 0.37 0.68 0.44 0.57 
38 Univ. of Minnesota 1995 0.52 0.60 0.58 0.67 
39 Univ. of Oregon 1995 0.45 0.51 0.57 0.44 
40 Univ. of Southern California 1995 0.53 0.69 0.37 0.50 
41 Univ. of Texas Southwestern 1995 0.35 0.33 0.46 0.43 
42 Univ. of Utah 1995 0.73 0.78 0.52 0.63 
43 Univ. of Virginia Patent Fdn. 1995 0.59 0.89 0.43 0.64 
44 Vanderbilt Univ. 1995 0.27 0.31 0.32 0.30 
45 Wake Forest Univ. 1995 0.26 0.60 0.32 0.67 
46 Washington Univ. 1995 0.41 0.47 0.46 0.52 
1 Baylor College of Medicine 1996 0.36 0.29 0.32 0.29 
2 Brigham & Women's Hospital, Inc. 1996 0.45 0.49 0.33 0.38 
3 Brigham Young Univ. 1996 1.93 1.81 0.93 2.22 
4 California Institute of Tech. 1996 1.67 1.52 0.93 2.36 
5 Case Western Reserve Univ. 1996 0.28 0.35 0.20 0.24 
6 City of Hope National Medic 1996 1.06 1.50 0.73 1.75 
7 Clemson Univ. 1996 0.28 0.22 0.19 0.18 
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Table D1: Modified Super-Efficiency Score of the 46 U.S. Institutions (continued) 
 
DMU 
ID 
Institutions Year Dt(t) Dt(t+1) Dt+1(t) Dt+1(t+1) 
8 Colorado State Univ. 1996 0.21 0.15 0.15 0.10 
9 Dartmouth College 1996 0.18 0.26 0.14 0.20 
10 Florida State Univ. 1996 1.94 1.01 1.21 1.33 
11 Fred Hutchinson Cancer Res. 1996 0.13 0.22 0.09 0.15 
12 Georgia Inst. of Technology 1996 0.87 0.75 0.74 0.59 
13 Harvard Univ. 1996 0.48 0.52 0.60 0.61 
14 Indiana Univ. (ARTI) 1996 0.25 0.37 0.20 0.29 
15 Johns Hopkins Univ. 1996 0.43 0.55 0.49 0.62 
16 Massachusetts Inst. of Tech 1996 2.59 0.98 1.96 1.86 
17 Mayo Foundation 1996 0.46 0.50 0.44 0.42 
18 Michigan State Univ. 1996 0.99 1.11 0.87 0.96 
19 National Jewish Center 1996 0.27 0.39 0.23 0.28 
20 New Jersey Institute of Tech. 1996 0.42 0.27 0.34 0.20 
21 Northwestern Univ. 1996 0.39 0.44 0.29 0.35 
22 Ohio State Univ. 1996 0.32 0.36 0.28 0.31 
23 Ohio Univ. 1996 0.32 0.46 0.31 0.45 
24 Oregon State Univ. 1996 0.09 0.17 0.06 0.11 
25 Penn State Univ. 1996 0.40 0.42 0.39 0.40 
26 Rutgers, The State Univ. 1996 0.51 0.45 0.35 0.31 
27 St. Jude Children's Researc 1996 0.25 0.39 0.19 0.28 
28 Tulane Univ. 1996 0.24 0.36 0.17 0.29 
29 Univ. of Akron 1996 4.07 1.71 1.85 4.26 
30 Univ. of Arizona 1996 0.21 0.26 0.19 0.25 
31 Univ. of Cincinnati 1996 0.51 0.60 0.36 0.43 
32 Univ. of Connecticut 1996 0.21 0.26 0.14 0.18 
33 Univ. of Dayton 1996 0.30 0.33 0.21 0.24 
34 Univ. of Delaware 1996 0.45 0.32 0.35 0.22 
35 Univ. of Iowa Research Fdn. 1996 0.38 0.36 0.31 0.34 
36 Univ. of Maryland, College 1996 0.38 0.73 0.27 0.53 
37 Univ. of Michigan 1996 0.57 0.52 0.56 0.53 
38 Univ. of Minnesota 1996 0.67 0.64 0.68 0.71 
39 Univ. of Oregon 1996 0.44 0.34 0.32 0.27 
40 Univ. of Southern California 1996 0.50 0.55 0.45 0.50 
41 Univ. of Texas Southwestern 1996 0.43 0.65 0.35 0.47 
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Table D1: Modified Super-Efficiency Score of the 46 U.S. Institutions (continued) 
 
DMU 
ID 
Institutions Year Dt(t) Dt(t+1) Dt+1(t) Dt+1(t+1) 
42 Univ. of Utah 1996 0.63 0.60 0.44 0.41 
43 Univ. of Virginia Patent Fdn. 1996 0.64 0.76 0.52 0.55 
44 Vanderbilt Univ. 1996 0.30 0.51 0.20 0.41 
45 Wake Forest Univ. 1996 0.67 0.78 0.47 0.55 
46 Washington Univ. 1996 0.52 0.46 0.48 0.42 
1 Baylor College of Medicine 1997 0.29 0.31 0.26 0.28 
2 Brigham & Women's Hospital, Inc. 1997 0.38 0.35 0.29 0.25 
3 Brigham Young Univ. 1997 2.22 1.96 0.97 2.05 
4 California Institute of Tech. 1997 2.36 1.42 1.30 2.73 
5 Case Western Reserve Univ. 1997 0.24 0.31 0.24 0.30 
6 City of Hope National Medic 1997 1.75 1.36 0.85 3.16 
7 Clemson Univ. 1997 0.18 0.25 0.17 0.27 
8 Colorado State Univ. 1997 0.10 0.22 0.11 0.27 
9 Dartmouth College 1997 0.20 0.37 0.20 0.29 
10 Florida State Univ. 1997 1.33 0.49 0.99 0.45 
11 Fred Hutchinson Cancer Res. 1997 0.15 0.14 0.17 0.11 
12 Georgia Inst. of Technology 1997 0.59 0.52 0.72 0.63 
13 Harvard Univ. 1997 0.61 0.78 0.54 0.68 
14 Indiana Univ. (ARTI) 1997 0.29 0.26 0.23 0.21 
15 Johns Hopkins Univ. 1997 0.62 0.80 0.53 0.68 
16 Massachusetts Inst. of Tech 1997 1.86 1.18 1.08 2.03 
17 Mayo Foundation 1997 0.42 0.58 0.30 0.53 
18 Michigan State Univ. 1997 0.96 0.82 0.77 0.66 
19 National Jewish Center 1997 0.28 0.36 0.24 0.28 
20 New Jersey Institute of Tech. 1997 0.20 0.18 0.16 0.16 
21 Northwestern Univ. 1997 0.35 0.36 0.43 0.45 
22 Ohio State Univ. 1997 0.31 0.42 0.37 0.50 
23 Ohio Univ. 1997 0.45 0.43 0.35 0.33 
24 Oregon State Univ. 1997 0.11 0.08 0.09 0.06 
25 Penn State Univ. 1997 0.40 0.49 0.33 0.41 
26 Rutgers, The State Univ. 1997 0.31 0.39 0.24 0.30 
27 St. Jude Children's Researc 1997 0.28 0.18 0.22 0.14 
28 Tulane Univ. 1997 0.29 0.26 0.24 0.21 
29 Univ. of Akron 1997 4.26 2.83 0.87 2.95 
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Table D1: Modified Super-Efficiency Score of the 46 U.S. Institutions (continued) 
 
DMU 
ID 
Institutions Year Dt(t) Dt(t+1) Dt+1(t) Dt+1(t+1) 
30 Univ. of Arizona 1997 0.25 0.23 0.29 0.27 
31 Univ. of Cincinnati 1997 0.43 0.20 0.33 0.20 
32 Univ. of Connecticut 1997 0.18 0.27 0.21 0.21 
33 Univ. of Dayton 1997 0.24 0.20 0.20 0.16 
34 Univ. of Delaware 1997 0.22 0.16 0.19 0.12 
35 Univ. of Iowa Research Fdn. 1997 0.34 0.38 0.27 0.31 
36 Univ. of Maryland, College 1997 0.53 0.17 0.65 0.22 
37 Univ. of Michigan 1997 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.44 
38 Univ. of Minnesota 1997 0.71 0.88 0.65 0.84 
39 Univ. of Oregon 1997 0.27 0.20 0.24 0.15 
40 Univ. of Southern California 1997 0.50 0.45 0.59 0.53 
41 Univ. of Texas Southwestern 1997 0.47 0.38 0.35 0.30 
42 Univ. of Utah 1997 0.41 0.83 0.42 1.07 
43 Univ. of Virginia Patent Fdn. 1997 0.55 0.33 0.68 0.37 
44 Vanderbilt Univ. 1997 0.41 0.31 0.32 0.26 
45 Wake Forest Univ. 1997 0.55 0.46 0.46 0.35 
46 Washington Univ. 1997 0.42 0.55 0.34 0.43 
1 Baylor College of Medicine 1998 0.28 0.21 0.34 0.23 
2 Brigham & Women's Hospital, Inc. 1998 0.25 0.31 0.30 0.37 
3 Brigham Young Univ. 1998 2.05 0.80 1.85 1.88 
4 California Institute of Tech. 1998 2.73 1.14 1.33 3.15 
5 Case Western Reserve Univ. 1998 0.30 0.31 0.36 0.37 
6 City of Hope National Medic 1998 3.16 0.85 1.54 1.68 
7 Clemson Univ. 1998 0.27 0.19 0.30 0.23 
8 Colorado State Univ. 1998 0.27 0.36 0.29 0.38 
9 Dartmouth College 1998 0.29 0.21 0.26 0.19 
10 Florida State Univ. 1998 0.45 0.33 0.53 0.39 
11 Fred Hutchinson Cancer Res. 1998 0.11 0.06 0.10 0.08 
12 Georgia Inst. of Technology 1998 0.63 0.81 0.67 0.86 
13 Harvard Univ. 1998 0.68 0.56 0.72 0.59 
14 Indiana Univ. (ARTI) 1998 0.21 0.38 0.27 0.43 
15 Johns Hopkins Univ. 1998 0.68 0.64 0.67 0.63 
16 Massachusetts Inst. of Tech 1998 2.03 1.06 1.15 2.04 
 
 
 
 
 320 
 
 
Table D1: Modified Super-Efficiency Score of the 46 U.S. Institutions (continued) 
 
DMU 
ID 
Institutions Year Dt(t) Dt(t+1) Dt+1(t) Dt+1(t+1) 
17 Mayo Foundation 1998 0.53 0.51 0.63 0.57 
18 Michigan State Univ. 1998 0.66 0.81 0.77 0.92 
19 National Jewish Center 1998 0.28 0.30 0.26 0.28 
20 New Jersey Institute of Tech. 1998 0.16 0.24 0.17 0.22 
21 Northwestern Univ. 1998 0.45 0.50 0.48 0.53 
22 Ohio State Univ. 1998 0.50 0.27 0.53 0.29 
23 Ohio Univ. 1998 0.33 0.40 0.33 0.45 
24 Oregon State Univ. 1998 0.06 0.16 0.07 0.17 
25 Penn State Univ. 1998 0.41 0.35 0.38 0.32 
26 Rutgers, The State Univ. 1998 0.30 0.27 0.31 0.29 
27 St. Jude Children's Researc 1998 0.14 0.10 0.14 0.10 
28 Tulane Univ. 1998 0.21 0.17 0.26 0.19 
29 Univ. of Akron 1998 2.95 1.78 1.23 4.76 
30 Univ. of Arizona 1998 0.27 0.18 0.29 0.19 
31 Univ. of Cincinnati 1998 0.20 0.14 0.23 0.12 
32 Univ. of Connecticut 1998 0.21 0.24 0.19 0.27 
33 Univ. of Dayton 1998 0.16 0.20 0.14 0.21 
34 Univ. of Delaware 1998 0.12 0.23 0.11 0.27 
35 Univ. of Iowa Research Fdn. 1998 0.31 0.31 0.39 0.35 
36 Univ. of Maryland, College 1998 0.22 0.58 0.23 0.61 
37 Univ. of Michigan 1998 0.44 0.56 0.45 0.53 
38 Univ. of Minnesota 1998 0.84 0.96 0.88 1.08 
39 Univ. of Oregon 1998 0.15 0.30 0.17 0.35 
40 Univ. of Southern California 1998 0.53 0.29 0.56 0.31 
41 Univ. of Texas Southwestern 1998 0.30 0.36 0.35 0.42 
42 Univ. of Utah 1998 1.07 0.97 1.06 1.19 
43 Univ. of Virginia Patent Fdn. 1998 0.37 0.23 0.41 0.27 
44 Vanderbilt Univ. 1998 0.26 0.21 0.32 0.26 
45 Wake Forest Univ. 1998 0.35 0.84 0.49 1.01 
46 Washington Univ. 1998 0.43 0.55 0.48 0.53 
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14Appendix E. Malmquist Indexes of the 46 Institutions during the Period 
Table E1: Malmquist Index Scores of the 46 Institutions 
 
DMU 
ID 
Institutions Year EC TC MI 
1 Baylor College of Medicine 1991 2.65 1.48 3.91 
2 
Brigham & Women's Hospital, 
Inc. 
1991 1.07 1.87 2.00 
3 Brigham Young Univ. 1991 0.56 0.88 0.49 
4 California Institute of Tech. 1991 1.75 1.52 2.66 
5 Case Western Reserve Univ. 1991 0.43 2.00 0.86 
6 City of Hope National Medic 1991 0.48 1.78 0.85 
7 Clemson Univ. 1991 0.74 1.50 1.11 
8 Colorado State Univ. 1991 0.44 1.85 0.82 
9 Dartmouth College 1991 1.64 1.68 2.75 
10 Florida State Univ. 1991 2.98 1.24 3.69 
11 Fred Hutchinson Cancer Res. 1991 0.52 1.91 0.99 
12 Georgia Inst. of Technology 1991 0.89 1.87 1.66 
13 Harvard Univ. 1991 1.47 1.46 2.14 
14 Indiana Univ. (ARTI) 1991 0.79 2.03 1.60 
15 Johns Hopkins Univ. 1991 1.10 1.68 1.85 
16 Massachusetts Inst. of Tech 1991 0.84 1.84 1.54 
17 Mayo Foundation 1991 0.85 1.81 1.54 
18 Michigan State Univ. 1991 0.82 1.42 1.17 
19 National Jewish Center 1991 0.41 1.48 0.61 
20 New Jersey Institute of Tech. 1991 3.88 1.54 5.98 
21 Northwestern Univ. 1991 0.92 2.06 1.89 
22 Ohio State Univ. 1991 1.14 2.09 2.39 
23 Ohio Univ. 1991 1.70 1.11 1.89 
24 Oregon State Univ. 1991 1.00 1.86 1.86 
25 Penn State Univ. 1991 0.73 1.48 1.07 
26 Rutgers, The State Univ. 1991 0.93 1.86 1.73 
27 St. Jude Children's Researc 1991 0.17 1.66 0.28 
28 Tulane Univ. 1991 0.73 1.66 1.20 
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Table E1: Malmquist Index Scores of the 46 Institutions (continued) 
 
DMU 
ID 
Institutions Year EC TC MI 
29 Univ. of Akron 1991 0.46 1.66 0.77 
30 Univ. of Arizona 1991 1.02 1.77 1.82 
31 Univ. of Cincinnati 1991 0.60 1.69 1.02 
32 Univ. of Connecticut 1991 0.85 1.84 1.57 
33 Univ. of Dayton 1991 0.67 1.69 1.13 
34 Univ. of Delaware 1991 0.75 1.57 1.19 
35 Univ. of Iowa Research Fdn. 1991 0.83 1.99 1.65 
36 Univ. of Maryland, College 1991 0.73 1.88 1.37 
37 Univ. of Michigan 1991 1.97 1.77 3.48 
38 Univ. of Minnesota 1991 1.14 1.74 1.98 
39 Univ. of Oregon 1991 0.56 1.73 0.96 
40 Univ. of Southern California 1991 0.90 1.66 1.50 
41 Univ. of Texas Southwestern 1991 1.03 1.89 1.94 
42 Univ. of Utah 1991 0.86 1.84 1.58 
43 Univ. of Virginia Patent Fdn. 1991 0.85 1.84 1.56 
44 Vanderbilt Univ. 1991 0.66 1.81 1.19 
45 Wake Forest Univ. 1991 0.86 1.68 1.45 
46 Washington Univ. 1991 0.62 1.59 0.99 
1 Baylor College of Medicine 1992 0.93 1.02 0.95 
2 
Brigham & Women's Hospital, 
Inc. 
1992 0.61 1.34 0.82 
3 Brigham Young Univ. 1992 15.18 2.82 42.80 
4 California Institute of Tech. 1992 1.03 1.10 1.14 
5 Case Western Reserve Univ. 1992 1.02 1.35 1.38 
6 City of Hope National Medic 1992 0.71 1.13 0.80 
7 Clemson Univ. 1992 0.43 1.18 0.51 
8 Colorado State Univ. 1992 0.66 0.94 0.62 
9 Dartmouth College 1992 0.50 1.23 0.62 
10 Florida State Univ. 1992 1.48 1.12 1.66 
11 Fred Hutchinson Cancer Res. 1992 2.45 1.30 3.20 
12 Georgia Inst. of Technology 1992 0.83 1.11 0.93 
13 Harvard Univ. 1992 0.73 1.14 0.83 
14 Indiana Univ. (ARTI) 1992 1.40 1.17 1.64 
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Table E1: Malmquist Index Scores of the 46 Institutions (continued) 
 
DMU 
ID 
Institutions Year EC TC MI 
15 Johns Hopkins Univ. 1992 1.34 1.01 1.35 
16 Massachusetts Inst. of Tech 1992 0.84 1.11 0.93 
17 Mayo Foundation 1992 0.50 1.20 0.59 
18 Michigan State Univ. 1992 1.35 1.06 1.43 
19 National Jewish Center 1992 1.38 1.72 2.38 
20 New Jersey Institute of Tech. 1992 1.11 1.78 1.99 
21 Northwestern Univ. 1992 1.47 1.34 1.97 
22 Ohio State Univ. 1992 1.18 1.03 1.21 
23 Ohio Univ. 1992 0.09 2.01 0.18 
24 Oregon State Univ. 1992 1.62 1.35 2.19 
25 Penn State Univ. 1992 1.72 1.02 1.76 
26 Rutgers, The State Univ. 1992 0.99 1.14 1.13 
27 St. Jude Children's Researc 1992 3.71 1.10 4.06 
28 Tulane Univ. 1992 0.85 1.11 0.94 
29 Univ. of Akron 1992 1.51 1.06 1.61 
30 Univ. of Arizona 1992 0.90 1.02 0.91 
31 Univ. of Cincinnati 1992 0.98 1.25 1.22 
32 Univ. of Connecticut 1992 0.47 1.39 0.65 
33 Univ. of Dayton 1992 1.03 1.33 1.38 
34 Univ. of Delaware 1992 1.03 1.27 1.31 
35 Univ. of Iowa Research Fdn. 1992 0.97 1.18 1.15 
36 Univ. of Maryland, College 1992 1.17 1.30 1.51 
37 Univ. of Michigan 1992 0.99 1.18 1.16 
38 Univ. of Minnesota 1992 0.94 0.99 0.93 
39 Univ. of Oregon 1992 0.69 1.30 0.90 
40 Univ. of Southern California 1992 1.61 0.95 1.53 
41 Univ. of Texas Southwestern 1992 0.87 1.32 1.15 
42 Univ. of Utah 1992 0.59 1.13 0.67 
43 Univ. of Virginia Patent Fdn. 1992 0.84 0.94 0.79 
44 Vanderbilt Univ. 1992 1.90 1.12 2.12 
45 Wake Forest Univ. 1992 0.69 1.16 0.80 
46 Washington Univ. 1992 1.45 0.98 1.43 
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Table E1: Malmquist Index Scores of the 46 Institutions (continued) 
 
DMU 
ID 
Institutions Year EC TC MI 
1 Baylor College of Medicine 1993 1.45 0.99 1.44 
2 
Brigham & Women's Hospital, 
Inc. 
1993 1.06 0.80 0.85 
3 Brigham Young Univ. 1993 0.18 3.73 0.69 
4 California Institute of Tech. 1993 0.72 0.97 0.70 
5 Case Western Reserve Univ. 1993 1.46 0.80 1.17 
6 City of Hope National Medic 1993 0.55 0.94 0.52 
7 Clemson Univ. 1993 1.33 0.80 1.07 
8 Colorado State Univ. 1993 1.16 0.83 0.96 
9 Dartmouth College 1993 2.13 0.80 1.70 
10 Florida State Univ. 1993 1.72 0.80 1.38 
11 Fred Hutchinson Cancer Res. 1993 0.83 0.77 0.64 
12 Georgia Inst. of Technology 1993 1.98 0.91 1.79 
13 Harvard Univ. 1993 1.10 1.06 1.16 
14 Indiana Univ. (ARTI) 1993 0.96 0.87 0.83 
15 Johns Hopkins Univ. 1993 1.22 1.08 1.31 
16 Massachusetts Inst. of Tech 1993 1.00 1.00 1.00 
17 Mayo Foundation 1993 1.42 0.86 1.22 
18 Michigan State Univ. 1993 1.02 0.93 0.95 
19 National Jewish Center 1993 1.10 0.97 1.07 
20 New Jersey Institute of Tech. 1993 0.83 1.68 1.40 
21 Northwestern Univ. 1993 1.28 0.78 1.00 
22 Ohio State Univ. 1993 0.76 0.90 0.69 
23 Ohio Univ. 1993 1.08 1.00 1.08 
24 Oregon State Univ. 1993 0.71 0.76 0.54 
25 Penn State Univ. 1993 0.91 0.99 0.91 
26 Rutgers, The State Univ. 1993 1.02 0.89 0.91 
27 St. Jude Children's Researc 1993 0.85 0.85 0.72 
28 Tulane Univ. 1993 0.99 0.81 0.80 
29 Univ. of Akron 1993 2.07 1.02 2.11 
30 Univ. of Arizona 1993 1.68 0.95 1.59 
31 Univ. of Cincinnati 1993 0.83 0.83 0.69 
32 Univ. of Connecticut 1993 1.03 0.77 0.80 
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Table E1: Malmquist Index Scores of the 46 Institutions (continued) 
 
DMU 
ID 
Institutions Year EC TC MI 
33 Univ. of Dayton 1993 1.06 0.80 0.85 
34 Univ. of Delaware 1993 0.62 0.97 0.60 
35 Univ. of Iowa Research Fdn. 1993 2.03 0.86 1.74 
36 Univ. of Maryland, College 1993 0.65 0.90 0.58 
37 Univ. of Michigan 1993 0.90 0.99 0.89 
38 Univ. of Minnesota 1993 1.03 0.94 0.97 
39 Univ. of Oregon 1993 0.84 1.00 0.84 
40 Univ. of Southern California 1993 0.89 0.91 0.80 
41 Univ. of Texas Southwestern 1993 1.21 0.81 0.98 
42 Univ. of Utah 1993 1.35 0.83 1.12 
43 Univ. of Virginia Patent Fdn. 1993 0.64 0.89 0.57 
44 Vanderbilt Univ. 1993 1.16 0.76 0.88 
45 Wake Forest Univ. 1993 0.81 0.78 0.63 
46 Washington Univ. 1993 1.12 0.96 1.07 
1 Baylor College of Medicine 1994 0.51 1.05 0.54 
2 
Brigham & Women's Hospital, 
Inc. 
1994 0.94 1.32 1.24 
3 Brigham Young Univ. 1994 0.38 1.22 0.47 
4 California Institute of Tech. 1994 1.11 0.92 1.02 
5 Case Western Reserve Univ. 1994 1.38 1.00 1.38 
6 City of Hope National Medic 1994 0.64 1.64 1.05 
7 Clemson Univ. 1994 0.56 1.44 0.81 
8 Colorado State Univ. 1994 2.38 0.92 2.18 
9 Dartmouth College 1994 4.36 1.17 5.11 
10 Florida State Univ. 1994 0.42 1.72 0.72 
11 Fred Hutchinson Cancer Res. 1994 0.71 0.95 0.68 
12 Georgia Inst. of Technology 1994 1.55 0.70 1.09 
13 Harvard Univ. 1994 0.85 1.25 1.07 
14 Indiana Univ. (ARTI) 1994 1.72 0.75 1.28 
15 Johns Hopkins Univ. 1994 0.83 1.18 0.98 
16 Massachusetts Inst. of Tech 1994 0.94 1.01 0.95 
17 Mayo Foundation 1994 0.65 1.18 0.77 
18 Michigan State Univ. 1994 0.85 1.37 1.16 
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Table E1: Malmquist Index Scores of the 46 Institutions (continued) 
 
DMU 
ID 
Institutions Year EC TC MI 
19 National Jewish Center 1994 1.91 1.18 2.25 
20 New Jersey Institute of Tech. 1994 0.50 0.80 0.40 
21 Northwestern Univ. 1994 0.44 1.15 0.50 
22 Ohio State Univ. 1994 0.82 0.91 0.75 
23 Ohio Univ. 1994 0.79 1.53 1.21 
24 Oregon State Univ. 1994 0.63 1.12 0.70 
25 Penn State Univ. 1994 0.98 0.99 0.97 
26 Rutgers, The State Univ. 1994 0.78 1.06 0.83 
27 St. Jude Children's Researc 1994 1.02 1.41 1.44 
28 Tulane Univ. 1994 0.69 1.48 1.02 
29 Univ. of Akron 1994 1.58 1.44 2.27 
30 Univ. of Arizona 1994 0.93 0.73 0.68 
31 Univ. of Cincinnati 1994 1.54 1.01 1.56 
32 Univ. of Connecticut 1994 1.72 1.10 1.89 
33 Univ. of Dayton 1994 0.88 1.15 1.01 
34 Univ. of Delaware 1994 1.27 1.02 1.30 
35 Univ. of Iowa Research Fdn. 1994 0.93 1.13 1.05 
36 Univ. of Maryland, College 1994 3.83 0.70 2.69 
37 Univ. of Michigan 1994 1.05 1.06 1.11 
38 Univ. of Minnesota 1994 1.05 0.96 1.02 
39 Univ. of Oregon 1994 1.97 0.97 1.91 
40 Univ. of Southern California 1994 1.14 0.71 0.82 
41 Univ. of Texas Southwestern 1994 0.78 1.36 1.06 
42 Univ. of Utah 1994 1.25 0.70 0.87 
43 Univ. of Virginia Patent Fdn. 1994 1.94 0.75 1.45 
44 Vanderbilt Univ. 1994 1.04 1.05 1.10 
45 Wake Forest Univ. 1994 1.36 1.38 1.88 
46 Washington Univ. 1994 0.97 1.21 1.18 
1 Baylor College of Medicine 1995 1.92 0.95 1.83 
2 
Brigham & Women's Hospital, 
Inc. 
1995 1.23 0.90 1.11 
3 Brigham Young Univ. 1995 1.54 0.65 1.00 
4 California Institute of Tech. 1995 1.34 0.90 1.20 
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Table E1: Malmquist Index Scores of the 46 Institutions (continued) 
 
DMU 
ID 
Institutions Year EC TC MI 
5 Case Western Reserve Univ. 1995 0.88 1.36 1.21 
6 City of Hope National Medic 1995 1.71 0.63 1.07 
7 Clemson Univ. 1995 2.15 0.74 1.59 
8 Colorado State Univ. 1995 0.62 1.40 0.87 
9 Dartmouth College 1995 0.11 1.12 0.12 
10 Florida State Univ. 1995 1.90 0.63 1.19 
11 Fred Hutchinson Cancer Res. 1995 0.84 1.04 0.87 
12 Georgia Inst. of Technology 1995 0.88 1.41 1.25 
13 Harvard Univ. 1995 1.18 0.98 1.16 
14 Indiana Univ. (ARTI) 1995 0.78 1.18 0.92 
15 Johns Hopkins Univ. 1995 0.92 1.13 1.03 
16 Massachusetts Inst. of Tech 1995 1.17 1.14 1.33 
17 Mayo Foundation 1995 1.96 0.81 1.58 
18 Michigan State Univ. 1995 1.32 0.78 1.03 
19 National Jewish Center 1995 0.61 0.85 0.52 
20 New Jersey Institute of Tech. 1995 1.65 0.77 1.28 
21 Northwestern Univ. 1995 1.83 0.89 1.63 
22 Ohio State Univ. 1995 1.14 1.16 1.32 
23 Ohio Univ. 1995 0.81 0.72 0.59 
24 Oregon State Univ. 1995 0.98 0.82 0.81 
25 Penn State Univ. 1995 1.46 0.81 1.18 
26 Rutgers, The State Univ. 1995 1.44 0.83 1.21 
27 St. Jude Children's Researc 1995 1.36 0.79 1.07 
28 Tulane Univ. 1995 1.27 0.73 0.93 
29 Univ. of Akron 1995 0.85 0.62 0.53 
30 Univ. of Arizona 1995 0.91 1.31 1.20 
31 Univ. of Cincinnati 1995 1.22 1.02 1.25 
32 Univ. of Connecticut 1995 0.75 0.88 0.65 
33 Univ. of Dayton 1995 0.96 1.15 1.10 
34 Univ. of Delaware 1995 1.61 1.34 2.16 
35 Univ. of Iowa Research Fdn. 1995 0.92 0.85 0.78 
36 Univ. of Maryland, College 1995 0.51 1.40 0.72 
37 Univ. of Michigan 1995 1.53 1.01 1.54 
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Table E1: Malmquist Index Scores of the 46 Institutions (continued) 
 
DMU 
ID 
Institutions Year EC TC MI 
38 Univ. of Minnesota 1995 1.30 0.89 1.16 
39 Univ. of Oregon 1995 0.98 0.96 0.94 
40 Univ. of Southern California 1995 0.94 1.41 1.33 
41 Univ. of Texas Southwestern 1995 1.22 0.77 0.94 
42 Univ. of Utah 1995 0.85 1.32 1.13 
43 Univ. of Virginia Patent Fdn. 1995 1.09 1.38 1.50 
44 Vanderbilt Univ. 1995 1.11 0.93 1.03 
45 Wake Forest Univ. 1995 2.55 0.86 2.18 
46 Washington Univ. 1995 1.29 0.89 1.16 
1 Baylor College of Medicine 1996 0.80 1.06 0.85 
2 
Brigham & Women's Hospital, 
Inc. 
1996 0.85 1.33 1.13 
3 Brigham Young Univ. 1996 1.15 1.30 1.50 
4 California Institute of Tech. 1996 1.41 1.08 1.52 
5 Case Western Reserve Univ. 1996 0.88 1.42 1.25 
6 City of Hope National Medic 1996 1.65 1.12 1.84 
7 Clemson Univ. 1996 0.64 1.34 0.87 
8 Colorado State Univ. 1996 0.48 1.45 0.69 
9 Dartmouth College 1996 1.15 1.30 1.49 
10 Florida State Univ. 1996 0.69 1.10 0.76 
11 Fred Hutchinson Cancer Res. 1996 1.12 1.46 1.63 
12 Georgia Inst. of Technology 1996 0.67 1.23 0.83 
13 Harvard Univ. 1996 1.27 0.82 1.04 
14 Indiana Univ. (ARTI) 1996 1.15 1.26 1.45 
15 Johns Hopkins Univ. 1996 1.44 0.88 1.27 
16 Massachusetts Inst. of Tech 1996 0.72 0.83 0.60 
17 Mayo Foundation 1996 0.90 1.12 1.01 
18 Michigan State Univ. 1996 0.97 1.15 1.11 
19 National Jewish Center 1996 1.06 1.28 1.35 
20 New Jersey Institute of Tech. 1996 0.48 1.30 0.62 
21 Northwestern Univ. 1996 0.88 1.31 1.16 
22 Ohio State Univ. 1996 0.97 1.15 1.11 
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Table E1: Malmquist Index Scores of the 46 Institutions (continued) 
 
DMU 
ID 
Institutions Year EC TC MI 
23 Ohio Univ. 1996 1.41 1.02 1.43 
24 Oregon State Univ. 1996 1.26 1.49 1.88 
25 Penn State Univ. 1996 0.99 1.04 1.04 
26 Rutgers, The State Univ. 1996 0.60 1.46 0.87 
27 St. Jude Children's Researc 1996 1.13 1.36 1.53 
28 Tulane Univ. 1996 1.21 1.33 1.61 
29 Univ. of Akron 1996 1.05 0.94 0.99 
30 Univ. of Arizona 1996 1.19 1.08 1.29 
31 Univ. of Cincinnati 1996 0.84 1.41 1.18 
32 Univ. of Connecticut 1996 0.88 1.46 1.28 
33 Univ. of Dayton 1996 0.81 1.41 1.14 
34 Univ. of Delaware 1996 0.50 1.35 0.68 
35 Univ. of Iowa Research Fdn. 1996 0.91 1.13 1.02 
36 Univ. of Maryland, College 1996 1.39 1.38 1.92 
37 Univ. of Michigan 1996 0.92 1.01 0.93 
38 Univ. of Minnesota 1996 1.05 0.95 0.99 
39 Univ. of Oregon 1996 0.61 1.33 0.81 
40 Univ. of Southern California 1996 1.01 1.10 1.11 
41 Univ. of Texas Southwestern 1996 1.10 1.29 1.42 
42 Univ. of Utah 1996 0.65 1.45 0.94 
43 Univ. of Virginia Patent Fdn. 1996 0.85 1.30 1.11 
44 Vanderbilt Univ. 1996 1.36 1.38 1.87 
45 Wake Forest Univ. 1996 0.83 1.42 1.17 
46 Washington Univ. 1996 0.80 1.09 0.87 
1 Baylor College of Medicine 1997 0.98 1.10 1.07 
2 
Brigham & Women's Hospital, 
Inc. 
1997 0.66 1.36 0.89 
3 Brigham Young Univ. 1997 0.93 1.47 1.37 
4 California Institute of Tech. 1997 1.15 0.97 1.12 
5 Case Western Reserve Univ. 1997 1.25 1.01 1.26 
6 City of Hope National Medic 1997 1.81 0.94 1.70 
7 Clemson Univ. 1997 1.49 1.01 1.50 
8 Colorado State Univ. 1997 2.70 0.85 2.30 
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Table E1: Malmquist Index Scores of the 46 Institutions (continued) 
 
DMU 
ID 
Institutions Year EC TC MI 
9 Dartmouth College 1997 1.43 1.14 1.63 
10 Florida State Univ. 1997 0.34 1.21 0.41 
11 Fred Hutchinson Cancer Res. 1997 0.73 1.07 0.77 
12 Georgia Inst. of Technology 1997 1.07 0.82 0.88 
13 Harvard Univ. 1997 1.11 1.14 1.27 
14 Indiana Univ. (ARTI) 1997 0.74 1.24 0.91 
15 Johns Hopkins Univ. 1997 1.09 1.18 1.29 
16 Massachusetts Inst. of Tech 1997 1.09 1.00 1.09 
17 Mayo Foundation 1997 1.26 1.23 1.56 
18 Michigan State Univ. 1997 0.70 1.24 0.86 
19 National Jewish Center 1997 1.00 1.24 1.24 
20 New Jersey Institute of Tech. 1997 0.77 1.21 0.93 
21 Northwestern Univ. 1997 1.29 0.81 1.04 
22 Ohio State Univ. 1997 1.63 0.83 1.35 
23 Ohio Univ. 1997 0.75 1.29 0.96 
24 Oregon State Univ. 1997 0.52 1.31 0.67 
25 Penn State Univ. 1997 1.01 1.21 1.23 
26 Rutgers, The State Univ. 1997 0.98 1.30 1.27 
27 St. Jude Children's Researc 1997 0.49 1.31 0.65 
28 Tulane Univ. 1997 0.74 1.23 0.91 
29 Univ. of Akron 1997 0.69 2.16 1.50 
30 Univ. of Arizona 1997 1.09 0.86 0.94 
31 Univ. of Cincinnati 1997 0.46 1.15 0.53 
32 Univ. of Connecticut 1997 1.16 1.05 1.21 
33 Univ. of Dayton 1997 0.64 1.25 0.79 
34 Univ. of Delaware 1997 0.55 1.22 0.66 
35 Univ. of Iowa Research Fdn. 1997 0.92 1.24 1.14 
36 Univ. of Maryland, College 1997 0.41 0.81 0.33 
37 Univ. of Michigan 1997 0.84 1.09 0.91 
38 Univ. of Minnesota 1997 1.20 1.06 1.27 
39 Univ. of Oregon 1997 0.58 1.22 0.70 
40 Univ. of Southern California 1997 1.05 0.85 0.89 
41 Univ. of Texas Southwestern 1997 0.63 1.31 0.83 
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Table E1: Malmquist Index Scores of the 46 Institutions (continued) 
 
DMU 
ID 
Institutions Year EC TC MI 
42 Univ. of Utah 1997 2.63 0.86 2.27 
43 Univ. of Virginia Patent Fdn. 1997 0.67 0.86 0.57 
44 Vanderbilt Univ. 1997 0.64 1.23 0.79 
45 Wake Forest Univ. 1997 0.64 1.25 0.80 
46 Washington Univ. 1997 1.02 1.26 1.29 
1 Baylor College of Medicine 1998 0.83 0.85 0.71 
2 
Brigham & Women's Hospital, 
Inc. 
1998 1.46 0.85 1.24 
3 Brigham Young Univ. 1998 0.92 0.68 0.63 
4 California Institute of Tech. 1998 1.15 0.86 1.00 
5 Case Western Reserve Univ. 1998 1.24 0.82 1.02 
6 City of Hope National Medic 1998 0.53 1.02 0.54 
7 Clemson Univ. 1998 0.85 0.86 0.74 
8 Colorado State Univ. 1998 1.43 0.93 1.33 
9 Dartmouth College 1998 0.66 1.13 0.74 
10 Florida State Univ. 1998 0.86 0.85 0.73 
11 Fred Hutchinson Cancer Res. 1998 0.70 0.97 0.68 
12 Georgia Inst. of Technology 1998 1.37 0.94 1.28 
13 Harvard Univ. 1998 0.87 0.95 0.82 
14 Indiana Univ. (ARTI) 1998 2.00 0.84 1.69 
15 Johns Hopkins Univ. 1998 0.93 1.01 0.95 
16 Massachusetts Inst. of Tech 1998 1.01 0.96 0.96 
17 Mayo Foundation 1998 1.08 0.87 0.94 
18 Michigan State Univ. 1998 1.38 0.87 1.21 
19 National Jewish Center 1998 0.97 1.09 1.06 
20 New Jersey Institute of Tech. 1998 1.42 1.00 1.42 
21 Northwestern Univ. 1998 1.18 0.93 1.10 
22 Ohio State Univ. 1998 0.58 0.93 0.54 
23 Ohio Univ. 1998 1.35 0.95 1.28 
24 Oregon State Univ. 1998 2.98 0.87 2.58 
25 Penn State Univ. 1998 0.80 1.08 0.86 
26 Rutgers, The State Univ. 1998 0.98 0.93 0.92 
27 St. Jude Children's Researc 1998 0.71 1.01 0.71 
28 Tulane Univ. 1998 0.90 0.86 0.77 
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Table E1: Malmquist Index Scores of the 46 Institutions (continued) 
 
DMU 
ID 
Institutions Year EC TC MI 
29 Univ. of Akron 1998 1.61 0.95 1.53 
30 Univ. of Arizona 1998 0.71 0.93 0.66 
31 Univ. of Cincinnati 1998 0.61 0.98 0.60 
32 Univ. of Connecticut 1998 1.29 0.99 1.28 
33 Univ. of Dayton 1998 1.37 1.01 1.38 
34 Univ. of Delaware 1998 2.19 0.97 2.13 
35 Univ. of Iowa Research Fdn. 1998 1.12 0.85 0.96 
36 Univ. of Maryland, College 1998 2.83 0.94 2.65 
37 Univ. of Michigan 1998 1.19 1.02 1.22 
38 Univ. of Minnesota 1998 1.28 0.92 1.18 
39 Univ. of Oregon 1998 2.29 0.87 2.00 
40 Univ. of Southern California 1998 0.59 0.93 0.55 
41 Univ. of Texas Southwestern 1998 1.42 0.85 1.22 
42 Univ. of Utah 1998 1.11 0.91 1.01 
43 Univ. of Virginia Patent Fdn. 1998 0.74 0.88 0.65 
44 Vanderbilt Univ. 1998 0.99 0.81 0.80 
45 Wake Forest Univ. 1998 2.87 0.77 2.21 
46 Washington Univ. 1998 1.23 0.97 1.19 
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15Appendix F. Normality Test of Cumulative Time-Lag Effect Neutralized Licensing 
Data by Four Institution Types 
Variables Institution Types 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov(a) Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Cumulative Time 
Aggregated 
Expenditure from 
1991 to 1999 
  
  
  
Universities .229 37 .000 .739 37 .000 
Medical Research 
Centers 
.283 3 . .934 3 .503 
Teaching and Research 
Hospitals 
.260 2 .       
Special Focus 
Institution - Medical 
.321 4 . .813 4 .127 
Cumulative Time 
Aggregated 
Disclosure from 
1991 to 1999 
  
  
  
Universities .185 37 .003 .779 37 .000 
Medical Research 
Centers 
.338 3 . .852 3 .245 
Teaching and Research 
Hospitals 
.260 2 .       
Special Focus 
Institution - Medical 
.237 4 . .932 4 .604 
Cumulative Time 
Aggregated Patents 
Filed from 1991 to 
1999 
  
  
  
Universities .211 37 .000 .717 37 .000 
Medical Research 
Centers 
.289 3 . .928 3 .480 
Teaching and Research 
Hospitals 
.260 2 .       
Special Focus 
Institution - Medical 
.327 4 . .788 4 .082 
Cumulative Time 
Aggregated Patents 
Issued from 1992 to 
2004 
  
  
  
Universities .227 37 .000 .700 37 .000 
Medical Research 
Centers 
.222 3 . .985 3 .768 
Teaching and Research 
Hospitals 
.260 2 .       
Special Focus 
Institution - Medical 
.283 4 . .937 4 .637 
Cumulative Time 
Aggregated 
Licenses and 
Options Executed 
from 1991 to 1999 
  
  
Universities .161 37 .017 .878 37 .001 
Medical Research 
Centers 
.195 3 . .996 3 .882 
Teaching and Research 
Hospitals 
.260 2 .       
Special Focus 
Institution - Medical 
.246 4 . .873 4 .308 
Cumulative Time 
Aggregated Start-
Ups from 1995 to 
2007 
  
  
  
Universities .211 37 .000 .679 37 .000 
Medical Research 
Centers 
.182 3 . .999 3 .935 
Teaching and Research 
Hospitals 
.260 2 .       
Special Focus 
Institution - Medical 
.302 4 . .923 4 .554 
Cumulative Time-
Aggregated 
Licensing Income 
from 1996 to 2004 
  
  
  
Universities .241 37 .000 .691 37 .000 
Medical Research 
Centers 
.375 3 . .775 3 .057 
Teaching and Research 
Hospitals 
.260 2 .       
Special Focus 
Institution - Medical 
.348 4 . .841 4 .198 
a  Lilliefors Significance Correction 
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16Appendix G. Normality Test of Cumulative Time-Lag Effect Neutralized Licensing 
Data by Two Institution Types 
  Universities Kolmogorov-Smirnov(a) Shapiro-Wilk 
    Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Cumulative Time 
Aggregated 
Expenditure from 1991 
to 1999 
Non-
university 
.194 9 .200(*) .885 9 .176 
  University .229 37 .000 .739 37 .000 
Cumulative Time 
Aggregated Disclosure 
from 1991 to 1999 
Non-
university .219 9 .200(*) .894 9 .219 
  University 
.185 37 .003 .779 37 .000 
Cumulative Time 
Aggregated Patents 
Filed from 1991 to 
1999 
Non-
university 
.240 9 .142 .739 9 .004 
  University .211 37 .000 .717 37 .000 
Cumulative Time 
Aggregated Patents 
Issued from 1992 to 
2004 
Non-
university 
.194 9 .200(*) .900 9 .254 
  University .227 37 .000 .700 37 .000 
Cumulative Time 
Aggregated Licenses 
and Options Executed 
from 1991 to 1999 
Non-
university 
.288 9 .030 .858 9 .091 
  University .161 37 .017 .878 37 .001 
Cumulative Time 
Aggregated Start-Ups 
from 1995 to 2007 
Non-
university .164 9 .200(*) .916 9 .362 
  University .211 37 .000 .679 37 .000 
Cumulative Time-
Aggregated Licensing 
Income from 1996 to 
2004 
Non-
university 
.331 9 .005 .668 9 .001 
  University .241 37 .000 .691 37 .000 
*  This is a lower bound of the true significance. 
a  Lilliefors Significance Correction 
 
